Collective beliefs and the nature of scientific knowledge

Abstract

The aim of this article is to understand the relationship between collective beliefs and science. The article brings together Margaret Gilbert’s non-summative conception of collective beliefs and Thomas Kuhn’s notion of disciplinary matrix. Gilbert argues that members of a scientific community can collectively accept certain beliefs that they do not hold individually. This occurs due to the joint commitments assumed by group members, which make scientific communities resistant to change. This phenomenon aligns with Kuhn’s description of normal science, in which members of a scientific community adhere to a disciplinary matrix composed of symbolic generalizations, metaphysical assumptions, values, and exemplary cases. These elements can be considered collective beliefs that constrain researchers’ critical attitudes, reducing their work to puzzle-solving. However, Kuhn also asserts that the disciplinary matrix, although inherently conservative, is fundamental to the development of science, as it itself fosters the emergence of anomalies that can stimulate scientific revolutions.