FROM <em>APÁTÊ</em> TO <em>PSEÛDÊS</em>. OR: HOW <em>MÊTIS</em> TURNS OUT TO BE A PROBLEM ON MORAL PHILOSOPHY

Abstract

In this article, we discuss the question about how the practices of deceiving become a matter of discussion on moral philosophy and how they could be thought beyond the sieve of this conviction. As we intend to defend, an answer to this question should refer to the Greek thought, particularly, the Platonic thought in dialogues: Hippias minor and The republic, taking as horizon the problem of the disambiguation of Alêtheia, and the exclusion, by philosophical thought, of the forms of clever and astute intelligence that the Greeks named in honor to the goddess Mêntis. On the other hand, should also imply a distinction of perspectives inherent to what we call by deceiving, which put on opposite sides of the deceiver and the deceived, according to the acknowledgement, or not, of the deceiving. Under this bias, we argue that, for the Greeks, the problem wouldn't be mainly the mistake itself – although platonic thought points that – but being deceived, and mainly, self-deceived.