Realismo vs. Instrumentalismo em Análise do Comportamento

esboço em prol de uma axiologia realista

Abstract

This article delves into the ongoing debate between realism and instrumentalism regarding scientific theories, placing a particular emphasis on the debate unfolding within the context of Behavior Analysis (BA). Realist axiologies are characterized by two key tenets: (i) scientific theories should aim to identify and describe the extra-theoretical processes, entities, properties, and/or relations within their study domains; and (ii) we are justified in deeming them successful in this endeavor when they are (highly) empirically adequate (or mature). Instrumentalist (or antirealist) axiologies, on the other hand, reject (ii), and in some cases, also (i). In the context of metatheoretical debates within BA, both from its predominant research matrix (radical behaviorism) and from some of its alternative foundational proposals (such as molar behaviorism), forms of instrumentalism are notably prevalent. This work presents a logical-conceptual reconstruction and examination of the recent debate in BA, scrutinizing common instrumentalist arguments within this context and outlining the defense of a nuanced form of realism, close to the proposal put forward by F. Suppe.