https://revistas.ufg.br/philosophos/issue/feedPhilósophos a journal of philosophy2024-10-07T15:24:00-03:00Revista Philósophosrevista.philosophos@gmail.comOpen Journal Systems<p>The <em>Journal Philósophos </em>published its first issue in 1996. Since then we’ve had as our goal the publishing of original and argumentative bibliographical material in the area of philosophy and the promotion of philosophical debate. The works published by<em> Philósophos </em>are always of authors dedicated to research within philosophy proper. The current editorial policy of <em>Philósophos </em>is to alternate numbers gathering papers from the normal inflow with numbers containing specialized thematic dossiers. The semestral publication is under the responsibility of the Faculty of philosophy (FAFIL) and the <a href="http://pos-filosofia.filosofia.ufg.br/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Graduate Program in Philosophy of the Goiás’ Federal University.</a></p> <p>Indexers: <a href="http://www.philinfo.org/electronic.htm" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Philosopher's Index</a>, <a href="http://harvesters.sfu.ca/demo/index.php/search/results?query=Phil%C3%B3sophos" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Open Archives Harvester</a>, <a href="http://www.sumarios.org/periodicos.asp" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Sumários de Revistas Brasileiras</a>, <a href="http://www.doaj.org/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">DOAJ (Directory of Open Access Journals)</a>, <a href="http://directorio.rcaap.pt/handle/1/332" target="_blank" rel="noopener">RCAAP (Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal)</a>.</p> <p><strong>Qualis Capes: A2</strong>.</p> <p>e-ISSN 1982-2928, ISSN; printed version 1414-2236.</p>https://revistas.ufg.br/philosophos/article/view/78663The epistemic reach of aisthēsis in Theaetetus 184-62024-05-14T09:04:07-03:00Anderson de Paula Borgesanderson_borges@ufg.br<p>This paper explores the scope of the theses presented in <em>Theaetetus</em> 184-6 concerning the epistemic capacity of <em>aisthēsis</em>. I develop two main arguments in this analysis. First, I situate the passage within the broader context of 151-183 and propose that the argument in 184-6 stands independently of the analysis of the Protagorean theses conducted in 151-183. Then, I analyze the traditional reading of 184-6, which holds that <em>aisthēsis</em> lacks cognition, and contrast this perspective with that of those who argue that Plato allows for some judicative content at the sensory level. I demonstrate that both readings exaggerate the importance of Plato’s defended position in 184-6, particularly regarding the epistemic limits of perception.</p>2024-06-30T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2024 Philósophos a journal of philosophyhttps://revistas.ufg.br/philosophos/article/view/78465Kuhn entre a Teoria Social da Investigação Científica e o Construcionismo Social2024-05-15T09:18:25-03:00Maurício Cavalcante Riosmauricioriosfil@gmail.com<p>In this article, we understand how Thomas Kuhn's perspective influences the Philosophy of Sciences in aspects of the scientific community. For this, we start from the following problem: if Kuhn's thought is characterized by a Social Theory of Scientific Investigation, does this theory endorse some form of Social Constructionist Thesis? Our hypothesis is if the Social Theory of Scientific Inquiry) refers to the social activity of scientists in the community, then this is not enough to endorse some form of Social Constructionist Thesis. That said, our objective is to understand these two interpretations of Kuhn's thought to differentiate the Social Theory of Scientific Inquiry in relation to the Social Constructionist epistemological perspective. We justify this work based on Kuhn's legacy for the proliferation of theoretical and epistemological concepts in the sciences. In this sense, we analyze two concepts: 1. The Social Theory of Scientific Research based on the interpretations of Luiz Herique Dutra and 2. Social Constructionism based on the criticisms of Ian Hacking.</p> <p><em>Keywords</em>: Thomas Samuel Kuhn; Luis Henrique Dutra; Ian Hacking; Social Theory of Scientific Investigation; Social Constructionist.</p>2024-06-30T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2024 Philósophos a journal of philosophyhttps://revistas.ufg.br/philosophos/article/view/78376Realismo vs. Instrumentalismo em Análise do Comportamento2024-04-26T10:15:29-03:00Filipe Lazzerifilipelazzeri@ufg.brDiego Ziliodzilioufes@gmail.com<p class="western" style="line-height: 100%; orphans: 0; widows: 0; margin-bottom: 0cm;" align="justify"><span lang="en-US">This article delves into the ongoing debate between realism and instrumentalism regarding scientific theories, placing a particular emphasis on the debate unfolding within the context of Behavior Analysis (BA). Realist axiologies are characterized by two key tenets: (i) scientific theories should aim to identify and describe the extra-theoretical processes, entities, properties, and/or relations within their study domains; and (ii) we are justified in deeming them successful in this endeavor when they are (highly) empirically adequate (or mature). Instrumentalist (or antirealist) axiologies, on the other hand, reject (ii), and in some cases, also (i). In the context of metatheoretical debates within BA, both from its predominant research matrix (radical behaviorism) and from some of its alternative foundational proposals (such as molar behaviorism), forms of instrumentalism are notably prevalent. This work presents a logical-conceptual reconstruction and examination of the recent debate in BA, scrutinizing common instrumentalist arguments within this context and outlining the defense of a nuanced form of realism, close to the proposal put forward by F. Suppe.</span></p>2024-06-30T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2024 Philósophos a journal of philosophyhttps://revistas.ufg.br/philosophos/article/view/78536Vibrant Matter and Affective Bodies2024-05-09T15:34:03-03:00Diogo Barros Bogéadiogobogeaa@hotmail.com<p align="justify"><span style="color: #000000;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="font-size: small;">In this article, we will present some considerations that allow us to outline a non-anthropocentric ontology. The article is divided into 5 parts. In the first part, we follow Meillassoux's confrontation with the predominance of correlationism after Kantian critical philosophy. Next, we present Jane Bennett's vital materialism as a non-anthropocentric alternative to correlationist philosophies. In the third section, we recover Spinoza's notion of affective bodies to think about a relational flat ontology. Following that, we present Nietzsche's affective relational perspectivism as an alternative to Kantian idealism. Finally, we introduce the notion of assemblage as a key concept for the composition of a non-anthropocentric ontology.</span></span></span></p>2024-06-30T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2024 Philósophos a journal of philosophyhttps://revistas.ufg.br/philosophos/article/view/78660Eric Weil and the (non)meaning of a world shaped by Science2024-04-06T17:45:28-03:00Judikael Castelo Brancojudikael79@hotmail.com<p>Based on the work of Eric Weil, this article analyzes the historical conditions for the emergence and evolution of modern science, reflecting on its meaning for our civilization. Divided into three distinct parts, the text begins by investigating the historical circumstances that gave rise to modern science and its progress until it became the basis of the “Cartesian dream”. It then examines the paradox inherent in the modern conception of science, highlighting its supposed “axiological neutrality”. This paradox is evident when the freedom of science from value considerations is itself considered a fundamental value. In this context, one must simultaneously recognize the importance of science in controlling nature and history and its insufficiency in dealing with the question of the meaning of this domain. Finally, the text addresses the common reactions to the challenge of the meaning of science: scientism and scientific denialism. The latter argument is developed within the framework of the relationship between philosophy and science.</p>2024-06-30T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2024 Philósophos a journal of philosophyhttps://revistas.ufg.br/philosophos/article/view/78535nothing technical or machine-like2024-05-14T10:40:44-03:00Marcos Aurélio Fernandesmaffernandes69@gmail.com<p> <em>Abstract</em>: this reflective contribution takes up and rethinks the question of the essence of technique following the guiding thread of Heidegger's meditation. It discusses the essentiality of the essence and then seeks to bring to light how the historical provenance of the technique occurs in the Greek <em>téchnē</em> and in the Roman <em>ars</em>, and, furthermore, how is the way of being and of come into force of the modern technique.</p> <p><em>Keywords</em>: technique, essence, production, unveiling, nothing.</p>2024-06-30T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2024 Philósophos a journal of philosophyhttps://revistas.ufg.br/philosophos/article/view/78434Vittorio Hösle’s philosophy of technology amplified by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi’s flow psychology2024-02-25T10:50:32-03:00Gabriel Almeida Assumpçãogabrielchou@gmail.com<p>We aim at presenting a debate proposal between Vittorio Hösle (1960-)’s philosophy of technology and environmental psychology, more specifically Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (1934-2021)’s flow psychology. Hösle’s reflections on technology and ecology are an expansion of Hans Jonas (1903-1993)’s philosophy, although emphasizing other topics, such as values and economy. Based in parallels between Hösle and Csikszentmihalyi’s accounts, we attempt to verify affinities between environmental psychology and Hösle’s theses. Furthermore, based on current studies on flow psychology and environmental psychology, we verify if there is an amplification of philosophy of technology with the empirical content regarding ecology and economy, aiming at a deepened bond between both domains, such as proposed by Hösle himself, fostering the study of both thinkers, still pending further research in Brazil.</p>2024-06-30T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2024 Philósophos a journal of philosophyhttps://revistas.ufg.br/philosophos/article/view/78497 Cultura técnica e recusa do antropocentrismo2024-05-15T16:42:30-03:00Itamar Soares Veigainpesquisa@yahoo.com.br<p>This article discusses the definitions of the technical object according to Gilbert Simondon's philosophy, focusing on criticisms of the anthropocentric perspective of technique. It investigates whether the technical object, in its demand for a technical culture and in its own process of evolution/concretization, exhibits a non-anthropocentric nature. This non-anthropocentric appeal can be highlighted by the advancements in communication and processing techniques, as seen in artificial intelligence models from the second half of the 21st century. The paper examines these aspects of the technical object, emphasizing Simondon's philosophical contributions to understanding today's technological reality.</p>2024-06-30T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2024 Philósophos a journal of philosophyhttps://revistas.ufg.br/philosophos/article/view/78537A Obsolescência Programada em questão2024-03-07T10:46:26-03:00Alex Calazansfiloalexcalazans@gmail.com<p><strong>Abstract</strong>: This article aims to evaluate how the considerations made by Gilbert Simondon, about the nature of <em>technical objects</em>, are incompatible with the practice of <em>planned obsolescence</em>. More precisely, we are interested in knowing how the concept of <em>concretization</em>, related to ontological aspects of such objects, has ethical implications against this type of disposal of what is produced by the contemporary industrialized world. Planned obsolescence, in the capitalist industrial context, has been used in the sense of economic maintenance. However, there are several problems resulting from this practice. One of them is the destructive impacts caused to the environment. So, would there be elements in Simondon's proposal to find answers to the problems caused by planned obsolescence? We argue that a way out of this lies in the ethical orientation inherent to the appropriate development of technical objects, from the perspective of their concretization.</p> <p><strong>Keywords</strong>: Simondon; Technical object; Planned obsolescence; Concretization; Ethic.</p>2024-06-30T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2024 Philósophos a journal of philosophyhttps://revistas.ufg.br/philosophos/article/view/78538A ontologia dos objetos digitais na perspectiva do conceito simondoniano de concretização2024-06-03T16:54:23-03:00Veronica Ferreira Bahr Calazanscalazansveronica@gmail.com<p>The attempt to establish an ontology of digital objects involves complex issues. The reduction of this ontology to the level of logic is not sufficient to encompass such ontological complexity and, even less, to shed light on the axiological consequences of such a discussion. Although digital objects are programmed within the scope of computational logic, they have guaranteed their role as mediators, between man and nature, as much as material technical objects, insofar as they are part of the technical actions indisputably present in the dynamics of today's society. However, if works on the ontology of material technical objects are already scarce, those focused on an ontology of digital objects are even rarer, even though these two classes of objects constitute an important part of the social structure. We find in the work of Gilbert Simondon a path focused on the ontology of material technical objects. The question that guides us here concerns the possibility of extending such an ontology to digital objects and pointing out the main limits and divergences raised by the peculiarities of this other class of objects. To do so, we resort to the renowned concept of concretization, central to the Simondonian ontogenesis of material technical objects, to apply it also to digital objects.</p>2024-07-05T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2024 Philósophos a journal of philosophyhttps://revistas.ufg.br/philosophos/article/view/78438Filosofia e Técnica Argumentativa Retórico-Dissociativa2024-04-10T08:12:28-03:00Narbal de Marsillac Fontesnmfmarsillac@gmail.com<p class="p1"><span class="s1">O objetivo do presente texto é mostrar, pela técnica argumentativa retórico-dissociativa, o caráter tópico de toda dissociação nocional e de todo discurso filosófico, de tal forma que, em vez de resolver uma incompatibilidade, como costumam pensar os retóricos, tais dissociações servem de suporte, incontestado, mas não incontestável, de um discurso que se revela, assim, sempre circunscrito e comprometido com escolhas. Desta forma, procuramos estabelecer as cinco regras da dissociação que visam facilitar a aplicação dessa técnica. A importância de tal objetivo é criar algumas condições de resistência e contestação discursiva que despertem a crítica e a reflexão próprias de uma conversação infinita pela tomada de consciência do nosso próprio “senso de relatividade” e sua aplicação relacionada ao preconceito, ao discurso de ódio e aos direitos humanos.</span></p>2024-06-30T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2024 Philósophos a journal of philosophyhttps://revistas.ufg.br/philosophos/article/view/78173Algorithms that rule us2024-04-03T16:30:06-03:00Ralph Leal Heckimagomundi@hotmail.com<p>The aim of this article is to reflect on the structure of the digital revolution, based on the influence of Big Techs on the behavior of people and societies. To understand the negative impacts, we will first analyze the infrastructure of the system, highlighting the internet, the relationship of hyperconnectivity and the use of Big Data, which is presented according to Floridi, as the environment of hyperhistory and the onlife mode of existence. Next, we will address algorithmic manipulation in behavioral modulation, exemplifying it in politics and in the economy, discussing microtargeting and management systems of harmful algorithms, the AMD. Followed by a critical reflection on the interface of this structure with the digital economy, we arrive at digital colonialism and data colonialism. Finally, I suggest a more incisive participation of philosophical thought on this structure that governs increasingly deeper dimensions of human existence, both in the form of a new ethical information paradigm, and in the construction of concepts opposing certain aspects of the structure.</p>2024-06-30T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2024 Philósophos a journal of philosophyhttps://revistas.ufg.br/philosophos/article/view/78657Inferential limits of Machine’s Intelligence2024-05-03T16:55:01-03:00Lucas Volletluvollet@gmail.com<p>We argue that a framework for comprehending the basic differences between the mental structures of humans and machines (as they currently exist) is established by Transcendental Analytics' argument in the <em>Critique of Pure Reason</em>. It will be demonstrated that Kant's theory of the synthetic unity of apperception, as established by Transcendental Analytics' argument in the <em>Critique of Pure Reason</em>, along with Dummett's theory of meaning for meaning-theoretical predictions of inferential connections, can assist in establishing this framework. When combined, these form a framework for organizing a coherent differentiation between what we refer to as the conscious grasp of the unity that is present during judgment and the machine-performed manipulation of signs. In the end, we will present an appendix on the underdevelopment of the Kantian framework for distinguishing artificial intelligence from human intelligence.</p>2024-06-30T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2024 Philósophos a journal of philosophyhttps://revistas.ufg.br/philosophos/article/view/78539Três abordagens sobre a tecnologia e sua relação com o religioso e o sagrado2024-04-27T10:49:02-03:00Vanessa Delazeri Mocellinvanamocellin@gmail.com<p>The issue discussed in this work refers to the relation between the technological and the sacred, regarding the context of philosophic, historiographic and sociologic discourses about technology. Science and Technology are typically thought of and characterized in opposition to religious beliefs, myths and mysticism. In this sense, they are considered the pinnacle of rationality, method and efficiency as opposed to faith. However, as we will see in this article, this way of thinking about technology and science is just one of the possible ways of thinking about this relationship between science and technology and the sacred and the religious. In this study, three contemporary approaches of such debate are analyzed and compared. The first one, which refers to the perspective of authors Jacques Ellul and Martin Heidegger, claims that technology overcomes and destroys the sacred, replacing it. The second one, designed by authors David Noble e Erik Davis, describes technology as being sacred by itself, meaning that contemporary technologies might allow human beings to reach their ideals of transcendence and overcoming of finiteness. The third one, while recognizing the connection between technology and the categories of the sacred, elaborates a commentary on the salvific tone of the speech about technology.</p>2024-06-30T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2024 Philósophos a journal of philosophyhttps://revistas.ufg.br/philosophos/article/view/78529Autonomia artificial2024-03-09T09:52:19-03:00Cristian Arão Silva de Jesuscristian_arao@hotmail.com<p>A tecnologia de aprendizado de máquina fez com que as inteligências artificiais aprendessem, de certa forma, por conta própria. Isso fez com que surgisse preocupação e encantamento por uma suposta autonomia dos sistemas automatizados. No entanto, em que pesem os processos de automação, isso não faz com que as máquinas sejam realmente autônomas, ainda que pareçam. Essa aparência de autonomia é sustentada por muito trabalho humano escondido. Por trás do véu tecnológico o que existe é um exército de trabalhadores que sustentam o bom funcionamento dos algoritmos. Esse fenômeno não é uma novidade nem um ponto fora da curva no desenvolvimento tecnológico. Marx, n’<em>O Capital</em>, já havia explicado o processo que transforma os trabalhadores em peças da engrenagem e a maquinaria da indústria em sujeito. Marcuse, dando continuidade a essa ideia, argumenta que disso surgiu uma racionalidade tecnológica que submete os seres humanos à lógica das máquinas. Pretende-se com esse artigo apresentar as análises desses filósofos sobre essa relação humano-máquina e oferecer uma perspectiva para superar essa inversão que coloca as pessoas à serviço da tecnologia.</p>2024-06-30T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2024 Philósophos a journal of philosophyhttps://revistas.ufg.br/philosophos/article/view/78641On the neutrality and values of artifacts2024-05-10T11:08:30-03:00Daniel de Vasconcelos Costacosta.daniel_4@uerj.brPedro Fior Mota de Andradepefimoan@gmail.com<p>This paper criticizes the thesis of the neutrality of moral values of artifacts, and makes the case for a proposal known as Value Sensitive Design, which states that moral values must be considered in the construction and analysis of artifacts. First, (1) we will present the best defense of the thesis of the neutrality of moral values of artifacts, made by Joseph Pitt. In the following, (2) we will criticize each of the arguments presented by Pitt in favor of the neutrality thesis. Finally, (3) we will consider the Value Sensitive Design proposal presented by Ibo van de Poel and Peter Kroes and explain how it would be suitable for a critique of the values and moral issues that artifacts can represent.</p>2024-06-30T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2024 Philósophos a journal of philosophyhttps://revistas.ufg.br/philosophos/article/view/78415TECNOLOGY AND VALUES2024-02-14T17:45:32-03:00Geraldo das Dôres de Armendaneg5armendane70@yahoo.com<p>This article discusses the need to cultivate <em>practical wisdom </em>(<em>phronesis</em>) in the face of the challenges posed by technological advances in contemporary societies. This is a type of rationality that has to do with the field of <em>duty</em>, as the sphere of <em>values</em>, the <em>meaning of</em> <em>life</em> and the most fundamental human existential choices. To do this, we will address some issues relevant to the debate in philosophy of technology, such as: the idea that technology is not reducible to applied science, but that it constitutes specific knowledge; the distinction between the concept of technique and technology; the political dimension of technology; and finally, the need to think about an ethical rationality that guides human action in today's world.</p>2024-06-30T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2024 Philósophos a journal of philosophyhttps://revistas.ufg.br/philosophos/article/view/78656Democracia e tecnologia no Grande Glocal da contemporânea sociedade do risco e da informação2024-06-30T08:53:42-03:00Roberto Correia da Silva Gomes Caldasrobertocsgcaldas@uol.com.br<p>The study in question involves Science, technique and technology intertwining in reference to the regulation of the good (sustainable) development of each nation, considering, for this purpose, the different meanings of Cybernetics juxtaposed in the risk and information society in interaction with related themes, such as interactive glocalization, socio-dromocracy and regulatory governance, through a parallel between the Theory of democracy and the positivization of Law. To this end, the analysis adopts a deductive method, using a bibliographical and documental approach, and an interdisciplinary methodology to identify the context of conflicts between Branches of government, and between these and stakeholders, in the anthropocene risk and information society, involving, for this purpose, different branches of Law, as well as Philosophy of Law, Sociology of Law, Social Psychology and Political Science, through a critical analysis of the reality exposed and using the aforementioned doctrine as a theoretical framework. The conclusion is that there is a need for <em>glocal/global governance </em>to regulate conflicts in order to preserve social peace and prosperous coexistence, valuing and weighing up personal or socially sectorized points of view of an ethical and moral nature, as well as the projection of solipsistic objectives onto the collective bias.</p>2024-07-02T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2024 Philósophos a journal of philosophyhttps://revistas.ufg.br/philosophos/article/view/79766Editorial2024-06-24T16:46:25-03:00Renato Moscatelirmoscateli@hotmail.com2024-06-30T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2024 Philósophos a journal of philosophyhttps://revistas.ufg.br/philosophos/article/view/80778Expediente e Sumário2024-10-07T15:24:00-03:00Renato Moscatelirmoscateli@hotmail.com2024-10-07T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2024 Philósophos a journal of philosophy