DEFINING TOPICS IN ARISTOTLE’S <em>TOPICS</em> VI

Abstract

I argue that Topics VI does not contain any serious theory about definitions (to be used by the scientist and the metaphysician at their most important tasks), but only a collection of advices for formulating definitions in a dialectical context, namely, definitions aiming to catch what the opponent means. Topics VI is full of inconsistencies that can be explained away by this approach: the inconsistencies reflect "acceptable opinions about definitions" that distinct groups of interlocutors accept. I also argue (as a way to prove my point) that the "topoi" need not be pieces of serious theory Aristotle is commited to. The "topoi" (i.e., the argumentative proto-schemata that Aristotle presentes as inference licenses) must also be considered as "endoxa", namely, as accepted opinions about how it is legitimate to draw an inference.