MAKING BELIEVE THAT THERE IS NO VULCANO
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5216/phi.v20i2.37530Keywords:
singular negative existentials, make-believe theories, the problem of semantic motivation.Abstract
My goal in this paper is to present and analyze some versions of make-believe theories for singular negative existentials. I will quickly present Evans’ perspective and, in greater detail, the perspectives of Kroon and Walton. I will claim that neither Evans nor Walton provide the right account of the phenomenon of singular negative existentials, and that Kroon’s perspective is better than both. However, I will argue that the three theories have the same problem, which I call the problem of semantic motivation.Downloads
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