HABERMAS AND THE QUESTION OF THE COGNITIVE VALIDITY OF MORAL AND THEORETICAL STATEMENTS

Authors

  • Antonio Saturnino Braga UERJ

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5216/phi.v14i1.9121

Keywords:

Discursive theory of truth, moral cognitivism, moral realism.

Abstract

A cognitivist and discursive ethics must distinguish itself from two other metaethical positions: on one side, a cognitivist but non-discursive ethics; on the other side, a noncognitivist but communicative, argumentative and procedural ethics. The aim of the present work is to use Habermas’ reflections on the topic of truth to develop an ideal-typical scheme which could be helpful in explaining those distinctions. This scheme will contain three typical conceptions about the truth of theoretical statements: realist-intuitionist conception, objectivist-semantic conception and discursive-consensual conception. The distinctiveness of the cognitive-discursive ethics will then be explained by relating the cognitivist but non-discursive ethics and the noncognitivist but procedural ethics to their respective conceptions of truth: the realist-intuitionist conception and the objectivist-semantic conception.

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Author Biography

Antonio Saturnino Braga, UERJ

Professor Adjunto da FACC-UFRJ e Professor Colaborador do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia da UERJ, na área de Ética e Filosofia Política.

Published

2010-08-19

How to Cite

BRAGA, A. S. HABERMAS AND THE QUESTION OF THE COGNITIVE VALIDITY OF MORAL AND THEORETICAL STATEMENTS. Philósophos a journal of philosophy, Goiânia, v. 14, n. 1, p. 11–44, 2010. DOI: 10.5216/phi.v14i1.9121. Disponível em: https://revistas.ufg.br/philosophos/article/view/9121. Acesso em: 3 jul. 2024.

Issue

Section

Artigos Originais