A R T I C L E

Pereira & Araujo's *"Updatism"* BETWEEN THE METAPHYSICS OF THE HISTORICAL TIME AND THE REGIME OF HISTORICITY

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"Updatism" or "updatist historicity" is a concept that has become part of the recent theory of history. This concept unfolds into two stages. First, it presents a historical-transcendental scope since it involves conditions of possibility according to which time can be historically experienced. Secondly, it is a heuristic-historiographical tool, insofar as it allows gathering and analyzing the updatist historical experiences under a steady focus. Therefore, it is possible to observe that the Heideggerian transcendental safeguard to which Pereira and Araujo appeal is a way of preserving the heuristic function of the concept, preventing it from being confused with the reality under its extension. Consequently, it is discussed Pereira and Araujo's critique regarding Hartog's "presentism" as a heuristic-historiographical concept, however, it is noted that this critique cannot be extended to Gumbrecht's "broad present".

ARTIGO

O *"Atualismo" de Pereira & Araujo* ENTRE A METAFÍSICA DO TEMPO HISTÓRICO E O REGIME DE HISTORICIDADE

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"Atualismo" ou "historicidade atualista" é um conceito que se tornou parte da teoria da história recente. Tal conceito desenvolve-se em duas etapas. Em primeiro lugar, ele apresenta caráter histórico-transcendental, no sentido de que envolve condições de possibilidade segundo as quais o tempo pode ser historicamente experienciado na contemporaneidade. Em segundo lugar, ele é uma ferramenta heurístico-historiográfica, no sentido de que permite reunir e analisar sob um foco conceitual bem determinado experiências históricas atualistas. Assim sendo, é possível observar que a salvaguarda transcendental heideggeriana à qual recorrem Pereira e Araujo é uma forma de preservar a função heurística do conceito, impedindo que ele se confunda com a realidade sob sua extensão. Em consequência, a crítica de Pereira e Araujo com relação ao "presentismo" de Hartog como conceito heurístico-historiográfico é discutida, no entanto, ressalva-se que essa crítica não pode ser estendida ao "presente amplo" de Gumbrecht.

Atualismo—história—metafísica do tempo—regimes de historicidade

THE DOUBLE FACE OF THE CONCEPT OF UPDATISM

Updatism is a concept that designates the contemporary historical experience that replaced the modern experience of time. In contrast to modern temporality, which focused both on the future and progress, updatism characterizes a historical experience marked by the immersion in widespread economic, social, behavioral, and digital systems whose effects are time dispersion and dissociation in instant presents, as defined by Pereira and Araujo (2019, 46). In updatism, the present determines the relationship between the past and the future, so the "the real is confused with the present experienced as an empty and self-centered present"[1] (Pereira and Araujo 2021, 3) [2]. Therefore, as stated by the authors, the "temporalization of time" (Pereira and Araujo 2019, 46)[3] occurs as though past and future become coadjutants of the present, insofar as they become sources of novelty, such as the memory that ends itself in the consumption of the relived pasts, or as the novelty with which the promise of future entertains the present. Past and future are co-opted as modes of updating the present, losing their own dimensions as they are diluted in the instantaneity of a present without horizons.

This generic description of updatism puts it closer to concepts that also have the present as a central dimension of contemporary historical experience, particularly Hartog's "presentism," and Gumbrecht's "broad present." The updatism, however, is not exactly in line with the concepts mentioned previously, although updatism itself is an experience of time that renounces the modernity by the mid-twentieth century. In order to establish the difference from their conceptual counterparts, Pereira and Araujo begin by assimilating both Hartogian and Gumbrechtian propositions, as "Gumbrecht and Hartog agree in the description of what the former calls 'broad present' and the latter 'presentism'" (Pereira and Araujo 2017, 13).[4] In this way, the alleged dissension between updatism and presentism/broad present demands from the authors, as will be discussed in more details later, a deeper dive into the notion of historical time, insofar as all historical experience involves the relationship between past, present, and future.

For Pereira and Araujo, presentism and broad present conceives a historical time without the future (and without the past) and is based on a flawed conception of the present entitled "one-dimensional present"[5] (Pereira and Araujo 2016, 270-297). Therefore, they point out the mistake that those concepts made: "how can a historical time be deprived of the future?" (Pereira and Araujo 2016, 279). [6] Due to this flaw, presentism and broad present need a conceptual restoration, since "any form of present will contain in itself specific forms of past and future" (Pereira and Araujo 2017, 14).[7] With this in mind, Pereira and Araujo request a philosophical safeguard, since presentism and broad present eventually justify "the lack of theoretical and empirical foundations of some

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[1] All translations from Pereira and Araujo presented in this article were made by me.

[2] *"o real se confunde com a atualidade experimentada como um presente vazio e autocentrado"*

[3] *"temporalization of time"*

[4] *"Gumbrecht e Hartog coincidem na descrição do que o primeiro chama de 'presente amplo', e o último, 'presentismo'"*

[5] *"presente unidimensional"*

[6] *"como pode um tempo histórico ser privado do futuro?"*

[7] *"qualquer forma de presente conterá em si mesmas formas específicas de passado e futuro"*

arguments and conclusions" (Pereira and Araujo 2016, 278).[8] In effect, the concept of updatism, because it is not congruent with its counterparts, requires a conceptual reformulation that would restore to the relationship between past, present and future the ontological complexity of the relationship between the dimensions of time that would be absent in presentism and in the broad present. Therefore, in order to give updatism an ontological basis, Pereira and Araujo believe that the historical experience of updatism is better characterized within the conceptual framework of Heidegger's *Being and Time*.

Consequently, the concept of updatism must face two sides at once. It is a heuristic concept that contains characteristics of a new experience of historical time or updatist historicity regime. At the same time, it is a transcendental concept that deals with the conditions in which the updatist historicity regime becomes possible. For that reason, Pereira and Araujo propose a metaphysics of time drawn from Heidegger. However, the criticism that updatism directs at presentism and the broad present, which weakens the historical-transcendental dimensions of the concept, has different incidences since they are not assimilable concepts, as assumed by Pereira and Araujo.

Before approaching this central aspect, it is important, in order to set a pattern in the terminology used in this article, to define the main areas of temporal studies among them which the concept of updatism develops its double reach in the recent theory of history.

Scopes of temporal studies in Theory of History

Different sciences, such as the humanities, the natural sciences and the arts, for example, develop epistemological reflections regarding time or the temporality of their objects of study. Therefore, it is understood that all study fields "dedicate themselves to time studies" (Burges and Elias 2016, 2). In order to illustrate and qualify the scopes covered in this article, a diagram illustrating the domains of temporal studies in theory and philosophy of history is presented:

1. **Metaphysics of natural time**
   (a) Natural time
2. **Metaphysics of historical time**
   (b) Historical time
3. **"Regimes of historicity"**
   (c) Experience of historical time
4. **"Historiographical regimes"**
   (d) time in historical writing

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[8] *"a falta de fundamentação teórica e empírica de alguns argumentos e conclusões"*

The *metaphysics of natural time* (1) is a branch of the "philosophy of time that asks questions about the nature of temporal reality" (Deng 2018). Its development confirms "the importance of time in contemporary debates in metaphysics" (Oaklander 2014, 14). In this regard, metaphysicians of time are primarily interested in physicists' time, that is, clock time or the natural order of time. As the term *metaphysics* is semantically and philosophically inflated, in this article a simplified definition is adopted. Indeed, as Whitehead states in 1929, "the elucidation of the meaning involved in the sentence 'all things flow' is one chief task of metaphysics" (Whitehead 1978, 208). In other words, a metaphysics which is intrinsic to the questioning about the nature of time is presented since it refers to existence *in general* (De Carvalho 2021). An important trend of the metaphysics of natural time states that "theories formulated in Biology (Post-Human) and Geosciences (Anthropocene) project a conception of historical time from these fields" (Lopes and Viana Junior 2020, 22). Regarding the temporal reflection developed by the recent theory of history, a dialogue between natural and theorists of history about historical time is progress concerning the way historians have incorporated the views on history produced by the natural sciences. For these reasons, metaphysics of natural time cannot be excluded from the theory of history.

The *metaphysics of historical time* (2) is located between lines a and b. It meets natural time at the top, and experiences of historical time at the bottom. The metaphysics of historical time does not fail to meet the Whiteheadian definition of metaphysics, as it also relates reflection about time to existence in general. However, it has a specific character, as it is the reflection that theorists of history carry out within the landscape of temporal studies about human time. Indeed, the metaphysics of time within the disciplinary framework of recent history was called the "new metaphysics of time" by Kleinberg:

> what strikes us as most interesting about this trend is the way that some of these theorists have sought to move beyond the emphasis on language and representation not by returning to a crude variant of objectivism or empiricism but by re-examining our relationship to the past and the past's very nature and by attempting to construct a *new metaphysics of time*. (Kleinberg 2012, 1)

According to the previous definition, the new metaphysics of time seeks to re-examine "our relationship with the past and the very nature of the past"; therefore, it is in line with a recent movement in theory and philosophy of history that seeks to "go beyond the emphasis on language and representation". In this sense, this article adopts the expression "metaphysics of historical time", as it presupposes a paradigmatic shift that goes beyond narrativism. At the same, although it turns to the nature of historical time, the metaphysics of historical time does not fall into the aporias of historical realism, which asserts the existence of a past independent from the mental frameworks employed by the historian.

Thus, the metaphysics of historical time in this new perspective focuses on a reflection of a meta-historical character, in view of Koselleck's definition: "These conditions—the reasons why something happened in this and not some other way—have first to be defined theoretically and metahistorically, then be practiced methodologically; however, they belong as much to real history as do the unique surprises giving rise to specific, concrete histories" (Koselleck 2002, 75). The metahistorical categories regulate the conditions of the possibilities for the historical time to be experienced.

In contrast, Hartog defines the regime of historicity as "a way of expressing and organizing experiences of time—that is, ways of articulating the past, the present, and the future—and investing them with sense." (Hartog 2015, 106). The *regimes of historicity* (3), located between lines b and c, constitute the field of temporal studies that deals with the collective and individual historical experience according to the dimension of time – the past, the present, or the future – predominates over the others. A regime of historicity whose experience of time is centered on the present, for instance, is called "presentism", whereas if it is centered on the future, it is called modern time or modernity.

Considering what was stated above, the following question arises: What is the relationship between the regimes of historicity defined as metaphysics of time, since areas (2) and (3) are contiguous in the presented diagram?

According to the Koselleckian theory, there is not "one historical time, but rather […] many forms of time superimposed one upon the other" (Koselleck 2004, 2). Thus, time is organized into "sediments or layers of time' […] that differ in age and depth and that changed and set themselves apart from each other at differing speeds over the course of the so-called history of the earth." (Koselleck 2018, 3). The superimposition of multiple temporalities is a concept of the metaphysics of historical time. It sets the conditions for the historical time to be experienced, but it does not refer to a particular regime of historicity. Any regime of historicity, despite different temporal constructions, fulfills the same conditions of possibility, that is, the temporal acceleration determined by technology over the perception of historical experience distances, throughout history, space of experience and horizon of expectation (Koselleck 2002, 113-114).

In turn, the relationship between a regime of historicity, and historiographical and historical writing practices determines *historiographical regimes* (4), which occupy the area between lines c and d of the proposed diagram. Mudrovcic defines a historiographical regime as being within the scope of "historiography [which is] understood as a social practice based on the representation of time, [which] reflects the historical regime of which it is part." (Mudrovic 2013, 11). The major theoretical and historiographical problem concerns the relationship between representations of time in history books (4) and the current historicity regime (3). Thus, for example, if the representation of time in historiography uncritically submits itself to the current regime of historicity, the representation of time that a historian performs might deforms the vision of the past.

For example, Turin hypothesized that the global economy, in the present, projects an acceleration of time that tends to overlap the temporal dynamics of the past, as it promotes the "neoliberal regime of historicity" (Turin 2019a, 252-253) that makes presentism articulate as a hegemonic historical experience. Presentism, however, without the historical strenght of neoliberalism, according to the same author, stems from a "problematic heuristic statement that makes the regime of historicity transhistorical" (Turin 2019b, 30). Therefore, the schemes of the presentist historical experience are not only vague in relation to an ontological commitment to history, but also lack historiographical specification. The presentist historical experience does not indicate synchrony, but asynchrony between temporal layers, so that it performs temporal phenomena that need to be represented by "distinct historiographical regimes (or discursive genera)"[9] (Turin 2016, 597).

According to the definitions and examples related to the temporal studies in the theory of history, in this article updatism will be approached according to layers (2) and (3) of the diagram shown previously. Indeed, Pereira and Araujo's updatism can be qualified as metaphysics of historical time as it approaches the conditions of possibility of contemporary experience of time and, at the same time, as a regime of historicity includes a specific historical-temporal experience. Furthermore, the concept of updatism, insofar as it seeks to bring together existing historical situations in a historical writing that contains a narratively consistent representation of time, is careful not to treat the regime of historicity in which the historian is embedded as a transhistorical category. Finally, updatism is a concept that makes the dialogue between historians and theorists of history in relation to the metaphysics of natural time possible, inasmuch it is situated beyond the "strict separation between natural and historical time was broken" (Pereira and Araujo, 2016, 273).[10]

Hence, we can deepen the question of the metaphysics of time that the concept of updatism contains and projects.

METAPHYSICS OF HISTORICAL TIME
Heidegger, inauthentic time and historical presence

Updatism is committed, as Pereira and Araujo state, to a Heideggerian idea of time. In fact, this concept draws from the metaphysics of historical developed in *Being and Time* its core, since, according to Heidegger, it is possible to define an authentic temporality and, at the same time, an inauthentic temporality.

In order to include updatism in the Heideggerian metaphysics of historical time, the authors make a careful incursion into the fourth chapter of the second section of *Being and Time*, which is dedicated to the characterization of the temporality of the "opening"[11] (Pereira e Araujo 2017, 12-13; see also Pereira e Araujo 2020, 1-2) where the "ontic-ontological" schemes of temporality are developed. The *opening* is defined by the temporality of "care", a fundamental structure of the human being, according to Heidegger. Pereira and Araujo's focus in this passage of *Being and Time* to understand how the

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[9] *"regimes historiográficos (ou gêneros discursivos) distintos"*
[10] *"separação estrita entre tempo natural e tempo histórico foi rompida"*
[11] *"Abertura"*

relationship between present, past, and future takes place, since the three dimensions appear "always gathered in specific arrangements (static horizon), both in 'authentic-proper' and 'inauthentic-improper' modes (Pereira and Araujo 2017, 14).[12]

Time, for Heidegger, is authentically *temporalized* in terms of a relationship between past, present, and future, that is under the future's command. The past only regains the strength of having been if the future activates it, so that, consequently, the present becomes meaningful. Therefore, it is the future that *temporalizes* time as the authentic temporality. If time is not temporalized in terms of the future, the present falls into the unauthentic temporality which drowns the human beings in the time of the clock and of things, reducing temporal change to the dimensionless flow of the present-past-future. The inauthentic experience of time is always included in authentic temporality or can lead to it. Indeed, when the temporal arrangement of the relationship between past, present and future falls into the unauthentic mode of time, it does not mean that temporality ceases to be human, since the human's temporal experience loses its own or authentic dimension, and that humans live historical time in a limited way.

From the time of the opening, which holds future as its fundamental dimension, the "ontic-temporal schemes" of temporality, the authors specifies the "temporality of understanding centered on the future and particularly associated with the authenticity and temporality of decadence, focused on the present and exemplary for the understanding of 'improper' ways" (Pereira and Araujo 2016, 281).

The temporality of "understanding" characterizes the relationship between past, present, and future, temporalized from the future. On the one hand, this temporality has an inappropriate way of situating the future, since the latter is profession. Thus, the present is seen as a mere "update". On the other hand, the temporality anticipated by the human being due to daily tasks of existence, for example, being a teacher makes the individuals entertain themselves in a series of "waits" characteristic of the teaching activity (prepare, teach classes, apply examinations, etc.). In this case, the present is temporalized by the inappropriateness of the future, as the teacher is trapped in the "now" of the tasks required by the daily demands of their profession. On the other hand, the temporality of understanding is authentic when the future is not tied to the present of the "nows" and it opens up to the future without the obstacles of everyday life as "anticipation", so that the present is articulated as an "instant".

The past, in turn, also presents authentic and inauthentic modes according to the temporality of understanding. In the inauthentic mode, the past is the oblivion of the "fall" in which the perspective of the existential condition of the human being is lost, so that the past becomes only data to be remembered, a present that has died. The authentic past, in the mode of understanding, is the repetition or replica of the "vigor of having been", a past that pushes towards the future. In this way, the past ceases to be numb.

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[12] *"sempre reunidas em arranjos específicos (horizonte estático), tanto em modo 'autêntico-próprio' quanto 'inautêntico-impróprio'"*

Starting from the present, the temporality of "decadence" characterizes the relationship between past, present, and future. The mode of the improper present, in "decadence", is "actuality", which boils down to the expectation to see and to be seen. In the actuality of the present, temporality is diluted in dispersion, as the future loses the authentic dimension of "anticipation" and is seen only as the horizon in which the needs dictated by the present are within the reach of the present. In the same way, the "vigor of having been" of the past is a mere object of remembrance for updatism, in a way that the past leaves the present immobilized, without any impulse towards the future. The paradox of the inappropriate temporality is that, although the future and the past always present novelties, they do not fill the present, since "'our present' is updated (almost) exclusively in terms of the present itself" (Pereira and Araujo 2016, 284). [13]

From the previous exposition of the "understanding" and "decadence" temporalities by Pereira and Araujo, the concept of updatism draws two components of improper temporality. Respectively, the first one concerns "the actuality [Gegenwartigen]", in the present, of an improper future and the "actuality [Gegenwart]" of the improper present (Pereira and Araujo 2017, 23). According to Pereira and Araujo, the inauthentic ways of temporalizing the time, "will have a special importance when we think about what we are calling 'updatism'" (Pereira and Araujo 2016, 283). [14]

Provided that "Much of the literature on historicity has dealt with the present as a singular dimension" (Pereira and Araujo 2016, 280) [15], the incursion to Heidegger's *Being and Time*, restores the three-dimensionality of temporality that the Hartogian presentism and the Gumbrechtian broad present lack. In effect, contrary to what Hartog and Gumbrecht think, "it is not substantially an expansion of the present, but even an expansion of references to the past and future, but in updatist ways" (Pereira and Araujo 2016, 285). [16]

UPDATISM AND PRESENTISM BETWEEN THE METAPHYSICS OF TIME AND REGIMES OF HISTORICITY

The distinction between the metaphysics of time and the regime of historicity established in the second section of this article differentiates Hartog and Koselleck's undertakings, although these concepts coincide in many aspects. Even though Hartog openly departs from Koselleck's "meta-historical categories" and "semantics of historical time" (Hartog 2015, 9), his approach does not involve a metaphysics of historical time.

Koselleck defines historical time as formal structure composed by "many layers of earlier times simultaneously present, without, however, providing any indication of the before and after." (Koselleck 2004, 260). Hartog, on the other hand, is not interested in the order of historical time as such, because "a regime of historicity has never been a universally applicable metaphysical entity sent from heaven. It expresses only a dominant order of time" (Hartog 2015, 106).

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[13] "'nossa atualidade' se atualiza (quase) exclusivamente em função da própria atualidade"

[14] "terá uma importância especial quando formos pensar o que estamos chamando de 'atualismo'"

[15] "Boa parte da literatura sobre historicidade tem tratado do presente como uma dimensão singular"

[16] "não se trata substancialmente de uma ampliação do presente, mas mesmo da ampliação de referências ao passado e futuro, mas em formas atualistas"

Hartog prefers to speak of regimes of historicity rather than "formal time structures" as Koselleck does (Koselleck 2004, 93) since they deal with historical time in "abstract" (Hartog 2015, xvi). This abstract conception of historical time, according to Hartog, "has the disadvantage of referring to an external standard of time, such as can still be found in Braudel, where the different durées are all measured against an 'exogenous,' mathematical, or astronomical time" (Hartog 2015, xvi).

For Hartog, historical time can only be presented in terms of temporal experiences, since the regime of historicity is a temporary arrangement of the experience of historical time. Its varieties are determined "Depending on whether the category of the past, the future, or the present is dominant, the order of time derived from it will obviously not be the same." (Hartog 2015, xvi), In short, the dominance of one temporal dimension over the others determines historical experience "in its three modes of memory (the presence of the past), attention (the presence of the present), and expectation (the presence of the future)." (Hartog 2015, xvi). These three modes of historical experience can be dated according to the crises that the confrontation between the previous and subsequent experiences of historical time expose: the crisis of the old regime of historicity, centered on the past, with the modern regime, centered on the future, which took place around 1789, and the crises of the modern regime with presentism, from 1989 onwards (Hartog 2015, 104-106).

When Pereira e Araujo launch the concept of updatism, the following critical question is proposed: is the regime of historicity, in general, and the concept of presentism, in particular, sufficient as descriptors of varieties of historical experiences? Such a question directly affects the claim to improve the alleged conceptual gap of presentism in order to correct the "poor sense of what comes to be present inside the temporality game that Hartog builds to conceptualize presentism and historicity regimes." (Pereira and Araujo 2020, 2). The Heideggerian metaphysical dimension previously discussed is able to correct the "poor sense" that Hartog assigns to the historical temporality.

As seen, the Heideggerian metaphysics of time defines the future as the authentic temporalization of time, while the regime of historicity, be it presentism, broad present or updatism, defines inauthentic temporality as centered in the present. Accordingly, it is worth emphasizing that authentic temporality temporalized by the future is *not* a regime of historicity oriented towards the future, but the order of time ontologically defined. This difference can be demonstrated by testing the hypothesis of a future-centered regime of historicity, and thus performing the counterproof of authentic time. In other words, because the regime of historicity is centered on the future, would it be an authentic experience of time, considering the parameters of Heidegger's metaphysics of time?

If, as previously presented, updatism, as presentism, is an inauthentic experience of time oriented by the present as the opposite of an authentic experience temporalized by the future, nothing prevents, correlatively, a historical experience centered on the future, as is the regime of modern historicity, from being an inauthentic experience. There would be, therefore, in the modern regime of historicity, a *futurism*. Thus, not only the present, but also the future and the past can be considered as inauthentic experiences located in different regimes of historicity, considering the authentic temporalization by the future.

Consequently, the Hartogian invective of not committing to the formal structures of historical time, or to the "ontic-temporal schemes", according to Heideggerian jargon, ends up causing presentism to waste the heuristic character of the concept, insofar as it "takes on the function of a substantive description of eras or historical periods" (Pereira and Araujo 2019, 77).[17] It turns out that presentism incurs a substantivation of the concept (Blocker and Haddad 2006; Hannoum 2008), that is, it treats regime of historicity not as an abstraction, but as reality, since "'regime of historicity' and 'presentism' are not realities, but analytical categories, ideal types constructed by the historian" (Pereira and Araujo 2019, 77).[18] Ergo, it was necessary to complement the "shortcomings of the notion of presentism" by resorting to the Heideggerian metaphysics of time (Pereira and Araujo 2019, 81).

In the case of presentism, the delimitation that the metaphysics of time offers to the concept is simple: authentic time temporalized by the future is the condition of possibility for the inauthentic time centered on the present, of the updatist historicity regime, to be experienced. Without the condition of possibility, without a transcendental character, the concept entangles with the reality it names, and its heuristic function ends up taking the place of the historiographical treatment. Thus, if the regime of historicity does not become a "universal applicable metaphysical entity", it also does not become a transhistorical reality.

Indeed, by rejecting the study of the formal structures of historical time, Hartog places historical time and regimes of historicity on the same level in order to avoid committing to metaphysics of time, as well as delimiting the regime of historicity as a heuristic category which focuses on the apprehension of experienced time in its varieties. However, and this is the main lesson to be extracted from Pereira and Araujo's theoretical approaches, when the metaphysical and abstract of historical time dimension is lost, presentism loses its conceptual framework and its heuristic function is compromised, incurring the danger of treating the regime of historicity not as a heuristic category, but as a historical reality.

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[17] *"assume a função de uma descrição substantiva das épocas ou períodos históricos"*

[18] *"'regime de historicidade' e 'presentismo' não são realidades, mas categorias analíticas, tipos ideais construídos pelo historiador"*

PRESENTISM AND BROAD PRESENT BETWEEN
METAPHYSICS OF TIME AND CHRONOTOPE

The course of the previous section allowed us to observe that the difference between metaphysics of historical time and regimes of historicity is relevant to understand Pereira and Araujo's criticism of the Hartogian concept of presentism. At the same time, this distinction makes it possible to demonstrate that this reservation to Hartog cannot be roughly extended to Gumbrecht's concept of broad present as the "chronotope governing our own time" (Gumbrecht 2014, 12). In fact, updatism and broad present compete for the same conceptual space, whether as metaphysics of time derived from Heidegger, or as a regime of historicity that depends on the defined relationship between past and present. Updatism is closer to the broad present than it is to presentism.

For Gumbrecht, the broad present, which is the chronotope of the beginning of the XXI century, "dictates the conditions under which human behavior finds its constitutive structures and experiences." (Gumbrecht 2014, 73). In short, the broad present is characterized as a historical phenomenon as follows: a) proximity and skepticism about things and events in the world, b) obsolescence and joy in relation to the individual body, c) shame about ostensive collective violence as means of political instrument and self-inflicted violence against individual bodies, d) fast thinking and slow thinking (Gumbrecht 2014, 73). These are paradoxes that have the temporal effect of anchoring individuals and societies in their present, which expands by moving the future and the past away from their field of view, since there is not "anything 'from the past' that we need to leave behind, nor anything 'from the future' that could not be made present by simulated anticipation." (Grumbrecht 2014, 71). In the broad present, the passage of time is suspended. Under these conditions, the broad present as a chronotope would be a is concept of a historiographical-heuristic character similar to Hartog's presentism and would be capable of tracking presentist historical phenomena. However, it is involved, additionally, as is updatism, by a transcendental clause, since it deals with the conditions of possibility according to which experience in time takes place in contemporary history.

Gumbrecht exposes the metaphysics of historical time that supports the broad present as inauthentic temporality by means of the Heideggerian concept of presence, which implies a modality of relating past, present and future. At the same time, presence has an authentic form that allows complementing the characterization of the broad present. In order to detail the relationship between updatism and broad present, a brief presentation of the concept of presence according to Gumbrecht will be made. Even when Gumbrecht is especially discussed, the Pereira and Araujo dedicate only a few passages to this theme. In those passages, symptomatically, the demarche of concept of presence in Heidegger's thinking is not addressed (Pereira and Araujo 2017, 17-19). Nor do they deal with historical presence as a theory of time developed by theorists of history from the 2000s onwards.

Generally, the recent theory of history shifts the focus from language and representation to historical experience. Therefore, narrativism is today censured for having reached the point of dispensing with the "past-in-itself" (Bentley 2006, 349), the "real past" (Domanska 2006, 348), or with the "sublime experience" of the past (Ankersmit 2005, 318). First, the idea of presence responds to this theoretical displacement corresponding to the "postlinguistic or postdiscursive attempt to return to the real, to material objects and conditions." (Kleinberg 2013, 7). Thus, the theory of presence hopes to overcome the narrativism that has exhausted itself on its different fronts, placing itself as "an alternative to meaning, representation, hermeneutics, and to postmodernism." (Peters 2006, 362). Consequently, the presence turns the attention of historians and theorists of history away from "mantras of this now so oppressive and suffocating lingualism [that threats] the intellectual health of our discipline." (Ankersmit 2006, 336). For this reason, presence is one of the names that historical experience received after the 2000s, paving the way for the return of philosophy to the classic questions of history after the predominance of narrativism that had repressed "ontological questions under epistemological answers" (Runia 2006, 306) for more than thirty years. In short, presence decreases the risk of losing the very object of historical knowledge (Froeyman, Ankersmit and Runia 2012, 393).

Furthermore, the emergence of presence in the recent theory of history brought the perspective that this concept of historical time could structure future research in different areas, from ontology to historiography (Simon and Kuukkanen 2015, 155). Indeed, presence underlies a considerable amount of work related to memorials, material and immaterial heritage, historical trauma, historical justice, reparation and truth commissions, as "both the time of history and the time of jurisdiction are in fact engaged in one and the same logic of presence" (Bevernage 2008, 164). Presence even emerges as an antidote to our unstable times that lack "a moral or ethical [conduct] to guide us" (Kleinberg 2013, 12). Waving with these credentials, some theorists named presence as a theoretical and historiographical paradigm, and may even, according to Gumbrecht, reach the status of a widespread "presence-culture (Gumbrecht 2006, 318).

Presence, according to Gumbrecht, however, is not just a way of naming the experience of the relationship between past and future. Moreover, and in depth, historical presence as metaphysics of historical time belongs to the "'critique of Western metaphysics'" (Gumbrecht 2006, 318), and thus acknowledges a debt to Heidegger. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger approaches presence based on two claims.

On the one hand, presence is related to the temporal present which, together with past and future, constitutes time and gives access to the being. Dasein, the being-there, is not a transcendent entity, because it finds its meaning in temporality and only from it. Therefore, the Dasein is only defined within a temporal horizon; only as a result of the interaction of the dimensions of time do human beings come to understand the meaning of being. The condition for the question about the essence of reality to make sense depends on the establishment of a horizon in which such a question can develop. This space is Dasein's temporal horizon. Without temporality, the question about the meaning of reality simply could not be posed. According to Carman, this notion of presence in *Being and Time* has a negative meaning, as the temporalization of the being must be rejected, since "it only ever appears in his [Heidegger] texts as

a gloss on the philosophical tradition, not as an expression of his own ontological commitments." (Carman 1995, 431). In this scenario, presence is shaped by the immediate present that blurs the interaction between past and future in an inadequately way that expresses the temporal understanding of Dasein's temporal horizon. For that reason, presence must have only an inauthentic meaning, as Dasein clings to the temporal present that is obliterated for the absence of the past and numbed to possibilities of the future.

On the other hand, Heidegger approaches presence as the main thesis of the metaphysical tradition, which goes from Plato to Nietzsche and which clings to the present as the middle level between the past and the future. In other words, the metaphysical tradition understands the being as something whose presence could be directly questioned (Plato's theory of ideas, Aristotle's unmoved mover, etc.) and not as a temporal horizon of possibilities always empty and aloof to a definitive truth. For Olafson (1994), if it is true that Heidegger opposes presence as the imprisonment of the meaning of the being in Dasein's inauthentic temporal horizon and, thus, entangles with traditional metaphysics, it is also true that *Being and Time*, in addition to Heidegger's other writings of the period, attempted to overcome presence in the negative sense. Presence, despite depending on the temporal scheme of the present, is not identical to it and, in the name of an authentic meaning of temporality, circumscribes Dasein's entire temporal horizon. Presence is involved by the prominence of the future over the past and over the present, as Heidegger "develops a concept of presence under which presence in the present tense and absence (past and future) are both subsumed." (Olafson 1994, 333). Namely, presence is the present that allows itself to be fertilized by the absence of a past that once had the vigor of the present, and by the absence of a future that fertilizes the present with the possibility of becoming. In this sense, presence performs a temporally authentic experience.

Gumbrecht understands that the search for the meaning of being is in the presence that reconnects us with the experience of the past. Gumbrecht, thereby, restates in Heidegger a positive temporal meaning for the concept of presence. In fact, Gumbrecht frames the reconnection with the past in a *spatially* oriented approach to the temporal meaning of the being, considering that presence is something concrete and material: "That something that is not language is what I have come to call 'presence.'" (Gumbrecht 2006, 317). Therefore, he rejects the Heideggerian-inspired post-structuralist approach according to which language becomes a "sustained complaint and melancholia (in its endless variations) incapacity of language to refer." (Gumbrecht 2006, 318). Language is not reduced to the countless interpretations presented by the past and that overlap in the present, but it is the means by which the experience of the past becomes present in the present, since it conveys a "presentification of the past" (Gumbrecht 2006, 318) that objects and things in space make tangible. For Gumbrecht, presence is simply "the spatio-temporally located existence of physical objects and events" (Gumbrecht 2006, 317). Presence is the presentation of the past that things arranged in space *materially* share with human beings through time, since "Being is not a meaning. Being belongs to the dimension of things." (Gumbrecht 2004, 68).

First, Gumbrecht emphasizes that the experience of the past depends on space, as things *touch* us in space. Secondly, language conveys the presence of the past, as it represents the feelings in which past things present themselves to our senses claiming their presence. The past produces "presence-effects"

(Gumbrecht 2004, 15) in the present that attune the human senses to historical experience even before they become conscious, similarly to how visual experience, objects and places of memory make the past present immediately. Language does nothing more than representng this immediate sensory historical experience. In this sense, Gumbrechtian historical presence grounds a "presence-culture," despite the "meaning-culture" and poststructuralism, whose emphasis on language led the Humanities astray into the "path of overrepresentation" (Gumbrecht 2006, 318). Thus, the reciprocity of presence and language guarantees the historical representation of past things and events, as it requires that the historical narrative represent them in the very presentification of the past in space, in order to challenge the mere interpretation – the dilution in the present – of the past that narrativism and culture of meaning promoted.

As Pereira and Araujo do not address the insertion of Gumbrecht in the Heideggerian world and, therefore, tend to characterize the broad present as if it were due to a sign of "nostalgia" in relation to the past or to the reduction of "collateral damage" by participating in digital societies of the present, or even as a reactive and pessimistic fear of losing the dimension of the future with which modernity nourished the present (Pereira and Araujo 2019, 59). For that reason, it is necessary to ask: what is the relationship between the concept of presence as metaphysics of historical time and the chronotope of broad present? The answer is simple: broad present is an inauthentic and dated historical experience that exploits historical time to the point of degrading the presence of the past as authentic temporality, that is, as a material and spatial relationship with the past (Gumbrecht 2014, 73). Finally, despite following different conceptual paths, Pereira and Araujo achieve the same result in terms of conceptual commitments of their temporal studies. Both broad present and updatism can be evaluated as inauthentic temporality from the definition of authentic temporality, having Dasein's temporal horizon as a parameter.

Last Remarks

Pereira and Araujo do not fail to recognize Gumbrecht as a theorist of presence and, in fact, seek to bring the broad present into the purview of updatism, since "in his [Gumbrecht's] typology 'culture of presence' versus 'culture of meaning', updatism would be the hypertrophy of meaning" (Pereira and Araujo 2019, 63). In addition, in favor of a selective neighborhood, they even admit that the broad present differs from presentism by extending to the former the exacerbation of a progress tendency, which is characteristic of the "modern temporality" (Pereira and Araujo 2017, 19). This contradicts Hartog, who sees in the current regime of historicity "a supposed end or exhaustion of modernity" (Pereira and Araujo 2019, 60). Nevertheless, the immersion of both concepts in the Heideggerian metaphysics is not recognized by Pereira and Araujo.

It is understood that the gaps in the triangulation between updatism, presentism and broad present are due to the fact that the insufficiency in the treatment of Gumbrecht's Heideggerian vein does not allow Pereira and Araujo to note that the broad present, being subsidiary of the presence, could not dispense with a full relation between past, present and future, in terms of Dasein's temporal horizon. As the Gumbrechtian presence brings with it a

Heideggerian metaphysics of historical time, as previously demonstrated, its conceptual structure is the same as that of updatism.

In addition, and in a broader sense, this article sought to draw attention not only to the proximity of updatism to the broader present, but also to the completion of the concept proposed by Pereira and Araujo. Thus, the request to explicitly separate the two faces or dimensions of updatism: updatism as metaphysics of historical time, and as heuristic concept.

As metaphysics of historical time, updatism develops a two-way transcendental clause. Firstly, it develops a transcendental characteristic because it is a metaphysical as well as an empirical concept, since it refers to historical experiences just insofar as it sets the conditions of possibility under which such experiences can be realized in the contemporary world. Secondly, the metaphysical character of the concept of updatism draws a historical-transcendental clause from Heidegger, according to the condition of possibility of historical experience assigned by Dasein's temporal horizon as an affirmation of the future as the fundamental dimension of time.

As a heuristic concept, updatism allows to recognize and classify updatist historical experiences, which are the object of the historiographical research. In this regard, this article has shown that, in the absence of a metaphysical clause, the heuristic function can be detached from the conceptual work and become substantive. Consequently, historiographical work can become dispensable or secondary, as in the old speculative philosophies of history.

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