NIETZSCHE AND RIBOT: MULTIPLICITY AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE SUBJECTIVITY
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5216/phi.v18i2.25073Keywords:
Nietzsche, Psychophysiology, Ribot, SubjectAbstract
The critiques against the concept of subject or the philosophy of subjectivity are very clear in the writings of Nietzsche. Despite these critiques, we can ask whether they result in overcoming the notion of subject or in a simple change of this conception, with the conservation of the general assumptions of a philosophy of subjectivity. In this article, which focuses on the aspect of multiplicity, we investigated whether the rejection of the unity of the subject is sufficient to reject also the philosophy of subjectivity. We also showed that the Nietzschean critiques against the subject are very close to the criticism presented by the French philosopher and psychologist Théodule Ribot at his effort to the formation of an experimental psychology, without metaphysics.Downloads
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