THE (IN)COMPATIBILITY BETWEEN THE RIGHT TO LIFE AND THE RIGHT TO ANTICIPATE DEATH UNDER THE PERSPECTIVES OF RONALD DWORKIN AND PETER SINGER

Abstract

This article intends to promote a reflection regarding the (im)possibility to accept medical practices of death antecipation in the Brazilian legal system. Our objective is to analyze the coherence of the thesis that the constitutional right to life would make it impossible to recognize a right to the anticipation of death. To this end, an eminently bibliographic methodology was used, with deductive and dialectical approach methods and having the comparative method of procedure, in order to analyze the different arguments related to the research theme on the philosophical theories of Ronald Dworkin and Peter Singer. Upon the study of Dworkin's Legal Integralism and Singer's Personalism, we intend to expose their conclusions to the possibility of recognizing the right to the anticipation of death. According to the philosophers studied, the right to the anticipation of death is not opposed to the right to life, which is why we can conclude that a hypothetical modification in the Brazilian legislation that allowed the practice of anticipating of death could not be considered unconstitutional.