The Concept of Matter and the Mind-Body Problem in Bergson's Philosophy

Abstract

The aim of this essay is to examine Henri Bergson's contribution to the understanding of the philosophical meaning of Modern Physics. The approach I intend to address here aligns with that interviewed by Prof. Milič Čapek in trying to think of the insertion of Bergsonian philosophy with modern physics above all from the concept of matter. The underlying hypothesis here is that to be able to refine the contraposition between psychological duration and physical time that pervades the reception of Duration & Simultaneity, an understanding of the Bergsonian theory of matter or, more precisely, of the relationship between matter and soul is indispensable. To this end, it is suggested here that such an understanding requires both situating Bergson's conception of matter concerning modern physics and deepening his distinction between two types of "extension" (on the one hand, the "l'étendue"; on the other, the "l'extension"). In this sense, even if preliminarily and indirectly, it is here sought to point out the prolegomena for a debate with modern physics, especially the theory of relativity, which Bergson indicates, but which he did not do, in this case, the one that refers to the notion of space.