

SENTIMENTS AS THE FOUNDATION OF RECIPROCAL DEMANDS: A SENTIMENTALIST INVESTIGATION OF THE MORALITY FROM HUME AND TUGENDHAT¹

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Abstract: The initial matter to be confronted by a sentimentalist investigation of immanent nature about moral is how to conceptualize it in a way that explains what ordinarily happens in the world. In this sense, a vertical explanation – where actions are catalogued based on abstract theoretical constructions – says little about the quotidian life. Thus, the investigation presented in this article will be guided by a methodological inversion. I will go deeper in the comprehension of the functionality of morality through the analysis of ordinary social behaviors. The concept of moral presented by Tugendhat, to whom morality is a set of reciprocal demands expressed by sentences of duty based on sentiments, is relevant to this approach of the subject matter. Conjointly, there will be a punctual study of the humane moral thought in order to sustain that the motivating power to approve or censor socially relevant actions lies on sentiments. As the moral phenomenon is being investigated from an immanent point of view, the closing of this article will present a possible compatibility between the theoretical bases of the humane empiricism and the social aspects of Tugendhat's philosophy.

Keywords: Moral; Sentimentalism; Tugendhat; Hume.

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An immanent approach of morality requires an investigation starting at the existing elements of the ordinary social behavior. In this sense, in order to establish the relation between the epistemic bases of the empiricism and the practical philosophy, it is necessary to explain normative behaviors through immanent mechanisms of sociability. The central point of this article is to investigate if the moral phenomenon may have developed from the elements that make life in small groups functional and harmonic.

An investigation of this nature is not achievable by studying higher principles of a specific conceptual system. In this article, there will be an empiricist inclination – that states that it is necessary to have a methodological inversion of the traditional studies about the topic. Considering that this approach of the matter is based on the analysis of experience data, it is then relevant to use what can be observed in the quotidian social life. Morality here is defined as a phenomenon understood through social behaviors, and not the other way round. Therefore, the intended investigation will be aimed at the sentiments, as conceived by humean philosophy, as an essential characteristic of the ability to ordinarily make distinctions of moral nature.

The empirical method of investigation about morals is found in the 18th century. Although not empirical in itself, the direction of this investigation will be towards the development of a philosophical framework in which future empirical researches on moral phenomena can be grounded on. The main issue addressed in empirical studies regards the understanding of the motivational element that is in-

herent to behaviors of approving and censoring socially relevant actions. Considering the sentimentalist line applied here, the proposed development of the subject matter goes beyond a conceptual exegesis of the studied authors, as it highlights that particular aspects of their theories may help the comprehension of morality. The investigation will start with reviewing the definition of morality and its functionality, in order to understand which characteristics work as motivational basis for the normative behavior. The goal is to draft the plausibility of a conception of immanent moral that is understood based on the social characteristics of the species.

1. MORALITY AND SOCIAL BONDING

Investigating the moral phenomenon through an immanent point of view demands a clarification of the concept of morality to support such perspective. Although referring to a single phenomenon, the term moral has been conceived in different ways throughout the history of philosophy. In this sense, the first step in this article is to establish and apply a conceptual singularity. The starting point is a definition of moral that may refer to what actually happens in the normative relations around the world.

It is quite evident that normative behaviors are a central element of the social life. It is then important to understand what factually occurs in this kind of relation, and how to understand it through the investigation proposed in this article. Although it constitutes a singular phenomenon, it is necessary to consider that the term moral has been differently understood throughout the philosophical tradition.

The complexity of such a conceptualization lies exactly in the need for responding to apparently contradictory factual plans. The emerging issue is how to define a concept of moral without dogmatically denying the plurality of normative systems existing in the world.

In his work, Tugendhat (2001) uses an ethnologic definition³ of moral that disconnects it from its conceptual bases of epistemic commitments towards the philosophic tradition. According to the ethnology, morality consists of a set of behavioral regularities that depend on how the mutual social pressure takes place among the members of a group. According to the author, the normativity that is intrinsic to the most intimate social relations is characterized as a system of reciprocal demands on which members of a group participate since birth. The distinctive factor of this concept is the restriction of freedom, since the individual is already inserted in a group with normative relations guided by affective bonds from birth.

The challenge of this definition is to keep it open enough to accommodate different or antagonist conceptions of social systems, so that it does not sound absurd to talk about morality in a universal level. This challenge may be overcome if the term is used as a reference to the most elementary structure of the social relations, instead of a particular normative system. In his investigation, Tugendhat (1997, p. 92 - author's translation) points out that "[...] if we do not perceive ourselves as members of the moral

³ The ethnologic definition of moral has been discussed by the central authors in the study of morality. If the reader wishes to know more about the use of such definition, see the work of Rawls (1971) and Scanlon (1998).

community (whatever it is), the possibility of approval and criticism disappear, and with this, also, the moral sentiments”⁴. Although it requires a better understanding, I defend that this meaning better represents the *prima facie* use of the term ‘moral’, considering that it refers to a broad and basic social phenomenon.

A moral is, in this sense, a system of reciprocal demands that are expressed in sentences of duty; this duty – the “obligation” – is based on sentiments of indignation and guilt, and to each moral system belongs a concept of a morally good person⁵ (Tugendhat, 2001, p. 61 – author’s translation).

The question then is what happens when one finds oneself outside the group. After all, according to the definition presented above, one would not be subject to the rules of the system. I believe the central point to address this objection is to understand if that would prevent one from experiencing certain sentiments. In other words, to what extent being outside the group influences or affects the relation of reciprocal demands between one and the other members.

According to Tugendhat (2001), an individual cannot choose to be indifferent to the behavior of others as long as they are apt to express sentiments. The author points out that one cannot simply prevent others from becoming outrage with him by establishing borderlines between different

⁴ [...] se não nos compreendemos como membros da comunidade moral (qualquer que seja ela), desaparece a possibilidade da aprovação e da crítica, e com isto, também, dos sentimentos morais (Tugendhat, 1997, p. 92).

⁵ Uma moral é, nesse sentido, um sistema de exigências recíprocas que se expressam em sentenças de dever; esse dever – a “obrigação” – está calcado nos sentimentos de indignação e culpa, e a cada sistema moral pertence um conceito de pessoa moralmente boa (Tugendhat, 2001, p. 61).

groups. This reinforces the argument that not belonging to the group might redirect the experience of certain sentiments, but does not eliminate them altogether. For instance, an outsider would not feel embarrassment for being censured by members of a group he or she does not belong to. There would hardly be guilt or shame for not acting according to the rules of that group. Likewise, the members of the group would not feel embarrassed for an external censure of their actions. However, the outsider would be more motivated to censor or approve the actions of the members of that group as he or she becomes affected by them, and the same would happen with the members. In other words, communication boundaries do not avoid manifestations of indignation by the members of the group towards the behaviors of outsiders nor vice-versa.

It is important to emphasize that, while indignation gets past any boundaries between particular social systems, that does not happen with shame and guilt. The issue here is that, in every presented situation, the social interactions occurring between the parties are sustained by sentiments. Thus, lingering on outside a particular normative system does not mean abandoning altogether the motivation to approve or censor the actions of others. Actually, the asymmetry of sentiments experienced in these different relations only confirms the tribal element that is inherent to the most elementary structure of morality as a unified system of reciprocal demands.

The analysis above points to the distinction between particular normative systems and the morality as a broad system of reciprocal demands, where there is an asymmetry between indignation, guilt and shame. It is relevant to

comprehend that either to realize or to receive demands, it is only necessary for the individual to be able to experience sentiments, which are influenced by the type of established social bond. As a result, there is no universalism related to the target of the sentiments, and the ability to feel and express them is enough for ordinary moral judgements to occur. Indeed, reason may make the social bonds to be established between different groups more complex. However, it will, at most, broaden and redirect the reach of the sentiments, which are considered essential to the most elementary normative systems.

The humane empiricism contributes to this position with his investigation about the foundation of moral. According to Hume (2007), moral judgements have no precedence over sentiments, but they are in their basis. Here, I call the attention to sympathy and the position it has as the basis of the bond between individuals, which provides a common ground and allows similar sentiments to be experienced with regards to actions that are relevant to those who are close to them.

In our general approbation of characters and manners, the useful tendency of the social virtues moves us [...] by affecting the benevolent principles of our frame, engage us on the side of the social virtues. And it appears, as an additional confirmation, that these principles of humanity and sympathy enter so deeply into all our sentiments, and have so powerful an influence, as may enable them to excite the strongest censure and applause (Hume, 2007, p. 231).

Tugendhat (1997) acknowledges that ordinary normative systems constitute a broad mosaic of moral tribes, where there is more or less overlapping of agreements on their borders. In addition, there are different social dynam-

ics guided by reciprocal demands. The distinctive point that unites them in the moral sphere is – except for adoptions and the like – that the members of a group are inserted in it since birth and for all their lives. Hume (2007) may connect to that perspective when he states that reason is instrumental for the individuals' ability to socially bond, and they are able to expand it and make it more complex. However, even if there are varied forms of social bonding associated with different complexities of normative relations, the motivation to morally approve or censor actions still lays on the sentiments of the species.

In ordinary social relations, the individual is rarely confronted with the decision of accepting or not a particular system of morality. Most commonly, one is already in the position of being excluded or not from a normative system, since one is already emotionally connected to a group since birth. In order to understand this social dynamics, it is important to understand to what extent sentiments and reasons are able to motivate moral approvals or censures. After all, a number of the existing contentions in this field comes from the confrontation – and all the variations – of these two positions. Hume (2007) believes that the defense either of sentiments or of reason has good arguments when addressing the motivational basis of normative behaviors. The central point of the next session will be to explore the human answer to this matter. The investigation will focus on the discussion of the moral motivation, especially the role of sentiments and reasons in the approval and censure of socially relevant actions.

2. MOTIVATIONAL BASES OF THE MORAL BEHAVIOR

The existence of moral distinctions is a fact, since it is not conceivable that all actions are equally deserving of approval or censure. With a Newtonian inspiration, Hume (2007) addresses the foundation of these distinctions from an empiricist point of view and not through *a priori* speculations. When it comes to morality, the author defines social behaviors as the observation platform, saving an important role to the investigation of the normative behavior motivational bases.

As this is a question of fact, not of abstract theory, the only way we can expect to succeed is by following the experimental method, deriving general maxims from a comparison of particular instances. The other scientific method, in which a general abstract principle is first established and then a variety of inferences and conclusions are drawn from it, may be intrinsically better, but [...] is a common source of illusion and error in morals as well as in other subjects. (Hume, 2007, p. 4).

In his investigation of morality, Hume (2007) consider the nature of virtue as estimable and of vice as odious. In fact, the author proceeds by asking if reason has the power to produce beforehand the motivation to morally approve or censor a certain object and his answer to this question is negative. As Hume (2007, p. 3) states: “inferences etc. reveal truths; but they can’t influence our behavior because the truths they reveal are indifferent, and don’t create either desire or aversion”. If reason is not enough to define interest, it makes sense to think that the sentiments have a decisive role in the matter. Therefore, based on the investigation of the relation between reason and sentiment and its motivational influence over the normative behavior, this

examination must be done through a sentimentalist study of morality.

Hume (2007) states that reason does not have the power to define beforehand what will be object to moral appreciation or not. Reason actually has an instrumental character, and it does not have sufficient strength to motivate the actions of someone confronted with moral decisions, being that role reserved to sentiments. For example, benevolent principles incite sentiments of tenderness, and such affective inclination impels an individual to defend them. Thus, a truth that does not refer to passions will only obtain a cold acceptance from understanding. In this case, the biggest joy it may provide is to please an intellectual curiosity, and nothing else. With regards to the role of reason on how moral distinctions are made, Ayer (2001, p. 108) says that “reason has control over the passions, in so far as it can be used to discover that a passion is based on a false judgment, as for example when the object of one’s fear is proven not to exist”. However, if the discovered object does not cause fear, its mere revelation would not motivate an adequate reaction to that evaluation.

If you extinguish all the warm feelings and attitudes in favour of virtue, and all disgust or aversion to vice, thus making people totally indifferent towards these distinctions, the result will be that morality is no longer a practical study, having no tendency to regulate our lives and actions. (Hume, 2007, p. 3).

If reason could determine *a priori* which actions are morally praiseworthy or censurable and if it were in itself motivational, the role of sentiments could be left unconsidered in investigations of this nature. However, this is not how the humane empiricism sees the matter. According to

Hume (2007, p. 65), “twist and turn this matter as much as you will, you can never base morality on relations; you have to bring in the decisions of sentiment”. In other words, reason may influence sentiments in order to cause the individual to acquire adequate insight about the motivations or consequences of a certain behavior. However, an action cannot cause a sensation for which there is no adequate reception structure. Thus, as much as reason may influence a behavior, it is limited by the spectrum of the sentiments the individual is able to experience.

There is the final judgment, which pronounces people and actions amiable or odious, praiseworthy or blamable, stamps on them the mark of honour or infamy, approval or censure, renders morality an active principle, and makes virtue our happiness, and vice our misery. This final moral conclusion depends on some internal sense or feeling that nature has made universal in the whole species; for only a feeling could have an influence such as I have described (Hume, 2007, p. 3).

According to Hume (2007), although the distinctions made by reason have an important role in the normative behavior, the motivational element of the ordinary moral judgements lies in the sentiments. Notably, the author proposes that the motivational impulse of the action would be found in the universal affective apparatus of the species. When considering morality from the immanent perspective proposed in this article, I defend that Tugendhat’s (2001) proposal – that morality consists of a system of reciprocal demands – is compatible with Hume’s (2007) description of the human nature, especially regarding the sentimental base of the moral judgements. In other words, actions of reciprocal moral approval or censure are useful to the mainte-

nance of the social harmony of a group. It is plausible to consider that the use of reciprocal normative relations coincides with the affective apparatus preferences of the species, and it is congruent to the evaluations of the actions motivated by the respective sensations, to the extent that what is morally approvable is reciprocally pleasant, and what is condemnable is unpleasant. Once this issue is understood, it is important to present which mechanism underlays the capacity of social bonding from which the reciprocity of demands derives.

2.1 RELATIONS BETWEEN SENTIMENTS AND SYMPATHY

Being able to experience sensations of pleasure and pain is essential for sentiments to become regulators of social behavior. Smith (2005, p. 164) claims that “[...] the distinction between the good and the evil, thus taken in their widest scope, is therefore ‘founded on pleasure and pain’”. If a sentiment does not cause the individual to feel any of these sensations, their actions will tend to indifference towards the behavior of other members of the group. In this sense, feeling pleasure and pain leads one’s preferences for the action that will cause them more satisfaction.

According to Hume (1896), moral distinctions are based on sentiments that cause the sensations of pleasure and pain. When satisfaction is instigated, the individual is biased to assimilate the cause of such sensation as being good. Similarly, whenever something causes an unpleasant sensation, it is assimilated as being bad. Nevertheless, the author adds that the specificity of the moral sentiment is that the awakened pleasure will always come from actions

that provide social wellbeing.

According to Sinhababu (2017), Hume's concept of sentiments can be understood as reactions endowed with unique phenomenological qualities. In this sense, it is plausible to consider that a behavior will be target of moral approval or censure only as a sign of a quality that awakens a social interest. As has already been pointed out above, individuals who perform actions of that nature become object of reciprocal demands within the community where they live. However, in order for a sentiment to be awakened and a sensation of pleasure or pain to be experienced, qualities that help with the reception of such signs are needed. Otherwise, the deeds of a member of the group would be indifferent to the others, as they do not awaken any sentiments and do not motivate them to judge the performed actions. Behaviors indicate traces of character much better than discourses, and as such indicators, they are sorted as being praiseworthy or odious.

The affections of others are at first known to us only by their effects, i.e. by their external bodily signs. These signs through association recall in idea the passions which have accompanied them in ourselves in the past. This is the first stage in the process of communication. The second stage consists in the conversion of the passions thus ideally entertained into the actual passions themselves (Smith, 2005, p. 170).

There is a great similarity throughout the whole species with regards to how sentiments are experienced. In other words, there is no sentiment that motivates an individual to make a moral judgement that cannot be experienced by any other individual, even if in different intensity. According to Hume (1896), sympathy is the quality that provides this sort

of interchange and grants intersubjectivity to sentiments. According to Schneewind (1998, p. 364), “sympathy is an animal capacity enabling the feelings of others to reverberate within us”. For instance, the sensations of pleasure and pain that follow the sentiments of one individual will also affect others and, if the affective bonds between them are solid, both tend to experience the same state of mind.

Hume (1896) adds that through sympathy individuals set the usefulness or not of an object or behavior. If an action awakens pleasure in its holder, it will be seen as pleasant. Likewise, if a certain action causes the opposite effect, it will be learnt as unpleasant. Quinton (1999, p.42) states that “the origins of morality in the passions is sympathy, the natural inclination to hold on to the happiness of others and to feel discomfort at their suffering”. In a community where social dynamics is regulated by reciprocal demands, the individual whose attitudes awaken pleasure in the other members tends to be seen as useful and, consequently, as a good member of the group. In this sense, such actions will please because of their tendency to awaken pleasure and they will tend to bring benefit and social esteem to their doer.

No quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in itself and in its consequences, than the propensity we have to sympathize with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments, however different from, or even contrary to our own (Hume, 1896, p. 166).

As to moral distinctions, one can say that when a member of the group expresses a sentiment, the others will promptly pass from the effects to the causes. This happens due to the individuals’ ability to be sympathetic to the

pleasure or pain of others. For example, **A** is feeling indignant because of **B**'s behavior. When the other members of the group apprehend such sentiment in **A**, they have in themselves the idea of indignation, but they experience it in a less vivacious fashion than **A**. Through sympathy, this sentiment is intensified, in a way that the idea of indignation apprehended by the group turns into an impression, and gets the same intensity experienced by **A**.

We react with a negative affect when someone violates the rules. Such moral affection can be called indignation. As it is an affection that any person of society would have towards any other, a shared affection, the transgressor also has this affection when others transgress and, therefore, have a corresponding negative affect when it transgresses itself; and this fact can be called guilt⁶ (Tugendhat, 2003, p. 15 – author's translation).

Sympathy turns the idea of a sentiment formed in one's mind into an impression experienced by one, and it intensifies in one the sensations of pleasure or pain. Tugendhat (2003, p. 16 – author's translation) highlights that “[...] the group of indignation and sentiment of guilty constitute what is the sanction relative to moral rules⁷”. According to the author, blame, shame and indignation are central for the regulation of social life. Hume (1896, p. 294) states that “we are only sensible of its causes or effects. From these we infer the passion: and consequently these give rise to our

⁶ Reagimos com um afeto negativo, quando alguém transgrede as normas. Tal afeto moral pode ser chamado de indignação. Como se trata de um afeto que qualquer pessoa da sociedade teria com qualquer outra, de um afeto compartilhado, também a pessoa transgressora tem esse afeto, quando outros transgredem e, por isso, tem um afeto negativo correspondente, quando ela mesma transgrede; e esse fato pode ser chamado de culpa (Tugendhat, 2003, p. 15).

⁷ [...] o conjunto de indignação e sentimento de culpa constitui o que é a sanção em relação às normas morais (Tugendhat, 2003, p. 16).

sympathy”. The main point here is that these sentiments may act as such due to sympathy. In order to go further in this matter, the next part of this article addresses the relation between sentiments and social life.

2.2 RELATION BETWEEN SENTIMENTS AND SOCIABILITY

This investigation aims at making the universalism of the ethnological definition of moral compatible with inherent aspects of the social life of the species. Hume (2007) admits that cultural factors may increase or decrease the capacity of sympathy towards certain actions. Religious dogmas and extreme nationalisms are examples of how cultural elements can influence the distinction made between praiseworthy or censurable attitudes. However, specific cultural values are extremely broad and differ as much as languages or words. And they do not have the required universalism to constitute the basis of all the moral esteem or reproach. As seen before, what universally motivates individuals to morally approve or censor social behaviors are the sentiments of the species.

If nature hadn't made any such distinction, based on the original constitution of the mind, language would not have contained the words 'honourable' and 'shameful', 'lovely' and 'odious', 'noble' and 'despicable'; and if politicians had invented these terms they could never have made them intelligible to anyone (Hume, 2007, p. 25).

It is undeniable that cultural signs are able to influence social behaviors, but they only do so because they awaken the sentiments that make individuals reactive to actions of that nature. According to Hume (2007), social virtues help promote social order, and that is why they conquer the con-

tentment and raise to the highest ground⁸. This is understandable to the extent that they consequently bring the benefits of mutual protection and assistance. The consequence of affection and resulting pursuit of such virtues is the maintenance of the functionality of life in groups, as this is an intrinsic characteristic of the moral phenomenon.

Hume (2007) says that private interests have influence over social behaviors. At a first moment, this argument seems to open space for the idea that moral distinctions derive from an inclination to selfishness. Nonetheless, the author disagrees that the sensations of pleasure and pain – intrinsic to sentiments – have such a trend. The argument that the last basis of social relations is selfishness contradicts the notion that there is moral judgement even for the actions that do not directly influence the life of those who are directly implicated. According to the author, this fact points to individuals being interested in the actions of other individuals whose action do not concern them, which contrasts with genuinely selfish dispositions.

Socially relevant actions are part of the day by day and there is an inclination to name as virtuous actions that please – because they favor – the harmony of the group, and those ones with selfish trends incite displeasure and are seen as vicious. In this sense, conducts that contribute to social wellbeing are often associated to virtues, and the op-

⁸ A deeper investigation of that matter can be found at Silveira (2015), where I discuss the relation between sympathy and the virtues of benevolence and justice. The conclusion is that sympathy grants an intersubjective power to sentiments, which causes the interests of the group members to converge to a common place. This process transforms a private sensation into a social interest, and what is good for one becomes good for all. As a result, the social virtues – natural or not – raise to a higher level due to the intersubjective character that sympathy adds to sentiments.

posite to vices. A moral selfish would say that such behavioral inclinations are variations of the love for oneself, supporting the argument with the frequent close relation between the public and the private interests. Undoubtedly, the ability of wishing one's own wellbeing is a strong principle of the species. For example, an individual tends to first sate their own hunger and not share their food with any other member of the species. Yet, when there are affective bonds with a group, that individual is inclined to share food with more or less equanimity among the members. That individual will also demand other members to do the same, as much as it will be demanded by them. After all, the wellbeing of one individual influences the others', and the common interest is to have strong enough peers for mutual protection.

After a superficial reading, the explanation above seems to favor the selfishness thesis. However, the simple convergence of interests is not enough to support the selfishness hypothesis. After all, there are cases where the public interest is opposite to the private one, but not only does the emotional response remain the same, but it even favors the social aspect. According to Hume (2007, p.26), "we are perhaps quicker to praise generous humane actions that further our own interests; but those interests come nowhere near to explaining the topics of praise that we insist on". The main aspect to emphasize here is that the indifference to social wellbeing is not an intrinsic characteristic of the species.

Hume's (2007) investigation about the moral phenomenon shows that sympathy brings intersubjectivity to sentiments. As a result, something that is interesting to the

group also pleases each of its members individually. The relevant point here is the distinction between understanding the gifts of life in group and the motivation to remain in the community. Obviously, behaviors that favor the social life would not be functional if they were not advantageous for the individuals as well. Nevertheless, these actions are not motivated by the consideration of its efficiency, but by a reciprocal interest in the social wellbeing. This is expressed as the satisfaction with socially adequate actions and the resistance to those that are not. In order to continue on this matter, I will return to Hume and Tugendhat to investigate the concept of *good person* from a sentimentalist viewpoint.

3. SENTIMENTALISM AND THE CONCEPT OF *GOOD PERSON*

One of the central points of Tugendhat's (2001) investigation about moral regards the meaning of *good person* within the social relations guided by reciprocal demands. For the author, such concept is associated to one acting in accordance with how the members of the group reciprocally demand one to do so. Likewise, although Hume (2007) does not base his practical philosophy on the analysis of the mutual pressures made by members of a community, it is not odd to his practical philosophy the pursuit of understanding what means to be good. In general terms, one shall be considered good when one is gifted with a genuinely benevolent motivation and whose actions are useful to society. Therefore, the questioning of both authors becomes relatively similar if we consider that every moral system somehow addresses this concept. It is important to under-

stand in what sense the meaning of being good relates to the inherent sentiments of the species.

This presumption must become a certainty, when we find that most of those qualities, which we *naturally* approve of, have actually that tendency, and render a man a proper member of society: While the qualities, which we *naturally* disapprove of, have a contrary tendency, and render any intercourse with the person dangerous or disagreeable (Hume, 1896, p. 383).

Based on the concept of morality presented in the first part of this article, it is plausible to consider that the concept of kindness is connected to the concept of good member of the community. Indeed, Tugendhat (2001, p. 60 – author’s translation) states that “a person is good [...] when she is as the members of the moral community reciprocal want (or demand) each other to be⁹”. The behaviors of the group members are influenced by the reciprocal demands of each one, which are motivated by the sentiments that are common to all of them. In this sense, the freedom of action is restricted when it comes to relations of that nature. From an ethnologic perspective of morality, what emerges is a pressure guided by sentiments for each individual to act in accordance with what is expected from each other.

Every member of a community will be exposed to approval or censure by the other members, depending on how their actions meet what is expected from them. Tugendhat (2001, p. 92 – author’s translation) says that “[...] if we do not comprehend ourselves as members of the moral community [...], the possibility of approval and criticism disap-

⁹ Uma pessoa é boa [...] quando ela é tal como os membros da comunidade moral querem (ou exigem) reciprocamente que seja (Tugendhat, 2001, p. 60).

pears and, with this, also the moral sentiments¹⁰". Whenever the bonding guided by sentiments is consistent among the members, not only will they feel indignant when the other does not act as expected, but they will also feel guilt and shame for not corresponding to the expectations of the others. In social relations of that nature, censure manifests through reactions based on sentiments of guilt, shame and indignation, and the maximum penalty may be the banishment of the transgressor by the group.

Tugendhat (1997) believes that even a morally autonomous individual does not simply want to withdraw from the group they live with. On the contrary, they try to show the other members that the rules that govern the community are not functional to the preservation of the social well-being anymore, frequently pointing out what changes they consider necessary. The reciprocal demands constitute the rules within this system, and it will gain power to impel an action whenever there is a penalty for breaching the rule. In other words, the sanction lays in the socially relevant characteristic of guilt, shame and indignation. Considering that Hume (1896) places sympathy as the element that makes others' sentiments vivid and grants them an intersubjective character, it is plausible to think that through this quality, the sentiments are intensified and gain the power of moral censure and approval within the group.

Dissatisfaction normally targets social rules, but even a moral reformist acts within the spectrum of the sentiments

¹⁰ [...] se não nos compreendemos como membros da comunidade moral [...], desaparece a possibilidade da aprovação e da crítica, e com isto, também, dos sentimentos morais (Tugendhat, 2001, p. 92).

mentioned above. What happens in this case is not a negation of the social bonding guided by sentiments, but rather their redirection to different actions. In fact, the social rooting of morality is kept, even when there is disagreement among the members of the community. The core difference between personal maxims and moral rules is that the first have individualist character and the second comes from how social relations are established.

Hume (1896) is insightful to defend that the focus of an investigation about moral does not lay on a reformless society, but on the individuals comprising it. Thus, the author directs the focus of approval and censure on the behavior of the community members. Such perspective gains even more amplitude when seen through the questioning of when an individual can be considered good. To this aspect, it is possible to add the perspective of Tugendhat (2001, p. 68 - author's translation), when he says that "there is no single 'we', from which one could depart, nor a single 'for us', to which doing good refers¹¹". My position is that the concept of *good person* results from the intelligibility of the sentiments made possible by the quality of sympathy, and they are the foundation that motivates the ordinary judgements of moral approval or censure.

[...] moral distinctions arise, in a great measure, from the tendency of qualities and characters to the interests of society, and that 'tis our concern for that interest, which makes us approve or disapprove of them. Now we have no such extensive concern for society but from sympathy; and consequently 'tis that principle, which takes us so far

¹¹ Não existe nem um 'nós' único, do qual se poderia partir, nem um 'para nós' único, ao qual o fazer o bem se refira (Tugendhat, 2001, p. 68).

out of ourselves, as to give us the same pleasure or uneasiness in the characters of others, as if they had a tendency to our own advantage or loss (Hume, 1896, p. 384).

The content associated to the concept of *good person* may vary in different communities, but if its foundation is self-destructive, then being good would inexorably lead to the dissolution of such groups, and that is not what can be observed in the ordinary life. The concept of good is connected to the ability of acting in accordance with the normative system of a group, and anybody who follows the rules gains the esteem and respect of their peers. To Tugendhat (2001, p. 73 – author’s translation), "if one reacts in an affectively way when another acts badly, he cannot but have the same corresponding reaction when himself acts badly¹²". In this sense, it is pertinent to consider that the ability to feel guilt, shame and indignation whenever there is a transgression of the social rules is associated to the type of social bonding guided by the sentiments that motivate reciprocal demands, and in ultimate extent such sentiments are originated from sympathy. The inclination to contentment towards actions considered good to the social life is due to its contribution to the maintenance of life in group.

4. CONCLUSION

The perspective of morality presented in the first part of this article places it in the core of the social relations. Tugendhat (1997) understands that being part of a group can

¹² Se alguém reage de modo afetivo quando outro age mal, ele não poderá senão ter a mesma correspondente reação quando ele próprio agir mal (Tugendhat, 2001, p. 73).

be defined not only as being able to follow a rule, but also to react when there is a breach of rule, either if it is committed by oneself or by another member. This universalizes the characteristics that motivate the approval or censure of socially relevant actions within a community. In agreement with Hume (2007), it was possible to conclude that although it is possible to distinguish an action using reason, sentiments motivate an individual to react in case of a breach of rule. Thoughts can foresee the consequences of a certain behavior, but sentiments impel the action. Thus, the reciprocal demands are motivated by the array of inherent sentiments of the species.

Apropos of the moral phenomenon and after having investigated it from the perspective of the motivation to action, it was possible to verify that moral judgements are based upon the sentiments that are universal to the species. According to Hume (2007), as ordinarily happens, the motivation to morally approve or censor an action is based on a sentiment of approval or censure directed towards such action. For the author, sentiments are associated with atavistic reactions of pleasure and pain, which incite in an individual a pleasant or unpleasant sensation, causing them to distinguish the cause of such sensation as good or bad, respectively. Nonetheless, such sentiments can only gain moral power to regulate social behaviors when the group's wellbeing is mixed up with that of the individual.

Tugendhat (2001) stated that every member of a moral system is exposed to the censure of their peers if they fail to act as expected. Considering that every individual is born amid a group, the maximum weight of censure is basically their banishment. The author defends that these sanctions

are expressed by sentiments such as guilt, shame and indignation. Thus, indignation is experienced not only when a peer does not act as expected, but also when the individual does not meet the community's expectations. Hume's (1896) contribution here is about the bonds that connect the members of a group, and how they need to be well established in order for this to happen. Sympathy is pointed out by the author as the quality that can grant intelligibility to sentiments and motivate pro-social behaviors. Therefore, the reciprocal demands expressed by sentiments only gain power to work as penalty to a breach of a group's rule when there are rooted affective bonds among the members of the community.

From Tugendhat's (2001) perspective, the universal aspect of the moral behavior is the existence of a distinction between what is right and what is wrong, even if such content varies between groups. Considering the ethnologic perspective defended by the author, the central element of such actions is the social pressure for the members of a group to act accordingly to what they expect of each other. Thus, the concept of *good person* is linked to the ability to act accordingly to the expectations of the group. Hume (1896) states that sympathy is able to turn the idea of a sentiment into a vivid impression, causing what is felt by each member of the group to reverberate on others. The humane contribution to the matter consists of connecting the ordinary reciprocal demands of each member with sympathy, namely, the quality that is able to grant vividness and intersubjectivity to the sentiments that motivate reactions of that nature.

In conclusion, the central point of this article is that

morality may be understood as a system of reciprocal demands, and its foundation is the social bonding influenced by the quality of sympathy. The consequence is that morality becomes relative to internal sanctions established by the members of the community and expressed by sentiments of guilt, shame and indignation. Thus, the normative behavior is based on a social system where the distinction between right and wrong is congruent to behaviors that are functional to social wellbeing. The advance presented by this perspective is that immanent qualities and characteristics of the species are sufficient to explain how the moral phenomenon ordinarily takes place.

Resumo: O problema inicial a ser confrontado por uma investigação sentimentalista de caráter imanente sobre a moral é o de conceituá-la de modo a explicar o que ocorre ordinariamente no mundo. Neste sentido, uma explicação vertical onde ações são catalogadas a partir de construções teóricas abstratas pouco diz sobre a vida cotidiana. Portanto, a investigação apresentada neste artigo será pautada por uma inversão metodológica. É mediante a análise de comportamentos sociais ordinários que avançarei na compreensão da moralidade a partir de sua funcionalidade. O conceito de moral apresentado por Tugendhat, para quem a moralidade é um conjunto de exigências recíprocas expressas por sentenças de dever baseadas em sentimentos, possui relevância no modo como abordarei a questão. Conjuntamente, realizarei um estudo pontual do pensamento moral humeano, a fim de sustentar que a força motivadora para aprovar e censurar ações socialmente relevantes está calcada nos sentimentos. Uma vez que se está investigando o fenômeno moral sob uma ótica imanente, encerrarei o artigo apresentando um possível compatibilismo entre as bases teóricas do empirismo humeano e os aspectos sociais da filosofia de Tugendhat.

Palavras-chave: Moral; Sentimentalismo; Tugendhat; Hume.

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