MODELS AND THE DYNAMICS OF THEORIES
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5216/phi.v9i2.3043Abstract
Abstract: This paper gives a historical overview of the ways various trends in the philosophy of science dealt with models and their relationship with the topics of heuristics and theoretical dynamics. First of all, N. Campbell’s account of analogies as components of scientific theories is presented. Next, the notion of ‘model’ in the reconstruction of the structure of scientific theories proposed by logical empiricists is examined. This overview finishes with M. Hesse’s attempts to develop Campbell’s early ideas in terms of an analogical inference. The final part of the paper points to contemporary developments on these issues which adopt a cognitivist perspective. It is indicated how discussions in the cognitive sciences might help to flesh out some of the insights philosophers of science had concerning the role models and analogies play in actual scientific theorizing. Key words: models, analogical reasoning, metaphors in science, the structure of scientific theories, theoretical dynamics, heuristics, scientific discovery.Downloads
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