SHADOW OF A DOUBT: REFLEXIVITY AND EPISTEMIC CLOSURE

Authors

  • Paulo Faria

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5216/phi.v14i2.11262

Keywords:

Skepticism, Epistemic Principles, Closure, Rationality, Reflexivity, Moore’s Paradox.

Abstract

The paper discusses the relations between two putative epistemic principles, Reflexivity and Closure, with a view to assess whether the repudiation of the former, usually required by externalistic accounts of knowledge, necessitates the repudiation, as well, of the latter. A negative reply to that question is offered, which prompts the hypothesis that alleged counterexamples to Closure are artifacts of the rather peculiar conditions on which, in the course of a particular kind of epistemological inquiry, are introduced assumptions such as are characteristic of the methodological use of so-called skeptical “doubts”.

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Author Biography

Paulo Faria

Holds a Ph.d. in philosophy from Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (1994). Was visiting researcher at the University of New York (1995), Rutgers University (1995-1996) and at the Institut Jean Nicod (2005-2006). He is currently an adjunct professor at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul and Vice President (2010-2012) of the Association Latinoamericana de analytic philosophy (ALFAn). His areas of expertise are the metafíisca and epistemology, the philosophies of logic and language, and the history of analytic philosophy.

Published

2010-09-03

How to Cite

FARIA, P. SHADOW OF A DOUBT: REFLEXIVITY AND EPISTEMIC CLOSURE. Philósophos a journal of philosophy, Goiânia, v. 14, n. 2, p. 63–113, 2010. DOI: 10.5216/phi.v14i2.11262. Disponível em: https://revistas.ufg.br/philosophos/article/view/11262. Acesso em: 27 jul. 2024.

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Section

Artigos Originais