THE END OF WITTGENSTEIN'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL PERIOD - A TEMPORAL PERSPECTIVE

Authors

  • Guilherme Ghisoni da Silva Universidade Federal de Goiás

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5216/phi.v18i2.26423

Keywords:

memory, source, identity, phenomenon

Abstract

First I will explore the importance granted by Wittgenstein, in the middle period, to memory, in the primary/phenomenological world. According to him, memory is the source of time, past, knowledge and identity. The main objective of this article is to present Wittgenstein's reasons for the rejection of the phenomenological project, using as backdrop his analysis about time (and the abandonment of the semantical and epistemological roles granted to memory). For this purpose it will be crucial to understand a false analogy, that according to him was the cause for the quest for an ideal language. This false analogy can be interpreted as the attribution of a mistaken status to memory (in the phenomenological sense), that leads to the illusion of a criteria of exactitude for the phenomenological description. At the end of this article, I will point out briefly the importance of those ideas to the understanding of the so called "private language argument".

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Author Biography

Guilherme Ghisoni da Silva, Universidade Federal de Goiás

Possui graduação em Filosofia pela Universidade Federal do Paraná (2004), mestrado em Filosofia pela Universidade Federal do Paraná (2006) e doutorado pela Universidade Federal de São Carlos (2011). Tem experiência na área de Filosofia, com ênfase em Filosofia, atuando principalmente nos seguintes temas: Wittgenstein, fenomenologia, tempo, linguagem privada

Published

2014-02-17

How to Cite

DA SILVA, G. G. THE END OF WITTGENSTEIN’S PHENOMENOLOGICAL PERIOD - A TEMPORAL PERSPECTIVE. Philósophos a journal of philosophy, Goiânia, v. 18, n. 2, p. 11–41, 2014. DOI: 10.5216/phi.v18i2.26423. Disponível em: https://revistas.ufg.br/philosophos/article/view/26423. Acesso em: 21 nov. 2024.