Inferential limits of Machine’s Intelligence

Can Kant teach us anything about the content of A.I. judgments?

Autores

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5216/phi.v29i1.78657

Palavras-chave:

Inferentialism, artificial intelligence, synthetic unity of apperception, Dummett, Kant.

Resumo

We argue that a framework for comprehending the basic differences between the mental structures of humans and machines (as they currently exist) is established by Transcendental Analytics' argument in the Critique of Pure Reason. It will be demonstrated that Kant's theory of the synthetic unity of apperception, as established by Transcendental Analytics' argument in the Critique of Pure Reason, along with Dummett's theory of meaning for meaning-theoretical predictions of inferential connections, can assist in establishing this framework. When combined, these form a framework for organizing a coherent differentiation between what we refer to as the conscious grasp of the unity that is present during judgment and the machine-performed manipulation of signs. In the end, we will present an appendix on the underdevelopment of the Kantian framework for distinguishing artificial intelligence from human intelligence.

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Publicado

30-06-2024

Como Citar

VOLLET, L. Inferential limits of Machine’s Intelligence: Can Kant teach us anything about the content of A.I. judgments?. Philósophos - Revista de Filosofia, Goiânia, v. 29, n. 1, 2024. DOI: 10.5216/phi.v29i1.78657. Disponível em: https://revistas.ufg.br/philosophos/article/view/78657. Acesso em: 13 jul. 2024.