LOGICAL FORM OF SCIENTIFIC PROPOSITIONS AND ONTOLOGY OF PREDICATION: A FALSE DILEMMA IN ARISTOTLE’SPOSTERIOR ANALYTICS

Abstract

In the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle imposes some requirements on the formulation of scientific propositions: (i) their terms must be able to perform the role of subject as well as of predicate; (ii) their terms should be universal; (iii) every demonstration must involve “primary” subjects denoted by terms that “cannot be said of another underlying subject”. Several interpreters, inspired by theses from the Categories, believed that this third requirement refers to names and descriptions of particular substances as basic subjects of predicative statements, since they cannot perform the logical role of predicate. However, such reading puts the third requirement in conflict with the other two. I shall argue that this interpretation is wrong and that the third requirement does not assign to singular terms the function of basic subjects of scientific discourse, but rather acknowledges that substantial predicates have a certain prerogative to occur in denoting phrases. Consequently, Aristotle’s three demands turn out to be compatible with one another.