The intermediation between the certain and the probable in Sartre's antipsychological psychology

Abstract

Sartre's critique of Husserl's idealism is related, in the most general scope of the author's work, to a philosophy that, taking freedom as the unavoidable ontological foundation of human-reality, cannot depart from a world lived in concrete situations. . However, starting from Sartre's critique of Husserl's idealism, we place ourselves in a much more limited scope, that of phenomenological psychology. Sartre cannot dissolve the reality of the world into idealism because that would also eliminate the possibility of elaborating a phenomenological psychology. And it is not just mundane situations that cannot be eliminated, but also the reality of the body. The body, in this conception, works as an intermediary between two fields that cannot be confused: the phenomenological foundations (the certain) and the psychological facts (the probable). With this strategy, Sartre elaborates something outlined by Husserl himself, that is, a psychology of phenomenological foundations.