

The Influence of the Memory of the 1964-1985 Dictatorship on Brazilian Democratic Politics

A influência da memória da ditadura de 1964-1985 na política democrática brasileira

Clorrie Violet Yeomans¹

Abstract: This paper discusses how the memory of the Brazilian dictatorship exerts both positive and negative influences on the democratic quality of post-transitional politics. Conservative politicians, such as Jair Bolsonaro, and their civilian supporters appropriate the military regime's binary political rhetoric that demonised progressive, leftist forces and glorified authoritarian, right-wing forces in order to censor political participation and to strengthen the ongoing impunity of the Brazilian Armed Forces and the Military Police. However, these barriers to combatting impunity via the state have also inspired the innovation of grassroots social movements which offer an alternative view of the past, denouncing the dictatorship's authoritarian reality and instilling a culture of human and civil rights among Brazilians today. The case study of Brazil demonstrates how the memory of authoritarianism in South America can be a double-edged sword for post-transition democracy and human rights.

Keywords: Memory. Brazilian military dictatorship. Democracy.

Resumo: Este artigo discute como a memória da ditadura brasileira exerce influências positivas e negativas na qualidade democrática da política pós-transição. A retórica política binária do regime militar que demonizou as forças progressistas de esquerda e glorificou as forças autoritárias de direita é uma ferramenta poderosa apropriada por políticos conservadores, como Jair Bolsonaro, e seus apoiadores civis para censurar a participação política e fortalecer a impunidade contínua das Forças Armadas e Polícia Militar brasileiras. No entanto, estas barreiras ao combate à impunidade por meio do Estado também inspiraram a inovação de movimentos sociais de base que oferecem uma visão alternativa do passado, denunciando a realidade autoritária da ditadura e inculcando uma cultura de direitos humanos e civis entre os brasileiros de hoje. O estudo de caso do Brasil demonstra como a memória do

¹ Clorrie Yeomans holds an MPhil in Latin American Studies from St Antony's College, University of Oxford and a BA in Modern Languages and Cultures from Durham University in the United Kingdom. This paper is based on an assessment written for the "Politics of Brazil" module of her MPhil. clorrie.v.yeomans@gmail.com; <https://orcid.org/0009-0001-9451-3151>; https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Clorrie_Yeomans3.

autoritarismo na América do Sul pode ser hoje uma faca de dois gumes para a democracia e os direitos humanos.

Palavras-chave: Memória. Ditadura militar brasileira. Democracia.

Introduction

According to the proverb, ‘Brazilians have no memory’². Nonetheless, after four decades, the memory of Brazil’s most recent dictatorship (1964-1985) prevails in politics. The dictatorship has assumed a stark presence in the discourse of Brazil’s former president and former army captain, Jair Bolsonaro. The authoritarian right-wing populist glorifies the dictatorship, declaring that the anniversary of the 1964 coup should be ‘a day of great liberty’ (Della Coletta, 2020) and ‘the second date of independence of our Brazil’ (Mergulhão; Castro, 2021). Bolsonaro has opened the unhealed wounds of Brazil’s dictatorship. It is, therefore, an opportune moment to reflect on the dictatorship’s enduring influence in Brazil today. This paper traces the links between the memory of the 1964-1985 dictatorship and democratic politics in post-transitional Brazil, from the presidencies of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2003) to the former Bolsonaro administration (2019-2022).

Hegemonic right-wing narratives uphold a version of History that was written by the perpetrators of the military regime to guarantee their impunity. Echoing its Argentine counterpart, the Brazilian military disseminated a ‘theory of two demons’ that argued the dictatorship was a two-sided war between the state and leftist guerrillas. During the Cold War, authoritarian regimes in South America adopted a National Security Doctrine which legitimised state terror against civilians and the repression of civil liberties by arguing that they were an exceptional, necessary measure to protect the nation from communism. The Brazilian military regime portrayed itself as a legitimate, democratic government that restored order and saved Brazil from descending into guerrilla warfare. The

² ‘O brasileiro não tem memória’ (cited in English by Ridenti *et al.*, 2018, p. 33).

rose-tinted vision of the dictatorship was legitimised by the unprecedented economic prosperity that Brazil experienced during this period.

Military leaders depended on the media to project this positive facade of the regime. TV Globo - the largest media outlet in Brazil - came under attack during the 2013 civil protests. Globo was coerced into publicly apologising for its complicity with the 1964-1985 dictatorship (Globo, 2013). The statement also named other media outlets that had yet to acknowledge their role as propaganda branches for the military regime. Some Brazilian media organisations thus continue to protect their own legitimacy by disseminating hegemonic narratives that downplay the human rights violations perpetrated by the military regime.

Alongside the media, the education system transmits these right-wing hegemonic narratives that glorify the dictatorship as a period of order and prosperity. The Bolsonaro government announced a clear strategy for militarising the state school curriculum and eliminating 'Marxist indoctrination' (Jeantet, 2019). The government has criticised teachers for introducing their students to the work of Paulo Freire, one of Brazil's main educators and leftist thinkers. This attack against freedom of speech and critical thinking in educational institutions echoed the repression of students and teachers during the 1964-1985 dictatorship. The Bolsonaro government's anti-leftist education reform also promised to rewrite the history of the 1964-1985 dictatorship in school textbooks. In April 2019, the former Education Minister for Bolsonaro's government, Ricardo Vélez, announced that 'there will be progressive changes' in History textbooks so that 'children have the true, real idea of the military coup' (Murakawa; Araújo, 2019). Vélez's authoritarian revisionist History claimed that the 1964-1985 military regime was not a dictatorship, but rather 'a democratic regime of force, because it was necessary at that moment.' (*ibid.*)

Through the education system and the media, hegemonic right-wing narratives written by the military regime are internalised by civil society. This creates a weak civil consciousness regarding the violent and undemocratic nature of the military regime. Right-wing authoritarian politicians, such as Bolsonaro, draw on this fictitious myth about the past to build an 'imagined

community' with conservative voters and military members (Anderson, 1983). Bolsonaro and his supporters share a common vision to rebuild Brazil's national identity by restoring the order and prosperity of the dictatorship.

In this paper, I will show how the memory of the 1964-1985 dictatorship is a multilateral phenomenon, in which right-wing hegemonic narratives compete with alternative histories voiced by civilian activists. In the first section, I outline the definitions of 'memory', 'dictatorship', and 'democratic politics' that frame my research question. I, then, explain the particularities of Brazil's military regime which make Brazil a distinctive case study within the wider scholarship on the memory of authoritarian rule in South America.

The main body of the paper discusses how the memory of the dictatorship exerts both positive and negative influences on the democratic quality of post-transitional politics in Brazil, depending on who is using that memory and for what purpose. The military regime's binary political rhetoric that demonised progressive, leftist forces and glorified authoritarian, right-wing forces is a powerful tool appropriated by conservative politicians and their civilian supporters in post-transitional Brazil. Similarly to the military regime, the authoritarian right in post-transitional Brazil denigrates any movements or politicians who challenge the elite's economic and political monopoly. This polarising discourse continues to exert an antidemocratic influence on Brazilian politics by censoring political participation and movements that aim to expand citizenship rights. Additionally, right-wing hegemonic narratives serve to uphold the military's legitimacy and popular backing. Contrary to Wendy Hunter's (1995) thesis, this means that politicians often accept or even encourage (rather than confront) the military's influence over the political sphere. The structures of impunity engineered by the military leaders during the democratic transition, thus, remain largely intact. This allows the Military Police to continue to commit the same extralegal acts against civilians (such as torture and assassination) as during the dictatorship, only on a much larger scale³. Ultimately, I contend that

³ Police killings in Brazil have risen since the military dictatorship due to the 'war on drugs'. Brazil is the country with the highest number of police killings worldwide and young Afro-Brazilians are disproportionately targeted (César Ramos; Völker, 2020). Pereira and Ungar (2004, p. 7) argue that the violent and insufficiently supervised police force is a longstanding issue in Brazil that

the prevailing hegemonic narratives of the dictatorship contribute to Brazil's current 'disjunctive democracy' (Caldeira; Holston, 1999). While Brazilians have gained universal political rights to vote in regular, free elections since the 1985 transition, there is, actually, considerable continuity between the dictatorship and current democracy given the weak rule of law, the persistent, high levels of extralegal violence committed by state security forces, and the state's failure to provide universal citizenship rights.

However, I, also, contend that social movements focusing on human rights and the dictatorship's legacy offer an alternative view of the recent past, denouncing the dictatorship's authoritarian reality and educating Brazilians about their entitlement to civil rights. The Brazilian state's delayed and inconsistent approach to the memory of authoritarian rule has fuelled the innovation and creativity of Brazilian civil activists. By distancing themselves from the state, grassroots actors have managed to carve new ways of using memory to strengthen democracy from the bottom up.

Definitions

I follow Astrid Erll's (2008, p.2) definition of 'cultural memory' as 'the interplay of present and past in socio-cultural contexts'. I, therefore, adopt a pluralistic understanding of memory, arguing that civil and political actors engage with narratives of the military dictatorship in divergent ways to suit their particular objectives. Today, generations of Brazilians born into democracy do not remember the dictatorship through their first-hand experience of trauma. Rather, they interact with what Marianne Hirsch (2012) calls 'postmemory'. That is to say, they indirectly engage with the trauma of the dictatorship through stories and cultural relics that are shared in familial and social settings. Such 'postmemory'

predates the military dictatorship. The institutionalised police repression was adapted by the military regime and maintained after the democratic transition.

practices counteract the hegemonic narratives transmitted through the education system and the media.

For the purposes of this paper, the dictatorship was the period of military rule conventionally dated from the coup on 31st March to 1st April 1964 to the first democratic elections on 15th January 1985. I do appreciate that the twenty-one-year dictatorship was intertwined with a prolonged trajectory of systematic violence, authoritarianism, and oligarchism in Brazil (Ridenti *et al.*, 2018, p. 33). However, as the Brazilian National Truth Commission's report explains, repression intensified significantly from 1964 to 1985 (2014, p. 962). For this reason, the period of the dictatorship warrants individual attention. Finally, I consider Brazil's regime as a 'civilian-military', rather than a 'military', dictatorship to recognise the involvement of politicians, civilians, media outlets, and business actors in supporting the regime (Ridenti *et al.*, 2018).

My definition of 'democratic politics' refers to politics since the establishment of a political democracy with competitive elections in 1985. However, political scientists widely concur that the quality of Latin American democracies cannot solely be measured by the absence of authoritarian regimes and the presence of free and fair elections. The region's democratic transitions did not lead to the establishment of fully-fledged liberal democracies⁴ resembling most countries in the West. Intermediate expressions between democracy and authoritarianism have developed, including the authoritarian populism of Jair Bolsonaro (Pachano; Anselmi, 2017, pp. 1-2). Many scholars argue that the region's persistent levels of violence are an indicator of its poor democracy. Contrastingly, Arias and Goldstein's (2010) 'violent pluralism' thesis posits that violence is, in fact, an enduring characteristic of Latin American democracies. They emphasise that, following the transition to democracy, the authoritarian state's monopoly of violence was replaced by a constellation of competing state and non-state violent actors. Moreover, Guillermo O'Donnell (1993) maintains

⁴ I refer to 'liberal democracy' according to Kenneth Bollen's (2009) definition as 'the extent to which a political system allows political liberties and democratic rule'. Political liberties refer to the degree of freedom of expression and democratic rule implies 'the accountability of the elites to the general population' through free and fair elections. Political liberties mean that every individual has the right to take part in government.

that Latin American democracies are defined by their ‘low intensity citizenship’ since different social groups have unequal opportunities to exercise the political rights to which they are entitled under democracy. In a similar vein, Teresa Caldeira and James Holston’s (1999) ‘disjunctive democracy’ thesis focuses on the civil and cultural dimensions of democracy. They maintain that Latin America’s post-transitional democracies are ‘disjunctive’ since there are political systems with regular competitive elections that nonetheless fail to deliver full civil rights and uphold the rule of law. The above critiques of the quality of democracy in Latin America have enriched the multidimensional analysis of this paper. I will measure the democratic quality of the Brazilian political system not only according to the presence of competitive elections. I will, also, benchmark democracy according to guarantees of universal political, civil, and cultural rights, the rule of law, and levels of extralegal violence committed by the state against civilians.

Contextualising the dictatorship

From the period of the 1950s to the 1980s, US-backed authoritarian regimes swept across South America, ousting democratically elected governments during the Cold War. They adopted a National Security Doctrine to supposedly protect Western, Christian values from the threat of communist expansion and popular mobilisation (Klein; Luna, 2017, Introduction, para. 3). Through fear, the military regimes legitimised the suspension of civil liberties and civilian repression including: illegal and arbitrary detentions, torture, executions, forced disappearances, and hiding corpses (National Truth Commission, 2014, p. 964). In total, there were 191 deaths, 210 disappearances, and 33 disappeared persons whose bodies were later found (National Truth Commission, 2014, p. 963)⁵. Land disputes, also, engendered the death or disappearance of at least 1,196 peasants and 8,350 indigenous people (Teles, 2019, p. 88). Beyond its

⁵ Many cases remain unrecorded (National Truth Commission, 2014, p. 963).

national agenda, Brazil's regime targeted foreign nationals through Operation Condor (Dinges, 2004; Lessa, 2018; Lessa, 2022) and intervened in Chile, Bolivia, and Uruguay to prevent or overturn left-wing governments (Harmer, 2012).

Several factors distinguish Brazil's dictatorship from those of other South American countries. Firstly, it was less physically repressive in terms of direct civilian repression by state personnel (Pereira, 2005). The 435 total estimated deaths and disappearances in Brazil (National Truth Commission, 2014, p. 963) are dwarfed by the 9,000⁶ (CONADEP, 1984) in Argentina and 2,025 in Chile (Rettig Commission, 1991, p. 1122). Consequently, the Brazilian Armed Forces emerged from the dictatorship with greater popular support than their South American counterparts (Hunter, 1995, p. 425).

The Brazilian dictatorship was also characterised by its economic success or so-called 'miracle' (Power, 2016, p. 15). GDP steadily grew until 1980, allowing infrastructural expansion and an increase in many Brazilians' material wealth (Power, 2016; Mainwaring, 1986, p. 154). The Brazilian dictatorship, therefore, maintained support from civilian and business elites and retained its power over a prolonged period⁷ (Power, 2016, p. 16). The Brazilian regime also built legitimacy by creating a pseudo-democracy (Mainwaring, 1986, p. 150). It maintained many of its democratic institutions, unlike Argentina and Chile, and only briefly closed Congress twice (Mainwaring, 1986). The regime even created an opposition party, the *Movimento Democrático Brasileiro* (MDB), which developed reasonable independence (Mainwaring, 1986). Furthermore, Brazil underwent a gradual, pacted transition to democracy which resembled a negotiation between the military regime and its opponents, rather than a rupture with the past (Mainwaring, 1986, p. 151). Having been a prominent member of the military regime, Brazil's first democratic president, José Sarney carried six

⁶ Human rights activists claim there were 30,000 deaths and disappearances (Comunicación Madres, 2019).

⁷ The Brazilian dictatorship was the most enduring Cold War dictatorship of the Southern Cone, lasting twenty one years. Argentina's regime lasted seven years (from 1976 to 1983), Uruguay's regime lasted twelve years (from 1973 to 1985), and the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile persisted for seventeen years (from 1973 to 1990).

military members of the dictatorship to his cabinet (Mainwaring, 1986, p. 174). These former members of the military regime helped draft the 1988 Constitution which still underpins the Brazilian political system today (Mainwaring, 1986; Zaverucha, 2010). The Brazilian military regime, thus, protected its impunity after the democratic transition, contrastingly to the Argentine regime which was dismantled after the debacle of the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War (Lessa, 2013, pp. 50-52).

The Brazilian state's memory efforts

The unique characteristics of the Brazilian dictatorship led Brazil to become a regional outlier in how it deals with the memory of its authoritarian past. The 1979 Amnesty Law was instituted by the military regime to excuse all 'political crimes' committed by military officers and left-wing guerrillas between September 1961 and August 1979 (Brasil, 1979). At the time, Brazilian activists welcomed the law since it emancipated political prisoners and restored their citizenship and employment (Teles, 2019, p. 91). During this period, amnesties were the normalised way of dealing with the end of military regimes. However, countries such as Argentina and Uruguay later overturned their amnesties during the turn-of-the-century switch in international norms⁸ which Francesca Lessa and Leigh Payne (2012) call 'the age of accountability'. Contrastingly, Brazil's Supreme Court reinstated the amnesty in 2010, despite being reprimanded by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights for its 'application of the Amnesty Law as an impediment to the investigation, trial and punishment' of dictatorship-era crimes (IACHR, 2010, p. 2).

Although the Amnesty Law has blocked criminal justice, certain Brazilian presidents have brought about restorative justice⁹. Cardoso (1995-

⁸ The shift was prompted by the establishment of the International Criminal Court in 2002.

⁹ Restorative justice focuses on the restitution of victims and compensating for the material losses and physical and psychological harm they endured.

2003) introduced the Law of the Disappeared (Brasil, 1995) obligating the state to pay indemnities to victims' families and established the 2002 Amnesty Commission. During his previous administrations (2003- 2011), current president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2011) expanded reparations and granted pardons to army officers who defected to the left-wing guerrillas (Power, 2016, p. 22). The most significant milestones were achieved under President Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016) including the establishment of Brazil's National Truth Commission in 2012. Having avoided its past for twenty-seven years, Brazil lagged behind Chile and Peru - which established truth commissions - and Argentina - which put military leaders on trial - during the early post-transitional years (Power, 2016, p. 21). Once Bolsonaro became President in 2019, he swiftly terminated state memory initiatives by censoring several memory and justice professionals, institutions, and networks (Snider, 2020, p. 5).



Figure One: photograph posted by Bolsonaro on Twitter on 31 March 2015: the fifty-first anniversary of the Brazilian military coup. Bolsonaro is standing in front of the Congress with a sign which reads: 'Congratulations to the military - 31 March 1964. Thanks to you, Brazil is not Cuba'.

The restorative justice efforts by presidents Cardoso, Lula, and Rousseff serve to exemplify that Brazilian politics is not inherently doomed by the dictatorship's legacy: a generalisation that I intentionally avoid. Rather, hegemonic narratives written by the military regime constitute a powerful

rhetorical tool that is adapted and appropriated by far-right populist politicians. I, now, turn to explain how such right-wing populist discourse draws on the memory of the military regime to exert an antidemocratic influence on politics in post-transitional Brazil.

Authoritarian memory in right-wing political rhetoric

Collective memory is formed by juxtaposing the self with the other (Bauer, 2019, p. 38). The military regime claimed that the Brazilian nation was at war against an invisible internal enemy who menaced the Western, Christian order. This polarising ‘theory of the two demons’ has entrenched itself in Brazilian collective memory (Paiva, 2019, p. 44). It provides a powerful rhetorical tool for the ‘nostalgic’ right which reifies the so-called ‘security and order’ and traditional patriarchal values of the military regime (Payne; de Souza Santos, 2020, p. 33). The following paragraphs develop Tayrine Dias *et al.*'s (2021) conceptualisation of Brazilian right-wing populist rhetoric by tracing its ties to the military regime. I show that Brazil's ‘nostalgic’ right (Payne; de Souza Santos, 2020, p. 33) employs the military regime's ‘antagonism’ in two ways: 1) by depicting itself as the guardian of national security and the left as ‘terrorists’; and 2) by defining itself as the guarantor of order and the left as chaotic (Dias *et al.*, 2021, p. 70). Like the military regime, right-wing politicians and their supporters today employ ‘reductionism’: identifying leftist or progressive politics as a scapegoat for their heterogeneous grievances (*ibid.*). I will now demonstrate how this political rhetoric exerted an antidemocratic influence on Brazilian politics during Rousseff's presidencies and Bolsonaro's 2018 presidential campaign.

National security versus terrorism

Brazilian politics has entered a war between two ‘memory communities’ (Bauer, 2019, p. 43): the victims of the military regime, such as former President Rousseff, and the sympathisers of the regime from the military including former President Bolsonaro. During her presidency, Rousseff challenged the military’s impunity by establishing the National Truth Commission and declassifying military archives. However, Rousseff’s efforts backfired as her opponents spread fake news online accusing her of attempting terrorism during her time in the guerrilla movement (Alencar, 2012, Chapter 1). Attempting to clear her image, Rousseff publicly lamented her violent tactics as a guerrilla in an interview for the *Folha de São Paulo*: ‘I changed. [...] I didn’t change sides, and I’m proud of that. I changed my methods, my vision’¹⁰ (cited in Odilla, 2009, own translation). However, it was too little too late. Former military members backed the calls for Rousseff’s impeachment, aiming to protect themselves from prosecutions in any potential trials that Rousseff could have initiated (Bauer, 2019, p. 41; Paiva, 2019, p. 48). Notably, Bolsonaro voted for his predecessor’s impeachment in honour of her torturer: ‘[a]gainst communism [...] for the memory of Colonel Carlos Alberto Brilhante Ustra’¹¹ (cited in Cardoso, 2016, own translation). The former army captain even called for the establishment of truth commissions for the crimes perpetrated by left-wing guerrillas.

Bolsonaro’s rejection of Rousseff’s Truth Commission reflects his wider agenda to crack down on human rights, which he argues are a pretence for protecting criminals (Paiva, 2019, p. 44). During his election campaign, Bolsonaro adapted the ‘antagonism’ of the political rhetoric of the military regime. He proclaimed that Brazil’s elitist ‘virtuous people’ (Dias *et al*, 2021, p. 70) were once again threatened by a new profile of *criminals* or *terrorists*. Although Bolsonaro is a self-declared anti-communist, he recycled the model of the ‘subversive’, communist enemy of the military regime and applied it to a new enemy: poor, Black Brazilians (Weichert, 2021). By creating fear and social divisions, Bolsonaro convinced millions of voters that he was a strong military outsider who could restore national security in the new ‘war on drugs’.

¹⁰ ‘Eu mudei [...] Não mudei de lado não, isso é um orgulho. Mudei de métodos, de visão’.

¹¹ ‘Contra o comunismo [...] Pela memória do coronel Carlos Alberto Brilhante Ustra’.

This polarising political discourse dating back to the military regime hinders democratic politics for several reasons. Bolsonaro appropriates Brazil's looming 'culture of fear' (Caldeira; Holston, 1999, p. 694) from the dictatorship to divide and conquer the electorate. Moreover, he uses the military regime's tactics of 'reductionism' and 'antagonism' (Dias *et al.*, 2021) to criminalise the underprivileged and mobilise millions of Brazilians to support the systematic rollbacks to their civil rights. Brazilian democracy is, therefore, 'disjunctive' because the political system serves to restrict the equal distribution of citizenship rights (Caldeira; Holston, 1999, p. 694). The discourse of today's 'nostalgic' right is not only rhetorically similar to that of the military regime (Payne; de Souza Santos, 2020, p. 33). It serves a shared objective of perpetuating a longstanding political and socio-economic system that benefits the elites.

Order versus chaos

Populist far-right politicians and their civil supporters, also, glorify authoritarianism as a source of order and demonise leftist or progressive resistance for creating chaos (Alencar, 2012, p. 37). Many cross-temporal parallels can be drawn between the civil mobilisations of conservatives against Brazil's last democratically elected president before the dictatorship, João Goulart,¹² in 1964, and those against President Rousseff in 2013 and 2015. However, before comparing these two historical moments, I must highlight some dissimilarities. While the military ousted Goulart, Rousseff was removed through impeachment, although Rousseff and her sympathisers did call it a coup (Snider, 2018, p. 65). Rousseff's opponents also held the president directly accountable for numerous grievances including corruption, poor public services, and expenditure on sporting mega-events. There are, however, some parallels between the anti-Goulart and anti-Rousseff mobilisations including economic decline and the involvement of Congress in the removal of democratically elected

¹² Goulart is best defined as a centrist, rather than a leftist, but he did advocate for the nationalisation of natural resources and agrarian reforms.

presidents (Snider, 2018, p. 64). Equally important were the mobilisations of conservative civil society groups seeking to overturn *chaotic* progressive governments and restore the capitalist status quo (Snider, 2018, p. 65). Some anti-Rousseff protesters framed their social mobilisations to align themselves with the 'repertoire' (Tilly, 1993) of anti-Goulart movements (Snider, 2018, p. 64). Leading up to Rousseff's impeachment, a group of protesters baptised themselves the *Marcha da Família* after the *Marcha da Família com Deus pela Liberdade*: a mobilisation of conservative women in São Paulo who called for military intervention in the lead-up to the dictatorship in 1964 (Snider, 2018). Although the 2013 and 2015 mobilisations did not culminate in a military coup, many conservatives did welcome an alternative form of military intervention through Bolsonaro's 2018 election campaign. 'Nostalgic', right-wing Brazilians looked to authoritarianism to restore the supposed social order and economic prosperity of the dictatorship (Payne; de Souza Santos, 2020, p. 33).

The hegemonic narrative that paints the dictatorship as a period of order and progress maintains several 'lingering antidemocratic tendencies' in today's society (Pagliarini, 2017, p. 764). Notably, Brazil's strong 'socially rooted authoritarianism' dictates that only an authoritarian state can maintain Brazil on the road towards 'progress' (Lecker, 2019, p. 255). Disappointed by the economic decline and rising crime rates since the democratic transition, many Brazilians doubt that democracy is the most legitimate form of government (Caldeira; Holston, 1999, p. 694; Power, 2016, p. 16). Despite the significant expansion of suffrage since the transition, only 21% of civilians were satisfied with democracy in 2020¹³ (Power, 2016, pp. 19-20; Latinobarómetro, 2021, p. 39). In 2016, millions of Brazilians willingly supported the impeachment of their democratically elected president provided that order and progress were seemingly threatened. Moreover, 'chaos' functions as a social construct that legitimises the elite's hegemony and the exclusion of 'undesirable' Brazilians from power (Zaverucha, 2010, p. 59). 'Undesirable' applies to anybody who challenges the status quo: from dictatorship-era leftists to poor Afro-Brazilians today (Weichert, 2021). The

¹³ Brazil falls below the regional average of 25% (Latinobarómetro, 2021, p.39).

order/chaos rhetoric hinders the democratic quality of Brazilian politics by turning civilians against structural changes that could lead to a more inclusive or participatory political system.

Enduring military influence

I will now elaborate on how such far-right populist narratives serve to legitimise the military's enduring influence on Brazilian politics. I will explain how this exerts a predominantly antidemocratic influence on Brazil's political system. For the purposes of this paper, I use the word 'military' as an umbrella term encompassing the Armed Forces and the Military Police.

Military influence from Cardoso to Rousseff

I argue that the military has a much stronger lingering antidemocratic influence on Brazilian political institutions today than Hunter (1995, p. 425) had foreseen based on her evidence that continues to mid-1993. Hunter (1995) posits that although the military retained much of its power during the democratic transition, its influence has since been progressively reduced by democratically elected politicians (Hunter, 1995). She contends that politicians are rational actors who willingly confront the military if it increases their chances of electoral success (Hunter, 1995, p. 427-428). Hunter's argument fits her time of writing at the beginning of Cardoso's government which attempted to dismantle some of the remaining laws of the military regime. Notably, Cardoso exempted murder from Decree Law 1,001 of 1969 which allowed all crimes committed by the military to be investigated by the military justice system (Caldeira; Holston, 1999, p. 701). However, manslaughter can still be trialled in military courts and often military sympathisers classify the crimes (Caldeira; Holston, 1999).

The piecemeal changes that Hunter (1995) advocates can only go so far in chipping away the military's influence. Eventually, it may well be necessary to rewrite the entire institutional structure engineered by the military regime to maintain its post-transitional political influence. Brazil's 1988 Constitution remains today and is heavily criticised for upholding the majority of the dictatorship's authoritarian structures concerning the Armed Forces, Military Police, and public security (Zaverucha, 2010, p. 54). The National Truth Commission recommended that Rousseff's government disband the Military Police and limit the military justice system to war crimes (2014, p. 971). Though Rousseff's government was keen to uncover the truth behind the crimes of the past, it showed a lack of political will to implement the recommended structural changes that would prevent other forms of human rights violations in the future (Almeida, 2019, p. 253). Hunter's (1995) argument- that politicians will confront the military if it increases their electoral chances - therefore needs to be revised. The scholar's thesis functions based on two factors: i) there is a discrepancy between popular and military interests and ii) there are considerable civilian challenges to the military's influence (Hunter, 1995, pp. 430-436). However, almost thirty years after Hunter's (1995) thesis, the Brazilian military remains one of the institutions with the highest levels of popular backing (Power, 2016, p. 16). In light of Rousseff's administration, Hunter's (1995) argument holds that politicians are rational choice actors. However, inversely to Hunter's (1995) thesis, Rousseff's rational choice led her to *avoid* confronting the military as this would *hinder* her election chances.

The military acts as a powerful 'veto player' (Lessa *et al.*, 2014) which blocks state initiatives to investigate the systematic human rights violations perpetrated by the military regime (Power, 2016, p. 22). This impedes the quality of Brazilian democracy because the political system does not work to fully restore the civil rights of dictatorship victims and their families. Furthermore, the exceptional popular support for the Armed Forces and Military Police in Brazil is partially maintained through hegemonic dictatorship narratives that protect the military's impunity and legitimacy (Power, 2016, p. 16). The Armed Forces and Military Police use the right-wing hegemonic narrative of the dictatorship to depict

themselves as guardians of security and rights today and maintain popular support (Junge, 2019, p. 922). Such discourse creates a smokescreen of impunity, allowing the Military Police to continue to commit the same dictatorship-era acts of violence but on a much higher scale (National Truth Commission, 2014, p. 964; Caldeira; Holston, 1999, p. 695). This exerts an antidemocratic influence on Brazilian politics because state security forces are not held accountable to the rule of law. Using data from Latinobarómetro, Harig (2021, pp. 5-6) finds that almost 50 per cent of civilian respondents strongly agree that Brazil's military should be involved in fighting violence and crime. For conservative citizens and Brazilians, the 'war on drugs' is a legitimate premise for extralegal police violence in the favelas. Police violence, disproportionately targeted towards young Afro-Brazilians from the working class, subverts the universality of citizenship rights and the right to due process, weakening Brazil's post-transitional democracy (Holston; Caldeira, 1999).

Military influence under Bolsonaro

At least Cardoso, Lula, and Rousseff made symbolic efforts to nuance hegemonic narratives and incite discussions about the military's political role. Contrastingly, Bolsonaro increased the military's influence and strengthened its impunity. In light of the developments of Bolsonaro's former presidency, Hunter's (1995) thesis needs to be revised. Hunter refers to politicians who negotiate with the military, such as Cardoso, Lula, and Rousseff. However, Bolsonaro brings a new type of political actor into Hunter's (1995) conceptualisation since he is both a former army captain *and* a politician. Rather than comparing Bolsonaro to previous presidents, Hunter and Diego Vega (2021) use the recent framework of global right-wing populism to understand Bolsonaro's relationship with the military. A populist with practically no party base, Bolsonaro established a 'mutually beneficial alliance' with the military (Hunter; Vega, 2021, p. 2). He granted the military political influence in return for its

political backing and appointed a higher number of military members to top government positions than during the dictatorship (Hunter; Vegas, 2021, pp. 1-2). Bolsonaro's government abounded with 'veto players' (Lessa *et al.*, 2014) who helped him to dismantle the advances towards truth and justice initiated by Rousseff (Snider, 2020).

Bolsonaro leveraged the hegemonic narrative of the military regime to threaten his opponents. Notably, he employed the 1969 National Security Law - an authoritarian pillar of the dictatorship - to legally accuse his critics of threatening national security¹⁴ (Andrade, 2021). By stirring up collective memories of political repression under the dictatorship, Bolsonaro silenced the political opposition, some of whom were victims of the military regime. A president who disregards the rule of law and censors electoral competition clearly holds an antidemocratic influence over Brazilian politics.

However, Hunter (1995, p. 430) stresses that a powerful military may threaten the president's autonomy and capacity to implement policies in Brazil. In this regard, Hunter and Vega (2021) find that Hunter's (1995) conclusions hold under the Bolsonaro administration. The President's public support plummeted in 2021, as millions of Brazilians denounced his disastrous COVID-19 response as 'genocide'. Forced to implement Bolsonaro's anti-scientific approach, former Health Minister General Eduardo Pazuello came under congressional investigation for the COVID-19 debacle (Hunter; Vega, 2021, p. 12). This sparked conflict between Bolsonaro and the Brazilian Army, which has since distanced itself from the former president to protect its public image (Hunter; Vega, 2021, p. 13). Perhaps the dictatorship's memory played a role as the Army was determined not to be accused of another *genocide*. The legacy of the dictatorship has potentially exerted a democratic influence on politics by having dissuaded the military from blindly following Bolsonaro's authoritarian orders.

¹⁴ The Senate revoked the law on 10 August 2021.

Innovative civilian actors

I previously demonstrated how the authoritarian right and, to some extent, the military propagate hegemonic narratives from the dictatorship era. I argued that this exerts an overwhelmingly antidemocratic influence on post-transitional Brazilian politics. However, the obstacles to challenging impunity at the state level have pushed Brazil's civilian activists to conceive their own innovative approaches to memory. I will contend that these grassroots memory initiatives exercise a profoundly democratic influence on Brazilian politics.

Although Brazil's democratic transition was undeniably controlled by the military regime (Mainwaring, 1986), this institutional narrative cannot overshadow the role of civilians who pushed for democracy and human rights from below. The denial of rights by the dictatorship (Cornwall; Shankland, 2013, p. 311) and the power of 'veto players' (Lessa *et al.*, 2014) after the democratic transition drove Brazilians to take matters into their own hands. Instigated by the Catholic Church, the *Brasil Nunca Mais* (Arns, 1985) report collated accounts of state torture. The publication was widely circulated among civil society and incited debate surrounding human rights violations under the dictatorship to such an extent that some consider it to be Brazil's first truth commission (Schneider, 2019, p. 8). The unique experience and know-how acquired by civilian groups became a source of authority. Notably, Brazil's 2012-2014 National Truth Commission was distinctive because it coexisted alongside local truth commissions that complemented and challenged the national report (Schneider, 2019, p. 7). Civilians did not merely pass the reigns of memory over to their elected representatives in Brasilia. They directly held the state accountable for restoring the rule of law and equal citizenship rights. This grassroots approach to rewriting memory had a positive effect on Brazilian politics because it served as a model for participatory democracy.

Victims and dictatorship-era civil activists also pioneered a culture for social movements after the democratic transition (Paiva, 2019, p. 49). Notably,

O Grupo Tortura Nunca Mais (OGTNM) was formed in 1985 by ex-political prisoners and the families of the dead and the disappeared. Nearly four decades later, the movement has broadened its commitment to fighting all types of human rights violations on an international scale (OGTNM, s.d.). Such movements built broad social networks with trade unionists, student movements, and political activists, inspiring post-transitional movements with their 'repertoire' (Tilly, 1993) of dictatorship-era activism (Power, 2016, pp. 23-24). For instance, demonstrators against Michel Temer's 2016-2018 interim presidency employed the name of the 1983-1984 *Diretas Já* movement - a civilian movement that called for direct elections during the military regime - as their battle cry (Snider, 2018, p. 65). As such, they drew a line between the impeachment of democratically elected President Rousseff and the suspension of direct elections under the dictatorship. By surfacing the memory of dictatorship-era activism, anti-Temer protesters mobilised Brazilians to defend the political rights for which their predecessors had fought.

Following the dictatorship's victims and their families, several recent social movements have resumed the fight for truth and accountability. Curiously, many contemporary activists were not directly affected by the dictatorship and some were even born into democracy. This illustrates the strength of the dictatorship's 'postmemory' which is transmitted through stories and cultural relics among Brazilian civil society (Hirsch, 2012). The *Cordão da Mentira* (CDM) movement is composed of thirty groups of activists, samba dancers, and actors from São Paulo who aim to carnivalize the dictatorship (CDM, s.d.; Pagliarini, 2017, p. 764). They rewrite the hegemonic narratives that have been transmitted and disseminated in textbooks by right-wing ideologues claiming the military regime was an *isolated* period during which the state committed occasional excesses of repression against civilians (National Truth Commission, 2014, p. 963). Instead, CDM's street performances tie the dictatorship to an extended trajectory of genocide committed by the Brazilian state (CDM, 2013). CDM uses the memory of the dictatorship in a democratising way by empowering Brazilians

to reclaim the streets and demand their citizenship rights: ‘the streets are for fighting’¹⁵ (CDM, 2013, own translation).



Figure Two: CDM protest in 2017 by Sato do Brasil/ Jornalistas Livres. The sign reads: ‘Brazil is the country where there are the most killings in the world. More than half of homicides target young people between 15 and 29 years old, 77% of whom are Black.’

These demonstrations invert the authority of the military regime and post-transitional state to silence ‘subaltern’ (Gramsci, 1948) voices through repression. Unlike protesters from the ‘nostalgic’ right, CDM and their counterparts do not take to the streets because they are disheartened with democracy (Payne; de Souza Santos, 2020, p. 33). Rather, they concord with Caldeira and Holston (1999) that the type of political democracy established during the democratic transition is a false promise. The activists demand a *developed*, rather than ‘disjunctive’ (Caldeira; Holston 1999), democracy that guarantees universal citizenship rights, the rule of law, and an end to extralegal violence perpetrated by state security forces. Such activism exerts a democratising effect on Brazilian politics by nurturing democratic consciousness among Brazilians and encouraging them to claim their ‘right to have rights’ (Arendt, 1951, p. 388).

¹⁵ ‘As ruas são para lutar’.



Figure Three: photo of CDM protest in 2017 by Roberto Brilhante. Samba dancers wore masks representing the continued state of terror of exception and proclaimed that 'it's 2014, but it could be 1964'.

Concluding remarks

Brazil's 1985 transition was not a simple switch from dictatorship to democracy. The memory of the dictatorship continues to influence just how far Brazilian politics can be called *democratic* today. However, the memory of authoritarian rule does not exert an inherently antidemocratic influence on Brazil's post-transitional politics. Rather, memory is a tool harnessed by various political actors to inhibit or enhance democracy, depending on their objectives. Through the education system and the media, right-wing ideologues uphold and normalise the legitimising dictatorship narratives written by the perpetrators (Paiva, 2019, p. 44). Far-right populist politicians and their civilian supporters have integrated these narratives into their political rhetoric: glorifying authoritarianism as a source of security and order and demonising leftist or progressive forces as chaotic and terrorist/criminal. These narratives perpetuate the military's popular support and impunity and maintain the 'socially rooted authoritarianism' across Brazilian civil society (Lecker, 2019, p. 255). For many

Brazilians, the dictatorship's memory is not a source of pain but rather a source of nostalgia. This nostalgia led them to elect a military president who disregarded the rule of law and advocated for the systematic denial of civil rights.

Notwithstanding, the Brazilian state's complicated relationship with its past has driven some civilian activists to innovate ways of rewriting history to denounce the authoritarian reality of the dictatorship. Demonstrators use their pluralist understanding of memory as a tool through which to promote public participation, the rule of law, and equal citizenship rights. By tracing the links between the dictatorship and today's 'disjunctive democracy', memory activists encourage society to reimagine a holistic system that exceeds the boundaries of political democracy (Caldeira; Holston, 1999).

To conclude, the Brazilian state is often outcast for being a regional memory outlier. Brazil's latent and piecemeal memory initiatives are often benchmarked against those of its neighbours. In particular, the Brazilian experience is dichotomised with Argentina's human rights journey from a 'pariah state' to a 'global protagonist' (Sikkink, 2008). However, Brazil's outlier experience can teach the region something valuable. Innovative civil activists from Brazil demonstrate that the initiative for meaningful memory projects does not need to come from political institutions. The independence of Brazilian civil activists from the state offers them a wider perspective. The dictatorship's memory thus becomes a looking glass through which to reconsider what politics could mean under democracy.

Acknowledgements

I appreciate the guidance from Dr Andreza de Souza Santos (King's College London, formerly University of Oxford) on an earlier draft of this manuscript and the suggestions from my former colleagues during the editing process. Thank you to the Canning Club for granting me the 2021-2022 William de Segundo Scholarship.

References

ALENCAR, J. F. **A Ditadura Continuada: Fatos, Factoides e Partidarismo Da Imprensa Na Eleição De Dilma Rousseff**. São Paulo: Paulus, 2012.

ALMEIDA, G. L. 'Nunca Mais': Lessons from Brazil's Dictatorial Past. SCHNEIDER, N. **The Brazilian Truth Commission: local, national and global perspectives**. New York: Berghahn Books, 2019, pp. 243-265.

ANDERSON, B. **Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism**. Rev. ed. London, New York: Verso, 1983.

ANDRADE, M. Dozens subpoenaed under Brazil's "national security" law for calling Bolsonaro "genocidal". **World Socialist Web Site** (2021). Disponível em: <<https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2021/03/30/bols-m30.html>>.

ARENDT, H. **The Origins of Totalitarianism**. [Kindle e-book]. London: Penguin, 1951.

ARIAS, E. D.; GOLDSTEIN, D. M. Violent Pluralism: Understanding the New Democracies of Latin America. ARIAS, E. D.; GOLDSTEIN, D. M. **Violent Democracies in Latin America**. Durham, London: Duke University Press, 2010, pp. 1-34.

ARNS, P. E. **Brasil: Nunca Mais**. Petrópolis: Vozes, 1985.

BAUER, C. S. La dictadura cívico-militar brasileña en los discursos de Jair Bolsonaro: usos del pasado y negacionismo. **Relaciones Internacionales**, v. 28, n. 57 (2019), pp. 37-51.

BOLLEN, K. A. Liberal Democracy Series I, 1972-1988. Definition, measurement, and trajectories. **Electoral Studies**, v. 28, n. 3 (2009), pp. 368-374.

BRASIL. **Lei nº 6.683, de 28 de agosto de 1979**. Concede anistia e dá outras providências (1979). Disponível em: <http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/l6683.htm>.

BRASIL. **Lei nº 9.140, de 04 de dezembro de 1995**. Reconhece como mortas pessoas desaparecidas em razão de participação, ou acusação de participação, em atividades políticas, no período de 2 de setembro de 1961 a 15 de agosto de 1979, e dá outras providências. (1995). Disponível em: <http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/l9140compilada.htm>.

CALDEIRA, T. P. R.; HOLSTON, J. Democracy and Violence in Brazil. **Comparative studies in society and history**, v. 41, n. 4 (1999), pp. 691-729.

CARDOSO, D. Conselho deve livrar Bolsonaro de cassação: Colegiado adia para hoje votação de processo sobre voto de parlamentar dedicado a Ulstra.

Estado de São Paulo (2016). Disponível em: <<https://www2.senado.leg.br/bdsf/bitstream/handle/id/527856/noticia.html?sequence=1&isAllo>>.

CDM. **Cordão da mentira.** (s.d.) Disponível em: <<https://cordaodamentira.milharal.org/>>.

CDM. Desfil&scracho 2: Quando vai acabar o genocídio popular? **Cordão da Mentira** (2013). Disponível em: <<https://cordaodamentira.milharal.org/2o-desfile-quando-vai-acabar-o-genocidio-popular/manifesto/>>.

COLETTA, R. D. Bolsonaro se refere a aniversário do golpe de 64 como 'dia da liberdade'. **Folha de São Paulo** (2020). Disponível em: <<https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2020/03/bolsonaro-se-refere-a-aniversario-do-golpe-de-64-como-dia-da-liberdade.shtml>>.

COMUNICACIÓN MADRES. Evel 'Beba' De Petrini: "Con Los 30.000 Como Bandera Volveremos A Ser Un Pueblo Con Esperanza, Trabajo, Amor Y Respeto Por El Otro". **Asociación Madres de Plaza de Mayo** (2019). Disponível em: <<https://madres.org/index.php/evelbebede-petrini-con-los-30-000-como-bandera-volveremos-a-ser-un-pueblo-con-esperanza-trabajo-amor-y-respeto-por-el-otro/>>.

CONADEP. Report of Conadep (National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons) - 1984. **Nunca más (Never Again)** (1986). Disponível em: <http://www.desaparecidos.org/nuncamas/web/english/library/neveragain/neveragain_001.htm>.

CORNWALL, A.; SHANKLAND, A. Cultures of politics, spaces of power: Contextualizing Brazilian experiences of participation. **Journal of Political Power**, v. 6, n. 2 (2013), pp. 309-333.

DIAS, T. *et al.* Populist Framing Mechanisms and the Rise of Right-wing Activism in Brazil. **Latin American Politics and Society**, v. 63, n. 3 (2021), pp. 69-92.

DINGES, J. **The Condor Years: How Pinochet and his allies brought terrorism to three continents.** New York, London: New Press, 2004.

ERLL, A. Cultural Memory Studies: An Introduction. ERLL, A.; NÜNNING, A. **A Companion to Cultural Memory Studies.** Berlin, New York: De Gruyter, 2008, pp. 1-15.

GLOBO, O. **Apoio editorial ao golpe de 64 foi um erro** (2013). Disponível em: <<https://oglobo.globo.com/politica/apoio-editorial-ao-golpe-de-64-foi-um-erro-9771604>>.

GRAMSCI, A. **Selections from the prison notebooks of Antonio Gramsci.** New York: International, 1948.

HALBWACHS, M. **La mémoire collective**. 2. ed. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1950.

HARIG, C. Militarisation by Popular Demand? Explaining the Politics of Internal Military Roles in Brazil. **Bulletin of Latin American Research** (2021). Disponível em: <<https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/blar.13289>>.

HARMER, T. Brazil's Cold War in the Southern Cone, 1970-1975. **Cold War History**, v. 12, n. 4 (2012), pp. 659-681.

HIRSCH, M. **The Generation of postmemory**: writing and visual culture after the Holocaust. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012.

HUNTER, W. Politicians against Soldiers: Contesting the Military in Postauthorization Brazil. **Comparative Politics**, v. 27, n. 4 (1995), pp. 425-443.

HUNTER, W.; VEGA, D. Populism and the military: symbiosis and tension in Bolsonaro's Brazil. **Democratization**, v. 29, n. 2 (2022), pp. 337-359. Disponível em: <<https://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080%2F13510347.2021.1956466>>.

IACHR. **Case of Gomes Lund Et Al. ("Guerrilha do Araguaia") V. Brazil** (2010). Disponível em: <https://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_219_ing.pdf>.

JEANTET, D. Brazil education overhaul aims at ousting 'Marxist ideology'. **AP** (2019). Disponível em: <<https://apnews.com/article/0fb07d84d14c4d948f7028907c60f23f>>.

JUNGE, B. "Our Brazil Has Become a Mess": Nostalgic Narratives of Disorder and Disinterest as a "Once-Rising Poor" Family from Recife, Brazil, Anticipates the 2018 Elections. **Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Anthropology**, v. 24, n. 4 (2019), pp. 914-931.

KLEIN, H. S.; LUNA, F. V. **Brazil, 1964-1985**: The Military Regimes of Latin America in the Cold War. [Kindle e-book]. New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 2017.

LATINOBARÓMETRO. **Informe 2021**. Santiago: Corporación Latinobarómetro, 2021. Disponível em: <<https://www.latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp>>.

LESSA, F. **Memory and transitional justice in Argentina and Uruguay**: against impunity. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.

_____. Operation Condor on trial: Justice for transnational human rights crimes in South America. **Journal of Latin American Studies**, v. 51, n. 2 (2018), pp. 409-439.

_____. **The Condor Trials: Transnational Repression and Human Rights in South America**. London: Yale University Press, 2022.

_____; PAYNE, L. A. Introduction. LESSA, F.; PAYNE, L. A. **Amnesty in the Age of Human Rights Accountability**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 1-16.

_____. *et al.* Overcoming Impunity: Pathways to Accountability in Latin America. **The International Journal of Transitional Justice**, v. 8, n. 1 (2014), pp. 75-98.

MAINWARING, S. The Transition to Democracy in Brazil. **Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs**, n. 28, n. 1 (1986), pp. 149-179.

MERGULHÃO, A.; CASTRO, R. Oito vezes em que Bolsonaro defendeu o golpe de 64. **O Globo** (2021). Disponível em: <<https://oglobo.globo.com/epoca/brasil/oito-vezes-em-que-bolsonaro-defendeu-golpe-de-64-24949762>>.

MURAKAWA, F.; ARAÚJO, C. Véléz quer alterar livros didáticos para "resgatar visão" sobre golpe. **Valor Econômico** (2019). Disponível em: <<https://valor.globo.com/politica/noticia/2019/04/03/velez-quer-alterar-livros-didaticos-para-resgatar-visao-sobre-golpe.ghtml>>.

NATIONAL TRUTH COMMISSION. **Relatório da Comissão Nacional da Verdade**. Volume III. São Paulo: Comissão Nacional da Verdade, 2014. Disponível em: <http://cnv.memoriasreveladas.gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=571>.

O'DONNELL, G. On the state, democratization and some conceptual problems: A Latin American view with glances at some postcommunist countries. **World Development**, v. 21, n. 8 (1993), pp. 1355-369.

ODILLA, F. Memória Da Ditadura: Aos 19, 20 anos, achava que eu estava salvando o mundo. **Folha de São Paulo** (2009). Disponível em: <<https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/brasil/fc0504200908.htm>>.

OGTNM. Quem Somos. **Grupo Tortura Nunca Mais/RJ** (s.d.). Disponível em: <<https://www.torturanuncamais-rj.org.br/quem-somos/>>.

OLIVEIRA, D. B.; REIS, U. L. S. A teoria dos dois demônios: resistências ao processo brasileiro de justiça de transição. **Revista Direito e Praxis**, v. 12, n. 1 (2020), pp. 49-76.

PACHANO, S.; ANSELMINI, M. Quality of democracy in Latin America. **Partecipazione e Conflitto - The Open Journal of Sociopolitical Studies**, v. 10, n. 1 (2017), pp. 1-7.

PAGLIARINI, A. "De onde? Para onde?" The Continuity Question and the Debate over Brazil's "Civil" - Military Dictatorship. **Latin American Research Review**, v. 52, n. 5 (2017), pp. 760-774.

PAIVA, V. A Never-Delivered Speech and a Never-Ending Story. SCHNEIDER, N. **The Brazilian Truth Commission: local, national and global perspectives**. New York: Berghahn Books, 2019, pp. 37-57.

PAYNE, L. A.; SANTOS, A. A. S. The Right-Wing Backlash in Brazil and Beyond. **Politics and Gender**, v. 16, n. 1 (2020), pp. 32-38.

PEREIRA, A. **Political (In)justice: Authoritarianism and the Rule of Law in Brazil, Chile and Argentina**. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005.

PEREIRA, A.; UNGAR, M. The Persistence of the "Mano Dura": Authoritarian Legacies and Policing in Brazil and the Southern Cone. **LAS Congress**, 2004. Disponível em: <https://biblioteca.cejamericas.org/bitstream/handle/2015/3596/UngarMark_xCD.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.

POWER, T. The Brazilian Military Regime of 1964-1985: Legacies for Contemporary Democracy. **Iberoamerica**, v. 16, n. 62 (2016), pp. 13-26.

RAMOS, P. C.; VÖLKER, S. Police Violence Against Black People Is on the Rise in Brazil. **GIGA Focus Latin America**, n. 5 (2020), pp. 1-11.

RETTIG COMMISSION. **Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation**. 2000 edition. Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991. Disponível em: <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/collections/truth_commissions/Chile90-Report/Chile90-Report.pdf>.

RIDENTI, M. *et al.* The Debate over Military (or Civilian-Military?) Dictatorship in Brazil in Historiographical Context. **Bulletin Of Latin American Research**, v. 37, n. 1 (2018), pp. 33-42.

SCHNEIDER, N. Introduction. SCHNEIDER, N. **The Brazilian Truth Commission: Local, National and Global Perspectives**. New York: Berghahn Books, 2019, pp. 1-36.

SIKKINK, K. From Pariah State to Global Protagonist: Argentina and the Struggle for International Human Rights. **Latin American Politics and Society**, v. 50, n. 1 (2008), pp. 1-29.

SNIDER, C. M. "The Perfection of Democracy Cannot Dispense with Dealing with the Past": Dictatorship, Memory, and the Politics of the Present in Brazil. **The Latin Americanist**, v. 62, n. 1 (2018), pp. 55-79.

SNIDER, N. Bolsonaro in Power: Failed Memory Politics in Post-Authoritarian Brazil? **Modern Languages Open**, v. 0, n. 1 (2020), pp. 1-11.

TELES, J. de A. Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Human Rights and the Legacy of the Brazilian Dictatorship. SCHNEIDER, N. **The Brazilian Truth Commission: local, national and global perspectives**. New York: Berghahn Books, 2019, pp. 86-110.

TILLY, C. Contentious Repertoires in Great Britain, 1758-1834. **Social Science History**, v. 17, n. 2 (1993), pp. 253-280.

WEICHERT, M. A. Systematic Recurrence of Murders and Disappearances in Democratic Brazil. ANSOLABEHERE, K.; PAYNE, L. A.; FREY, B. **Disappearances in the Post-transition Era in Latin America**. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021, pp. 148-159.

ZAVERUCHA, J. Relações civil-militares: o legado autoritário da constituição brasileira de 1988. TELES, E.; SAFATLE, V. **O que resta da ditadura: A exceção brasileira**. [Kindle e-book]. São Paulo: Boitempo Editorial, 2010, pp.50-97.