Intersubjetividade e o fantasma do solipsismo

Sartre em debate com Husserl, Hegel e Heidegger

Abstract

The essay's theme is the problem of intersubjectivity as addressed by phenomenology. It primarily addresses how the French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre deals with this issue, seeking to overcome the risk of solipsism. Limiting our text to the context of Being and Nothingness, we seek to thematically reconstruct Sartre's positions, indicating how much they derive from the interpretation of thinkers whom the French philosopher recognizes as having contributed to his understanding of the fundamental connection between consciousnesses and their own self-determination. Thus, the text begins with Sartre's interpretation of how Husserl would consider intersubjectivity in light of his transcendental phenomenology; it moves on to the French author's reading of the dialectic between self-consciousnesses according to Hegel; finally, it presents how Heidegger is interpreted in his phenomenological ontology by proposing the existential “being-with” as a structure indicative of the possibility of coexistence with others. The paper also presents Sartre's criticisms of each of these interlocutors, criticisms that start from the evidence that any phenomenological consideration regarding the theme of intersubjectivity (and with the purpose of refuting solipsism), must aim at an essential capture of the other in the key of consciousness-consciousness and not in the cognitive record of objective data.