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Adorno e a dialética do amor não-idêntico: Barbárie ou humanização

**Adorno and the dialectic of non-identical love:
Barbarism or humanization**

**El adorno y la dialéctica del amor no idéntico:
Barbarie o humanización**

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Resumo: O Amor em Adorno ultrapassa o sentido subjetivista e romântico e considera contradições inerentes à teoria do conhecimento; constitui fonte de representação social ideológica, mediada pela relação entre sujeito e objeto. Nessa medida suas contradições o eleva a construto cultural perpassado pela dialética negativa. Logo, para Adorno, o amor é um princípio de aspiração humanista ao lado de valores como: ética, esperança, gratidão, bondade, solidariedade, justiça e democracia. Tais valores, se desmistificados, postulam oposição à frieza, ao totalitarismo e ao horror do nazismo e do fascismo; em resistência ao sofrimento, preconceito e à barbárie recorrentes na civilização. Não obstante, desmistificar o amor ideal e romântico, como a outros valores configura experiência autorreflexiva, não-idêntica e formativa com vistas a uma sociedade consciente, emancipada e humanista, que reconhece riscos de alienação e inversão de totalidade a totalitarismo, democracia a pseudodemocracia. O amor

consciente, verdadeiro e crítico transpõe-se em iminente ação social. À luz de Adorno, o amor dialético pressupõe esperança de uma real sociedade justa em termos políticos, culturais e sociais.

Palavras-chave: Adorno. Amor. Dialética negativa. Barbárie. Educação. Teoria crítica.

Abstract: Love in Adorno goes beyond the subjectivist and romantic sense and considers contradictions inherent to the theory of knowledge, constituting a source of ideological social representation, mediated by the relationship between subject and object. To that extent, its contradictions elevate it to a cultural construct permeated by negative dialectics. Therefore, for Adorno, love is a principle of humanist aspiration alongside values such as ethics, hope, gratitude, kindness, solidarity, justice, and democracy. Such values, if demystified, postulate opposition to the apathy, totalitarianism, and horror of Nazism and Fascism; in resistance to the suffering, prejudice, and barbarism recurrent in civilization. However, demystifying ideal and romantic love, as with other values, configures a self-reflexive, non-identical, and formative experience with a view to a conscious, emancipated, and humanist society, which recognizes risks of alienation and inversion of totality to totalitarianism, democracy to pseudo-democracy. Conscious, true, and critical love is transposed into immanent social action. In the light of Adorno, dialectical love presupposes hope for a real just society in political, cultural, and social terms.

Keywords: Adorno. Love. Negative dialéctic. Barbarism. Critical theory.

Resumen: El amor en Adorno va más allá del sentido subjetivista y romántico y considera las contradicciones inherentes a la teoría del conocimiento, constituyendo una fuente de representación social ideológica, mediada por la

relación entre sujeto y objeto. En esa medida, sus contradicciones lo elevan a una construcción cultural permeada por dialéctica negativa. Por eso, para Adorno, el amor es un principio de aspiración humanista junto a valores como: la ética, la esperanza, la gratitud, la bondad, la solidaridad, la justicia y la democracia. Tales valores, si se desmitifican, postulan oposición a la frialdad, totalitarismo y horror del nazismo y el fascismo; en resistencia al sufrimiento, al prejuicio ya la barbarie recurrente en la civilización. Sin embargo, desmitificar el amor ideal y romántico, como ocurre con otros valores, configura una experiencia autorreflexiva, no idéntica y formativa con miras a una sociedad consciente, emancipada y humanista, que reconoce riesgos de alienación e inversión de la totalidad al totalitarismo, la democracia a la pseudodemocracia. El amor consciente, verdadero y crítico se transpone a la acción social inmanente. A la luz de Adorno, el amor dialéctico presupone la esperanza de una verdadera sociedad justa en términos políticos, culturales y sociales.

Palabras clave: Adorno. Amor. Dialéctica negativa. Barbarie. Educación. Teoría crítica.

Submission date: 06/09/2023

Date of approval: 06/09/2023

Between the years of 1920 and 1945, the world witnessed the (ir)rational horror and genocide of Nazism and Fascism. In this context, philosopher, sociologist, and musician Theodor Adorno conceptually unraveled, in his work titled *Dialética negativa* (1984), all the pain in experiencing first-hand the consequences of such cruelty due to human ignorance: "What is hurtful in dialectics is pain, heightened to the concept, by the poverty in this world"¹ (1984, p. 14, our translation). Such a declaration could not be more aesthetically and politically coherent with the life and work composition of the Frankfurt thinker (Jay, 1973).

Adorno projects his critical and humanistic perspective, expressing theoretically and with sensibility, onto the dialectic relationship between subject and object, which should be incomprehensible to an authentic humanity that aims to be fair, conscious, and emancipated (Adorno, 1984; 1995a; 1995). Thus, in the context of technological and economic development, this expression contradicts the idealization of knowledge as enlightenment that, when mystified as an ultimate goal, surrendered to totalitarian ideologies (Adorno, Horkheimer, 1985). Fascism, undeniably, is not a political, cultural, or theoretical model compatible with a civilization of noble principles and humane values. Hence, the 'dialectic pain' is the "pain of totalitarian and

¹ **Original citation:** "O que há de doloroso na dialética é a dor, elevada ao conceito, pela pobreza desse mundo" (1984, p. 14).

inhumane conciliation between subject and object'.² The Adornian critical theory, as a socio-historical principle, analyzes humanity considering the dialectic connection between the universal and particular, theory and practice, and subjectivity and objectivity (Adorno, 1984; 1985; 1995a). In that sense, the historical inhumanity that society sweeps through reflects the ongoing struggle with recurring barbarism, both in the material and human sense (1995b).

Due to the complexity of his thinking, Adorno is often considered idealistic, pessimistic, or elitist (Lucaks, 1978; Safatle, 2012). Considering the irony within dialects, his production speaks for itself when perceiving the current growth of fascism in various ways. Nonetheless, "it is necessary to maintain alive the recollection of the recurring, shameful, and incomprehensible history of fascism so that forces that evoke barbarism can be inhibited (Adorno, 1984; 1993; 1994; 1995a; 1995b: Adorno; Horkheimer, 1985).³

In Adorno's (1995b) perspective, when confronting barbarism, there is a need to face cultural taboos as a political action through education and the construction of values (1995a). From this perspective, the concept of love, according to Adorno (1995b), embodies the opposite of barbarism, pervaded by human apathy. Thus, loving is the social experience attached to human warmth, ethics, and solidarity; it indicates critical consciousness that crosses

² **Original citation:** 'dor da conciliação totalitarista e desumana entre sujeito e objeto'

³ **Original citation:** 'há que se manter viva a lembrança da recorrente, vergonhosa e incompreensível história do fascismo para que as forças que estimulam a barbárie sejam impedidas (Adorno, 1984; 1993; 1994; ;1995a; 1995b: Adorno; Horkheimer, 1985).

theory and practices dialectically. Love goes against the immediate practices of narcissistic actions - egotistical, individualistic, indifferent, non-reflective, pragmatic, and alienated (1995a; 1995b, 1994); opposite to the pain and suffering linked to barbarism.

If love is a dialectic experience, this includes recognizing ideological contradictions inherent to the bourgeois principle from which it originates, romantic and idealized; thus, fetishized and appropriated by capitalism (Adorno, 1993; Adorno, Horkheimer, 1985). The "painful dialectic" brings to light the absolutist and indifferent - totalitarian - conciliation between subject and object: the 'mediation of mediacy'⁴ (Adorno, 1984). This fact undermines the critical and conscious experience by merging them symbiotically and erasing the dialectical tension between affirmation and denial, constituting the subject and the object (Adorno, 1984; 1994; 1995a; 2013). Indeed, we should question the risk of subjectivizing love in a 'psychologizing' and abstract romantic sense, aiming at staying on course with critical sociological analysis. Thus, by doing so, one demystifies its bourgeois ideological nature.

⁴ **Original expression:** 'mediação da mediatez' (Adorno, 1984).

The relationship of exchange, to which love imposes a partial resistance during the bourgeois era, completely absorbed it; the last immediacy becomes a victim of the distance that separates the parties from all others. Love cools down due to the value that the Self assigns to itself. To love, in that sense, appears as a greater loving, and whoever loves more stands in error. (Adorno, 1993, p. 147, our translation)⁵

Nonetheless, what mediates the ideal bourgeois love are social representations. Its ideological influence reaches the cultural and political realm. Thus, suffering and illness, in contrast with love, reverberate in the commodified, alienated, and anti-ethical individual. Adorno's notion of "conceptual pain" is a political denouncement of rationalized and administered barbarism, the inability to foster genuine solidary and just experiences (Adorno, 1995b). According to Adorno (1984), considering love, ethics must not disregard psychological elements within socio-historical aspects; admitting subjectivity demands assessing its inherent contradictions. Thus, "antipsychological ethics leads to subsequent psychological traits" (p. 279, our translation).⁶

That said, suffering is also a dialectic category that composes the universal and particular: "The particularity of society, as grim as it is, turns itself as a whole against suffering" (1984, p. 204, our translation).⁷ Thus, denying the

⁵ **Original citation:** A relação de troca, à qual o amor opõe uma resistência parcial ao longo da era burguesa, absorveu-o completamente; a última imediatez cai vítima do distanciamento em que os contratantes se encontram de todos os demais. O amor esfria pelo valor que o Eu atribui a si mesmo. Amar, em seu caso, aparece-lhe como um mais amar e quem ama mais põe-se no erro (Adorno, 1993, p. 147).

⁶ **Original citation:** "A ética antipsicológica converge para traços psicológicos posteriores" (p. 279).

⁷ **Original citation:** "A particularidade da sociedade, por mais sombria que seja, se volta como um todo contra o sofrimento" (1984, p. 204).

suffering would also constitute a 'harmonically' alienating ideology. In Adorno's perspective (1984; 1993), what is missing is the condemnation of pain in all its nuances, including the physical one, which falls under the guise of productivist ideologies as manifesting weakness or incompetence.

In addition, such as trivialized pain, love faces the risk of immediate psychologism: "To love means to be capable of hindering immediacy from withering away under the omnipresent pressure of mediation, of economy. In this commitment, love mediates within itself, and becomes a determined counterpressure. Only the one who loves possesses the strength to persist in love" (Adorno, 1993, p. 151, our translation).⁸ However, even if love can arise against oppression, it alone cannot hinder ideology's violation against life, genuinely free of the suffering resulting from its mediations. According to Freud (1973a), suffering connects to the idea of death as a rationalized ideological illusion. To Adorno, the distortion of death happens when

⁸ **Original citation:** Amar significa ser capaz de não deixar a imediatividade atrofiar-se por força da onipresente pressão da mediação, da economia, e nessa fidelidade ela se mediatiza em si mesma, torna-se uma obstinada contrapressão. Só ama quem tem força para persistir no amor. (Adorno, 1993, p. 151).

The prevalent metaphysics of death is nothing but society's impotent consolation for how social changes have robbed people of what once allowed them to bear death, namely, the sense of their epic unity with an intact life [...] The illusion of death being commensurate with their life has vanished, and they are unable to come to terms with the fact that they must die. (Adorno, 1984, p. 369, our translation)⁹

Idealized death, as metaphysics of pseudo totality, is the 'superstitious hope for eternity', seen as the escape from reality and its transformation: "Conversely, the idea that death is merely the last breath is inconceivable" (p. 371, our translation).¹⁰ Adorno redefines 'hope' - in its critical sense, emphasizing that the illusion implies nothing to change in a conformed society. Thus, "hopelessness is the last historically and socially conditioned ideology" (p. 373, our translation).¹¹

Additionally, to Adorno, the ideology of death opposes love. It finds its rationale in any pain and suffering stemming from social logic. The situation encompasses civilization's ineptitude to overcome states of subjective, economic, and political domination. Tragic contexts pervaded by horror, as exemplified by Nazism and Fascism, indicate the condition of idealization within this reality. The mass extermination of

⁹ **Original citation:** A metafísica corrente da morte não é senão o impotente consolo da sociedade pelo fato de que as mudanças sociais têm usurpado aos homens o que antigamente os fez suportarem a morte, a saber, o sentimento de sua unidade épica com uma vida intacta [...] A ilusão da comensura da morte com sua a vida desapareceu e eles são incapazes de assimilar que têm de morrer (Adorno, 1984, p. 369).

¹⁰ **Original citation:** Por outro lado, o pensamento de que a morte seja simplesmente o último suspiro é impensável" (Adorno, p. 371).

¹¹ **Original citation:** O desespero é assim a última ideologia condicionada histórica e socialmente. (Adorno, p. 373).

millions of Jews, Black people, gypsies, homosexuals, and Hitler's opponents (1889-1945) signals illusion, rationality, and death. As Adorno puts it, "The genocide consecrates the absolute union of concepts with humans through their nullity, and Auschwitz affirms the philosophical theory that equates pure identity with death" (1984, p. 362, our translation).¹² Therefore, much like suffering, pain, and death, the illusion of Happiness also conceals its *raison d'être* in service to the social structure. Considering this, Adorno draws from psychoanalysis based on the absolutizing romantic idealization: "Happiness is the only aspect from the metaphysical experience that goes beyond impotent desire; it gives us the essence of objects as something liberated from them" (1984, p. 374).¹³ Although contradictory, happiness takes place in possibility besides Gratitude and Dignity:

With happiness, things are not different from truth: we don't possess it but are within it. Happiness is none other than being involved, a security copy inside the mother. Yet, the happy one will never acknowledge they are. To see happiness, they would have to leave it: it would be as someone who was born.

¹² **Original citation:** O genocídio consagra a união absoluta dos conceitos com os homens pela sua nulidade, e Auschwitz confirma a teoria filosófica que equipara a pura identidade com a morte. (Adorno, 1984, p. 362)

¹³ **Original citation:** "felicidade é o único da experiência metafísica que é mais que desejo impotente, nos dá o interior dos objetos como algo por sua vez liberado deles" (Adorno, 1984, p. 374).

Those who claim to be happy lie while evoking happiness and, thus, sin against it. Loyal to it, only the one who says: I was happy. The sole connection of consciousness with happiness is gratitude: this constitutes its unparalleled dignity. (Adorno, 1993, p. 97, our translation).¹⁴

The myth of happiness shatters as there is no sustenance for the idea of an individual who is genuinely happy in their historical, psych, and physical constitution. To Freud (1973), the ultimate idea is of "moments of happiness" since human beings spend their existence dealing with incompleteness and helplessness, like the need for social acceptance, which results in frustration, sacrifices, and repressed desires. Handling such helplessness determines acceptance, realization, and social adaption (Freud, 1973).

Seeing as suffering and death oppose love, Adorno aligns the latter with conscious gratitude as the possibility to overcome the most primary instincts, leading to consciousness as an element of dignity in collective and individual terms (Adorno, 1993). Gratitude is the differentiation pathway - countering inequality, leading to a dialectical sense of Peace: "[...] in the perspective of epistemology, the relationship between subject and object is in achieved peace, both among humans and in the other

¹⁴ **Original citation:** Com a felicidade as coisas não são diferentes do que se passa com a verdade: nós não a temos, mas sim, estamos nela. Com efeito, a felicidade nada mais é que estar envolvido, uma cópia da segurança dentro da mãe. Mas, por isso, quem é feliz jamais pode saber que o é. Para ver a felicidade, ele teria que sair dela: seria como alguém que nasceu. Quem diz que é feliz mente ao invocar a felicidade, e assim peca contra ela. A ela só é fiel quem diz: eu era feliz. A única relação da consciência com a felicidade é a gratidão: nisto consiste sua incomparável dignidade. (Adorno, 1993, p. 97)

that is not them. Peace is a state of differentiation without dominance in which the difference is shared" (Adorno, 1995a, p. 184, our translation).¹⁵ In that sense, peace connects with love by the *will* that infuses humanization with historical meaning. Therefore, the *will* also imposes an ideal contradiction, as per Kant:

The objectification of individual impulses while synthesizing and determining *will* is a sublimation, a deceptive deviation from the primary objective of the impulse, which is thus displaced and assumed over time. Kant's rationality of *will* accurately describes this deviation. It transforms diffuse impulses, its 'material,' into something else. When we accentuate a person's *will*, we refer to the synthetic element of their actions, their subordination to reason. Kantian ethics grants supremacy to the entirety of the subject; their life finds its essence solely within it; indeed, without this totality, the *will* would not exist. (Adorno, 1984, p. 238, our translation)¹⁶

Nonetheless, comprehending love and will without concrete actions is not enough. According to Adorno: "Everywhere, the bourgeois society insists on reinforcing will; only love must be involuntary, solely feeling immediacy. In this aspiration, which implies the liberation from labor, the bourgeois concept of love transcends bourgeois society"

¹⁵ **Original citation:** [...] do ponto de vista da teoria do conhecimento, a relação entre sujeito e objeto está na paz realizada, tanto entre os homens como no outro que não eles. A paz é um estado de diferenciação sem dominação no qual o diferente é compartilhado. (Adorno, 1995a, p. 184)

¹⁶ **Original citation:** A objetificação dos impulsos singulares em forma de vontade sintetizante e determinante é uma sublimação, mentiroso desvio do objetivo primário do impulso, que é assim deslocado e assumido na duração. A racionalidade da vontade descreve fielmente em Kant tal desvio. Ela converte em outra coisa, seu 'material', impulsos difusos. Quando destacamos em um homem sua vontade, nos referimos ao elemento sintético de suas ações, a saber: sua subordinação à razão [...] A ética kantiana outorga à totalidade do sujeito o predomínio sobre seus componentes; só nelas consiste sua vida e, no entanto, fora dessa totalidade não haveria vontade. (Adorno, 1984, p. 238)

(1993, p. 150-151, our translation).¹⁷ Thus, love constitutes hope for the conscious will.

Adorno's critical consciousness engages with individual will. The latter cannot escape the ideology of totalitarian reason, which masquerades as pseudo-Freedom, seeing as: "As soon as freedom finds an ally in the individual, the subject itself becomes the moral authority and cannot be suspicious of what is alien to it, namely, the particular, whether internal or external" (Adorno, 1984, p. 238, our translation).¹⁸ The contradiction within the category freedom and its identification with consciousness uncovers the ideological reversal, where the universal becomes the particular; subject, the object; equality, the differentiation; and the non-identical becomes the always-identical (Adorno, 1984, 2013; Adorno; Horkheimer, 1985). When knowledge orders cultural production and politics in inequality, work and Equality do not escape the myths and historical paradoxes: "Before, the fetishes were under the law of equality. Now, equality itself becomes the fetish" (Adorno; Horkheimer, 1985, p. 30, our translation).¹⁹ Love, by principle, belongs to the realm of equality and justice. Therefore, its social representation as an ultimate

¹⁷ **Original citation:** "Por toda a parte a sociedade burguesa insiste no esforço da vontade; só o amor deve ser involuntário, pura imediaticidade do sentimento. Nesta aspiração, que significa a dispensa do trabalho, a ideia burguesa do amor transcende a sociedade burguesa" (1993, p.p. 150-151)

¹⁸ **Original citation:** "Assim que a liberdade encontrou nele um aliado, o sujeito se converte em moral para si mesmo e não pode ser suspeito segundo o que lhe é estranho, a saber: segundo o particular, seja interno, ou externo" (Adorno, 1984, p. 238).

¹⁹ **Original citation:** "Antes, os fetiches estavam sob a lei da igualdade. Agora, a própria igualdade torna-se fetiche" (Adorno; Horkheimer, 1985, p. 30).

expression of human warmth encounters a setback when subjected to ideological management and rationalization, which includes its fetishization and confusion with aversive passion and sexuality; love transcends these limitations:

It is not mesmerizing love but the socially accepted one that elicits disgust; according to Ibsen, this love is clingy. When taken by an erotic feeling, fatigue becomes a request for caresses and momentary sexual incapacity, considered something incidental, entirely external to passion (Adorno, 1993, p. 154, our translation).²⁰

Above all, romantic love opposes the sexual aspect, rigidified by unenlightening taboos and prejudices in a conscious sense; 'heightened, it becomes an excuse not to love'. Even then, "each person secretly desires to be loved, even when they themselves don't: no less indiscriminate and universal than the alienation among people is the urge to break it" (Adorno, 1993, p. 157).²¹ Suppose love truly embodies genuine equality, in political and institutional terms. In that case, there's no room to overlook the principle of justice with inherent contradictions: "The blindfold over the eyes of Justice means we must not interfere with the law, but also that it did not originate from freedom" (Adorno; Horkheimer, 1985, p. 30, our translation). That

²⁰ **Original citation:** Não é o amor inebriante, mas ao amor socialmente aprovado que se segue o nojo: segundo Ibsen, este amor é pegajoso. Quando a pessoa está tomada de um sentimento erótico, o cansaço transforma-se no pedido de carícias, e a incapacidade sexual momentânea é considerada algo casual, totalmente exterior à paixão (Adorno, 1993, p. 154).

²¹ **Original citation:** "cada um deseja em segredo ser amado mesmo quando ele próprio não ama: não menos indiscriminada e universal que a alienação entre as pessoas é o anseio de rompê-la" (Adorno, 1993, p. 157).

would be simple enough if it weren't for Law itself - guardian of justice as an institution, value permeated by dialectics in its essence: "Although the positive doctrine of natural law, when developing concretely, gives rise to dichotomies, its idea sustains the fallacy of positive law [...], domination" (Adorno, 1984, p. 308, our translation).²²

Allied to justice as an ideal, Law, the universal doctrine, becomes totalitarian when seizing equality to justify political power, defending a fraudulent common good, and prioritizing the individual over the collective (Adorno, 1984). Throughout history, such paradoxes concerning justice idealize and crystalize equality and freedom, romanticizing them and hindering true democracy. However, genuine justice for an actual democratic political consciousness depends on social conditions that enable emancipation through a capacity for courage:

The requirement for emancipation is evident in a democracy [...]. Democracy relies on the conscious formation of individual will, as synthesized in the institution of representative elections. Thus, to prevent an irrational outcome, there is a need to presuppose the aptitude and courage of each person to use their own understanding (Adorno, 1995b, p. 169, our translation).²³

²² **Original citation:** "Por mais que a doutrina positiva do direito natural leve a antinomias, enquanto se desenvolve concretamente, sua ideia conserva a falsidade do direito positivo [...], dominação" (ADORNO, 1984, p. 308).

²³ **Original citation:** A exigência de emancipação é evidente em uma democracia [...] A democracia repousa na formação consciente da vontade de cada um em particular, tal como ela sintetiza na instituição das eleições representativas. Para evitar um resultado irracional é preciso pressupor a aptidão e a coragem de cada um em se servir de seu próprio entendimento (Adorno, 1995b, p. 169).

Emancipation demands subjective experiences that are critical and reflective, aptitude and courage, and knowledge contrary to pseudo-activity, immediacy, and the pragmatic reason administered by fetishized politics, which harms life (Adorno, 1984). Psychoanalysis facilitates the comprehension of pseudo-activity, or the lack of capability to develop genuine love experiences. The illusion of a conscious action reflects conciliation between the subject and object. Consequently, subjectivity and objectivity become absolutized, abstractly nullifying themselves as the primary instinct - unconscious aggressiveness, non-elaborated (conscious), tends to sustain irrational practices. Such practices, rationalized and immediate, promote apathy contrary to reflective love:

The pseudo-activity arises from technic productive forces, a state that simultaneously condemns it to illusion [...]. One cannot merely separate rationality from self-preservation; in the same way, it cannot detach the latter from the Self, the subjective instance that serves rationality [...]. Indeed, the construction of reality is, ultimately, imposed by subjective obstacles. It is mediated psychologically, while paralysis of thought depends on the dynamic of drives [...]. Here, above all, one can observe the extension of Freud's thesis on mass psychology and the analysis of ego, where the images associated with authority subjectively represent the lack of love and connection with others, the aspect of apathy (Adorno, 1995, p. 217-221, our translation).²⁴

²⁴ **Original citation:** A pseudoatividade é provocada pelo estado das forças produtivas técnicas, estado que, ao mesmo tempo, a condena à ilusão [...]. Não se pode separar simplesmente racionalidade de autoconservação, assim como também não se pode separar desta o Eu, a instância subjetiva que serve à racionalidade [...]. É verdade que a construção de uma realidade é imposta, em definitivo, pelas barreiras objetivas; ela é psicologicamente mediada, e a paralisia do pensamento está condicionada pela dinâmica pulsional [...]. Pode-se verificar aqui, antes de mais nada, o prolongamento da tese freudiana de psicologia das massas e análise do ego, segundo a qual as imagens próprias da autoridade possuem subjetivamente o caráter da falta de amor e de relação com os demais, o caráter da frieza (Adorno, 1995, p.p. 217-221).

Apathy is a subjective element that resonates with objectivity. It encompasses a state opposite to consciousness, to the authentic transformative experience; this is why love receives special attention from Adorno. In addition, since it contradicts apathy, its subjective basis could hinder barbarism (Adorno, 1993; 1994; 1984; 1995a; 1995b). Conceptually, love carries within the humanizing dream of genuinely solidary, just, and ethical spirits. To Adorno, the recognition of true love only occurs through critical and creative education, the one for emancipation and self-reflective experience, operating as hope to impede the inhumane outcomes of barbarism in a broader sense: as resistance (Adorno, 1993; 1984; 1995a; 1995b; 1994). Thus, where genuine love is lacking, there lies totalitarian ideology: deformation, the objectification of consciousness.

Apathy seizes everything they do: the affectionate word that remains unpronounced, the unpracticed consideration. In the end, this apathy resonates in those who emanate. Every un-deformed relationship, perhaps even that which is conciliatory in organic life, is a gift. Those who become incapable of this through the logical force of coherence turn themselves into a thing and allow themselves to freeze. (Adorno, 1993, p. 36, our translation)²⁵

²⁵ **Original citation:** A frieza apodera-se de tudo o que fazem, da palavra amistosa, que permanece impronunciada, da consideração que não é praticada. Essa frieza acaba repercutindo naqueles que emana. Toda relação não deformada, talvez até mesmo aquilo que é conciliador na vida orgânica, é um dom. Quem se torna incapaz disso pela força lógica da coerência faz de si uma coisa e deixa-se congelar (Adorno, 1993, p. 36).

The historical recurrence of apathy reinforces Adorno's (1995b) warning, within the educational context, "that Auschwitz must not repeat itself." On the other hand, what remains are the injustices and totalitarian actions resulting from antidemocratic and excluding politics, detached from solidarity. Moreover, teaching about love, peace, kindness, equality, justice, solidarity, courage, and compassion mobilizes education and culture in sociohistorical, materialistic, and political perspectives.

Therefore, humanity fails to overcome the horror. Fascism, in subjective and political terms, is in the inability to establish a dialectic relationship between subject and object, theory and practice, and values and actions. Thus, this deformation hinders the experience of exercising critical reflection. To Adorno (1984; 1995a), at the essence of apathy lies the always-identical, which shapes indistinctiveness and human standardization, the loss of dialectic between universal and particular. Such dialectic could indicate the non-identical, different, diverse, and the opposite of prejudice (Adorno; Horkheimer, 1984, 1995a; 1995b).

Love, for Adorno, highlights ideological contradictions, opposing suffering and ignorance. This perspective associates barbarism and totalitarianism with the always-identical and apathetic nature of capitalism, while fascist indifference banalizes all. Those who benefit from the ideological illusion invest in cultural distortion and reversal of values, including regarding the Cultural Industry (Adorno; Horkheimer, 1985). When deformed by apathy, love reflects

lovelessness, serving ideology through the immediate thoughtlessness of passion and romanticism.

Love surrenders to soulless apathy as a symbol of what resides within the soul because what the living represent to it is a theater of the desperate urge to save it; it only discerns the soul where it is absent. Thus, what is humane is precisely the expression in the eyes that most resemble those of animals, creatures distant from the reflection of the Self. (Adorno, 1993, p. 149, our translation)²⁶

Romantic or passionate love does not foster consciousness but rather alienation. Beyond these contradictions, the "pure immediacy of feeling", we acknowledge its potential of immanence in the face of the bourgeois context, considering it takes its place in the chain of humanistic values as a noble and conscious principle; thus, it constitutes resistance. "But love's involuntary nature, even when not systematically arranged, contributes to the whole once it establishes itself as a principle. If love can represent a better version of society itself, it cannot achieve this pacifically but only through conscious resistance" (Adorno, 1993, p. 151, our translation).²⁷

²⁶ **Original citation:** O amor se entrega à frieza desalmada como a um símbolo do que tem na alma, porque os viventes são para ele o teatro do desejo desesperado de salvar, que só tem por objeto o que está perdido: o amor só descobre a alma onde ela está ausente. Assim, humana é justamente a expressão dos olhos que mais lembram os dos animais, das criaturas distantes da reflexão do Eu (Adorno, 1993, p. 149).

²⁷ **Original citation:** Mas o caráter involuntário do próprio amor, mesmo onde este não está de antemão organizado de modo prático, contribui para aquele todo a partir do momento em que se estabelece como princípio. Se o amor deve representar na sociedade uma sociedade melhor, ele não é capaz de fazê-lo como um enclave pacífico, mas tão somente numa resistência consciente" (Adorno, 1993, p. 151).

As mentioned before, love is a constructed feeling - built - culturally through humanistic principles. Thus, it cannot be free from contradiction or immune to serving capitalism. In that sense, bourgeois love is not distant from the productive action concerning alienation. Its derivatives, such as solidarity, kindness, and compassion, or labor, activity, and art manifest a rational elaboration (Adorno, 1993). This reality corresponds to the order of life administration concealed by apathy, as in the Cultural Industry's ideology.

The Cultural Industry [...] reflects the assistance provided to the administered as immediate solidarity among individuals in the realm of the competent. No one is forgotten; everyone is surrounded by neighbors, social workers [...] The insistence on kindness is how society confesses the suffering it causes: everyone knows that, within this system, they cannot help themselves; this is what ideology must acknowledge. [...] The *pathos* of an apathetic temperament justifies the world that necessitates it. That is life, so harsh but precisely because of this, so wonderful, so robust. Lies do not retreat in the face of tragedy. (Adorno, e1995; Horkheimer, 1985, p. 141, our translation)²⁸

Kindness and Solidarity connect to Compassion.

However, when it comes to their utilitarian idealization for

²⁸ **Original citation:** A indústria cultural [...] reflete a assistência dispensada aos administrados como solidariedade imediata dos homens no mundo dos competentes. Ninguém é esquecido, todos estão cercados de vizinhos, assistentes sociais [...]. Essa insistência na bondade é a maneira pela qual a sociedade confessa o sofrimento que ela causa: todos sabem que não podem mais, neste sistema, ajudar-se a si mesmos, e é isso que a ideologia deve levar em conta. [...] O *pathos* da frieza de ânimo justifica o mundo que a torna necessária. Assim é a vida, tão dura, mas por isso mesmo tão maravilhosa, tão sadia. A mentira não recua diante do trágico (Adorno, e1995 Horkheimer, 1985, p. 141).

ideological and political purposes, these aspects paradoxically favor apathy,

But the outstanding helpers and benefactors of humanity, whose scientific accomplishments had to be displayed by writers as compassion acts aiming to extract a fictitious human interest, function as lieutenants of national leaders. Those leaders ultimately dictate the eradication of compassion and know how to contain any contagion after the last individual has been eliminated. (Adorno; Horkheimer, 1985, p. 141, our translation)²⁹

Considering this, human emancipation can only succeed through the awareness of contradictions within the political and conceptual realm - in subjective and objective terms, as love cannot escape the risk of ideological inversion of barbarism through the 'administered irrational logic' (Adorno, 2013). Nonetheless, Adorno asserts the honorable place of love as a humanistic principle, regardless of the limitations within its social and cultural representations. Therefore, teaching how to love, not demanding it, would be the educational and formative plan focused on emancipation against barbarism. In *Educação após Auschwitz* (1995a; 1996b; 1994), Adorno affirms that emancipation, connected to conscious love, is a conceptual, historical, subjective, objective conquest and the possibility to contain the unyielding dehumanization that devastates

²⁹ **Original citation:** Mas os grandes ajudantes e benfeitores da humanidade, cujos feitos científicos têm de ser apresentados pelos escritores como atos de compaixão, a fim de extrair deles um fictício interesse humano, funcionam como lugar-tenentes dos chefes das nações, e estes acabam por decretar a eliminação da compaixão e sabem prevenir todo contágio depois de exterminado o último paralítico (Adorno; Horkheimer, 1985, p. 141).

civilization. Thus, psychology contributes to reflecting on human contradiction within society as an impediment to emancipation.

Moreover, we caution about the inversion of meaning concerning love but also democratic and anti-democratic values; it encompasses the universal, referring to totality, and the particular, referring to totalitarianism. The political forces of fascism serve barbarism, ideologically founded on deformative "tactics" and the inversion of consciousness to unconsciousness (Adorno, 1985). In that sense, subjectivity must be unconcealed:

Since the opportunity to alter presupposed goals, particularly the social and political ones where such intentions nourish, is extremely limited nowadays, attempts to assert oneself in the face of repetition inevitably turn towards the subjective realm. I also refer essentially to the psychology of individuals involved in such practices. (Adorno, 1995a, p. 106, our translation)³⁰

Love constitutes a crucial concept to subjectivity's comprehension and opposes apathy and barbarism. Thus, its articulation through emancipatory formative processes is urgent. This principle reiterates Kant's notion of 'maturity' as a premonition of authentic consciousness, an omen to overcoming the distortion resulting from totalitarian ideology. In *Educação e Emancipação* (1995b), Adorno

³⁰ **Original citation:** Como a possibilidade de alterar os pressupostos objetivos, isto é, sociais e políticos, nos quais se incubam tais intenções é, hoje, extremamente limitada, as tentativas para se fazer frente à repetição tão necessariamente desviadas para o lado subjetivo. Com isso, refiro-me também, no essencial, à psicologia das pessoas que fazem tais coisas (Adorno, 1995a, p. 106).

discusses the obstacle heteronomy poses for autonomy and proposes liberation from nonage, of dependence, "following Kant's definitive assertion that men must free themselves of their self-incriminating nonage" (p. 141).³¹ Therefore, enlightenment must offer adequate conditions for the development of maturity, where the individual "[...] can benefit from understanding without the guidance of others" (p. 169).³²

In Adorno's perspective, the formative principles for maturity align with an education that adopts love as conscious, non-identical, original, and for diversity. In that sense, authority emanates from a self-reflective process, an interface of the dialectics between subject and object. Broadly speaking, critical cultural formation makes the individual responsible for their actions and choices, making them aware of the risk of the recurrence of Auschwitz, a symbol of barbarism and contrariety of holistic, cultural, and humanistic education.

³¹ **Original citation:** "conforme formulação definitiva de Kant na exigência de que os homens tenham que se libertar de sua auto-inculpável menoridade" (p. 141).

³² **Original citation:** "[...] servir-se-ia do entendimento sem a orientação de outrem" (p. 169).

When I mention education after Auschwitz, I refer to: firstly, childhood education, especially in the early years; thus, a comprehensive arrangement that establishes a spiritual, cultural, and social environment intolerant to the repetition of such an event; an environment where, to the best extent, the motives that led to the horror have become conscious. (Adorno, 1995a, p. 108, our translation)³³

To that end, it is necessary to catch a glimpse of the unconsciousness of hatred, aggressive fury, and the lack of human warmth that society faces; thus, education against apathy is a *sine qua non* principle (Adorno, 1995a, p. 106). Preventing apathy on its foundations in precarious material and human conditions demands an education that prospects authentic authority - consciousness about your contradictory connections and identifications. This authority differs from the conditions of authoritarianism and the totalitarian materialization of repression, power, and domination. In that sense, the idea of Connection and Identification, which acts as a mediator for values' construction in early childhood, finds, in psychoanalysis, the potential to oppose apathy's distortive manipulation.

According to Adorno, contradiction permeates any connections: "The so-called connections easily become

³³ **Original citation:** Quando falo da educação após Auschwitz, refiro-me a duas esferas: em primeiro lugar, educação na infância, sobretudo na primeira; logo, o esclarecimento geral que estabeleça um clima espiritual, cultural e social que não admita a repetição daquilo; um clima, portanto, em que os motivos que conduziram ao horror tenham chegado, na medida do possível, a tornar-se conscientes (Adorno, 1995a, p. 108).

social passports - accepted by an individual to legitimize oneself as an honorable citizen, or produce hateful resentment, a psychological contradiction to its primary intention" (Adorno, 1995a, p. 109, our translation).³⁴ Blind, immediate, and idealized bonds do not give value to the construction of authority and autonomy. Instead, they favor authoritarian personalities, leading to perversion and submission or manipulative and weak traits, in opposition to the Kantian maturity: "The only true force against the principle of Auschwitz would be autonomy, if I may use the Kantian expression; the strength for reflection, for not letting oneself be carried away (Adorno, 1995a, p. 110).³⁵

According to Adorno (1995a), if connection does not secure autonomy, the archaic and regressive inclination to violence permeates a culture corrupted by distortion, whose ultimate goal is totalitarianism with fetishized, standard, superstitious, prejudicious occurrences taken by destructive impulses: "All of this relates, in a higher or lower level, to the old authoritarian structure, manifesting the behavior of the - I almost said - good-natured authoritarian character of the past" (p. 112-113).³⁶

³⁴ **Original citation:** "Os assim chamados vínculos facilmente convertem-se em passaportes sociais - aceitos por uma pessoa com o fim de legitimar-se como honrado cidadão -, ou então produzem odiosos rancores, psicologicamente contrários à sua finalidade original" (Adorno, 1995a, p. 109).

³⁵ **Original citation:** "A única força verdadeira contra o princípio de Auschwitz seria a autonomia, se me for permitido empregar a expressão kantiana; a força para a reflexão, para o não deixar-se levar" (Adorno, 1995a, p. 110).

³⁶ **Original citation:** "Tudo isso se relaciona, em maior ou menor grau, à velha estrutura autoritária, com certos modos de comportamento do - eu quase dizia -, bom caráter autoritário de antigamente" (p. 112-113).

However, authoritarianism stands thanks to the human agents at its service. Moreover, there is no authoritarian manipulation without collective blindness. The latter reflects the arrangement of passionate and energetic individuals but also apathetic, susceptible to the manipulation of fascist leaders, with repetitive actions, 'always-identical,' symbiotized: "People who blindly adjust to the collective become something material, disappearing as self-determined beings" (p. 115).³⁷ This dependence simultaneously becomes an anchor for objectification and fascism by the leaders, who constitute a "manipulative personality".³⁸

The manipulative personality [...] those Nazi commanders - distinguishes themselves through an organizational compulsion, the ultimate inability to experience, a sort of lack of emotion, exaggerated realism. Whatever the cost, they wish to advance the supposed *Realpolitik* [...]. If there were a need to reduce such manipulative personality to a formula - perhaps I shouldn't minimize this, but it aids in understanding - I would define it as an *objectified consciousness*. (Adorno, 1995, p. 115, our translation)³⁹

The manipulative personality suffices the authoritarian, apathetic, omnipotent, objectified character, immediately rationalized by its interests (Adorno, 1995a; 1995b; 1966). It

³⁷ **Original citation:** "Pessoas que se enquadram cegamente em coletividades transformam-se em algo material, desaparecendo como seres autodeterminados" (p. 115).

³⁸ **Original expression:** caráter manipulador.

³⁹ **Original citation:** O caráter manipulador [...] aqueles dirigentes nazistas - distingue-se por sua mania organizadora, sua absoluta incapacidade para ter experiências, um certo tipo de ausência de emoção, de realismo exagerado. Quer, a qualquer preço, levar adiante uma suposta *Realpolitik* [...]. Se tivesse de reduzir a uma fórmula este tipo caráter manipulador - talvez não devesse, mas ajuda na compreensão - denominá-lo-ia de tipo da *consciência coisificada* (Adorno, 1995, p. 115).

aligns with the *modus operandi* of pragmatic minds, which stems from the "calculating reason" that Adorno and Horkheimer explore in *Dialética do Esclarecimento* (1985). This personality constitutes an egotistical, omnipotent, self-centered, narcissistic individual - the one that hinders the dialectical opposition between subject and object, indifferent to the other, focused on control and domination, seeking rationalized power as the ultimate pleasure; their objectified consciousness unleashes "the glorious future of inhumanity" (Adorno; Horkheimer, 1995a, p. 116, our translation).

Additionally, according to Adorno, "To act against the repetition of Auschwitz, it seems essential to clarify how the manipulative character constitutes itself, aiming to hinder its emergence, to the best possible extent, through the modification of conditions" (p. 116).⁴⁰ Thus, the central axis that opposes barbarism, apathy, and the manipulative personality is education; it constitutes the only possible way to stop the inability to love, stemming from fetishization, objectification, and formal-logical rationalism in an inhumane perspective.

What represents types prone to technological fetishization are, in simple terms, people incapable of loving. This statement holds no sentimental or moralizing connotation; it merely describes the insufficient lustful relationship with others. These are wholly apathetic people who must deny,

⁴⁰ **Original citation:** "Visando reagir contra a repetição de Auschwitz, parece-me essencial pôr a claro, em primeiro lugar, como se forma o caráter manipulador, a fim de procurar logo, na medida do possível, impedir seu surgimento mediante a modificação das condições" (p. 116).

within their core, the possibility of loving and who reject it from the beginning - before they can develop their love for others. And any capability for love that may survive in them invariably turns towards means. (p. 118-119)⁴¹

In that sense, the manipulative personality manifests an extreme and objectified identification with "material things", which later moves to a "love for technological equipment". This situation corresponds to objectified individuals who, according to Adorno, "would be obsessed with beautiful machines": "Their love had been absorbed by the objects, by the machines" (1995a, p. 119).⁴² This individual conforms to the apathy of rationalized barbarism: "Certainly, allow me a few words regarding general apathy [...] if people were not so profoundly unconcerned to what happens to others, except for a few, Auschwitz would not have been possible, people would not have tolerated it" (1995a, p. 119).⁴³

Therefore, since apathy is the opposite of humanization, of the possibility of creating conscious loving

⁴¹ **Original citation:** O tipo propenso à fetichização da técnica está representado por pessoas que, dito de modo simples, são incapazes de amar. Esta afirmação não tem um sentido sentimental nem moralizante; apenas se limita a descrever a insuficiente relação libidinosa com outras pessoas. Trata-se de pessoas completamente frias, que devem negar mesmo em seu íntimo a possibilidade de amar e a rechaçam desde o princípio, ainda antes que se desenvolva seu amor pelas outras pessoas. E a capacidade de amar que, porventura, sobreviva nelas volta-se invariavelmente, para os meios (p.p. 118-119).

⁴² **Original citation:** "Seu amor estava absorvido pelos objetos, pelas máquinas como tais" (1995a, p. 119).

⁴³ **Original citation:** "Certamente, permitir-me-ão algumas palavras em relação à frieza em geral [...] não fossem as pessoas tão profundamente indiferentes em relação ao que sucede com os demais, com exceção de uns poucos, Auschwitz não teria sido possível, as pessoas não a teriam tolerado" (1995a, p. 119).

experiences, indifference discloses, according to Adorno (1995a), the "inability to love". Silencing and bearing apathy reinforces the adjustment and perpetuation of barbarism because it inhibits identifying with the pain of others:

Today, each person, without exception, feels excessively unloved because each one is only capable of loving too little. The inability to identify was, no question, the most important psychological condition that gave rise to Auschwitz among people, in a sense, civilized and harmless. (Adorno, 1995, p. 120)⁴⁴

According to Adorno (1995), love, however contradictory or romantic it may be, in a non-simple and non-identical manner, can oppose apathy and indifference through conscious identification, through the criticism of human warmth in contrast to pain and suffering.

"Do not misunderstand me. I do not intend to preach love. To preach it would be useless: No one would have the right to do so, given that the lack of love - as I have already stated - is a flaw in 'all' individuals nowadays, no exception, within their current ways of existing. Preaching love presupposes in those addressed a character structure different from the one who aims to modify it. For the people who one should love are already incapable of loving, and therefore, by no means are worthy of love" (Adorno, 1995a, p. 120, our translation).⁴⁵

⁴⁴ **Original citation:** Cada pessoa hoje, sem exceção alguma, sente-se demasiado pouco amada, porque cada uma só é capaz de amar demasiado pouco. A incapacidade de identificação foi, sem dúvida, a condição psicológica mais importante para que pudesse ocorrer algo assim como Auschwitz entre pessoas, em certa medida, civilizadas e inofensivas. (Adorno, 1995, p. 120)

⁴⁵ **Original citation:** Não me entendam mal. Não pretendo pregar o amor. Pregá-lo seria inútil: Ninguém teria o direito de fazê-lo, posto que a falta de amor hoje - já o disse - é uma falha de 'todas' as pessoas, sem exceção alguma, dentro de suas atuais formas de existência. A pregação do amor pressupõe naqueles aos quais se dirige uma estrutura de caráter diversa da que se quer modificar. Pois as pessoas as quais se deve amar já são incapazes elas mesmo de amar e, portanto, de modo algum são dignas de amor (Adorno, 1995a, p. 120).

Thus, the failure in humanization, considering its values, reveals a social order that reproduces theory and practice in mimetic, rationalized, indifferent, always-identical behavior in rigid and impoverished concepts. Consequently, alienation comes from the lack of conscious identification with the suffering of others; it would give rise to historical apathy, and, against this, the genuine humanistic formation would not retreat. "If there is something that can help counteract apathy as a disgraceful condition, that is the comprehension of what determines its emergence and the push to fight it since its formation in the individual realm" (Adorno, 1995a, p. 121).⁴⁶ In this perspective, Crochík (2001) refers to the recurring apathy Adorno analyzes: "Without apathy, this author tells us, it is not possible to survive in our current world, full of suffering, injustice, and humiliation, but with it, such curses prevail". Only authentic cultural, conscious, and (self)critical education can stop this ongoing social apathy (Crochík, 2001, p. 8).⁴⁷

Following this, Adorno (1995a) stresses childhood education as the fundamental root of critical and conscious formation against barbarism. Although not overlooking the idealization of childhood education, the conscious identification with authority figures at an early age might

⁴⁶ **Original citation:** "Se há algo que pode ajudar contra a frieza como condição de desgraça, seria a compreensão das condições que determinam seu surgimento e o esforço de combatê-las desde a sua formação no âmbito individual" (Adorno, 1995a, p. 121).

⁴⁷ **Original citation:** "Sem a frieza, nos diz esse autor, não é possível viver no mundo atual, repleto de sofrimentos, injustiças e humilhações, mas com ela essas maldições se perpetuam" (CROCHÍK, 2001, p. 8).

contribute to constructing an autonomous, solidary, and self-critical adulthood, through love and in opposition to apathy.

Adorno recognizes this but warns about the threat of ideological illusions in this realm: "The encouragement to give more warmth to children by parents renders it artificial and, precisely for this reason, negates it" (p. 121).⁴⁸ Consequently, the notion of love as a socially obligatory or premeditated satisfaction would invert its intended meaning. Parents, as the ultimate authority, often find themselves unprepared to love, and this extends to other types of authorities in a system governed by expanding capitalist productive forces (Adorno, 1995a; 1995b).

The immediate and thoughtless way to deal with love reflects the lack of preparation: "Love is immediate and, paradoxically, inherently contradicts immediate connections. The recommendation of love - especially in the imperative expression of loving - constitutes itself as part of the ideology that makes apathy eternal" (Adorno, 1995a, p. 121, our translation).⁴⁹ The author adds that: "Within it, there is a coercive and repressive nature acting against the capability of loving. Consequently, the first step would be to bring awareness to apathy and assess the motives that led

⁴⁸ **Original citation:** "O incentivo de dar mais calidez aos filhos pelos pais torna-a artificial, e por isso mesmo, a nega" (Adorno, p. 121).

⁴⁹ **Original citation:** "O amor é algo imediato e está, por essência, em contradição com as relações imediatas. A recomendação do amor - tanto mais na forma imperativa de que se deve amar - constitui em si mesma um componente da ideologia que eterniza a frieza" (Adorno, 1995a, p. 121).

to it" (p. 121, our translation).⁵⁰ In that sense, self-critique and self-reflection would be formative attitudes for experiences that contradict any shape of barbarism.

First, conscious and critical love, as Adorno states, aligns with the dialectical conception of objective and political reality. From this perspective, the human tragedy of fascism and the repetition of authoritarian regimes distort consciousness. Considering this and despite the contexts in which narcissism, antidemocratic, manipulative, and cold individuals arise, we need to invest in "[...] concrete opportunities of resistance" (Adorno, 1995a, p. 122, our translation).⁵¹ Therefore, political education constitutes one of these opportunities: "[...] every and any political education should focus on the need to prevent the recurrence of Auschwitz" (p. 122, our translation).

Thus, where there are perspectives, the pursuit of critical love finds its reason to exist, connected with Hope as a paradoxical subjective element. More directly, it is the possibility of truth: "[...] hope is the only place where truth manifests. Without hope, there is no possibility for truth" (Adorno, 1993, p. 85, our translation).⁵² Hope opposes the impoverished denial of ideological domination that would demystify reality: "Hope, as it tears itself away from reality

⁵⁰ **Original citation:** "Dela fazem parte o caráter coercitivo e repressivo, que atua contra a capacidade de amar. Em consequência, o primeiro passo seria a conscientização da frieza em si e apurar os motivos que conduziram a ela" (p. 121).

⁵¹ **Original citation:** "[...] possibilidades concretas de resistência" (Adorno, 1995a, p. 122).

⁵² **Original citation:** "[...] a esperança é a única forma na qual a verdade se manifesta. Sem esperança seria impossível pensar a ideia de verdade" (Adorno, 1993, p. 85)

by negating it, is the ultimate way for truth to manifest itself" (Adorno, p. 85, our translation).⁵³

Moreover, hope is the way to bear the horror of lovelessness. If conscious love enables self-critical experiences, even in the face of domination, hope gives rise to authentic emancipation while love is demystified as always-identical, and indifferent. And, if Adorno is correct, the hope of the coming-to-be finds in love the formative and political experience for the benefit of a society of diversity, justice, democracy, and human warmth. If this is true, it brings about the possibility of reversing the historical fascist reality, after all, non-identical love unravels itself as "[...] the ability to perceive the similar within the dissimilar" (Adorno, 1993, p. 167, our translation).⁵⁴

⁵³ **Original citation:** "No fim das contas - a esperança na medida em que arranca da realidade ao negá-la -, é a única forma na qual a verdade se manifesta" (Adorno, p. 85).

⁵⁴ **Original citation:** "[...] a capacidade de perceber o semelhante no dessemelhante" (Adorno, 1993, p. 167).

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