THE PROBLEM OF THE TRANSCENDENCE OF PERCEPTUAL OBJECT AND THE PHYSICAL OBJECT IN HUSSERL’S LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5216/phi.v19i1.30410Keywords:
Edmund Husserl, phenomenology, immanence, transcendenceAbstract
It is well known that in the first edition of Logical Investigations (1900/1901), Husserl defines the research field of phenomenology as a psychological immanence. However, if we closely examine the criteria used for defining the psychological immanence, we find that they imply certain conception of transcendence of the intentional object. This conception of transcendence leads to epistemological problems concerning the relationship between the physical object and the object of perception. After all, it would be correct to say that the physical object is transcendent in the same sense which it is stated that the perceived object is transcendent to the experience of perceiving? This article seeks to show how the transcendental turn of 1906/1907 and the consequent distinction between three concepts of immanence and transcendence in his work Idea of Phenomenology contributed to solving such problems.
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